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WHAT'S BUGGING YOU? INCONSISTENCIES AND
IRRATIONALITIES OF THE LAW
OF EAVESDROPPING
Carol M. Bast*
INTRODUCTION
Even though you may least expect it, someone may be taping what
you say. Little did Michael LaSane, a seventeen year old murder sus-
pect, expect that the murder victim would secretly tape record forty-
six minutes of their conversation.' The mini-cassette was found in
Kathleen Weinstein's pocket after she was murdered on March 14,
1996.2 The forty-five year old teacher apparently recorded part of the
conversation on the first side of the tape, turned the tape over, and
recorded twenty-three more minutes on the second side. 3 Initially, in-
vestigators listened to the first side of the tape which ended in an eight
minute lapse.4 An expert later found the additional twenty-three min-
utes on the second side. 5
The Weinstein tape led police to LaSane. 6 LaSane had Weinstein's
car keys and her 1995 Toyota Camry was parked outside his apart-
ment; he allegedly murdered Weinstein and took her car to celebrate
his seventeenth birthday the following day. 7 The second side of the
tape gave the police the alleged murderer's first name and age as well
as other personal information which helped the prosecution's case. 8
Weinstein legally taped the conversation; New Jersey is one of a ma-
jority of states which allows a conversation to be taped with the con-
* Carol M. Bast is an associate professor of legal studies in the Department of Criminal
Justice and Legal Studies at the University of Central Florida.
1. William K. Heine & Maria M. Perotin, Additional 23 Minutes of Tape: Teacher's Courage
Praised "Extraordinary" Act Before Dying, RECORD, Mar. 28, 1996, at A01, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Njrec File.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Robert Rudolph, Slain Teacher Recorded on Tape's 2d Side; Cops Uncover 22 Minutes More
of Woman's Pleas, STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 27, 1996, at 001, available in 1996 WL 7927006; Malcolm
Gladwell, Slain Teacher Left Final Lesson in Kindness, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1996, at A01. For
further discussion of the incident, see infra note 217 and accompanying text, and note 291.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
sent of only one participant. 9 If the events had happened in any of a
dozen other states, the taping would have been illegal and inadmissi-
ble.10 A dozen states require all parties to consent to tape recording
an oral conversation."1
The fact pattern of a murder victim recording the victim's own mur-
der is not so unusual as it may seem. In 1982, a Florida business man,
Michael Anthony Phillips, taped his conversation with his business as-
sociate, Anthony Paul Inciarrano, in Phillips's office.1 2 The tape con-
tained their conversation, the sounds of a gun firing and Phillips
groaning and falling to the floor.13 The tape was the only evidence
against Inciarrano. 14 Although Inciarrano acknowledged it was his
voice on the tape, he moved to suppress the tape because the taping
was illegal; Florida requires all parties to consent to the recording and
penalizes an unconsented-to recording as a third-degree felony. 15
A surreptitiously made tape was similarly important in a California
murder prosecution. In People v. Otto,16 a case before the California
Supreme Court, the prosecution unsuccessfully attempted to use tapes
made by the murder victim to prove spousal murder.17 Joe Otto re-
corded his younger wife, Brenda Sue's telephone conversations even
before they were married.' 8 When Brenda Sue found the telephone
answering machine that had been used to record her calls, she unplug-
ged it.' 9 She did not know that Joe was continuing to tape her calls by
using a voice activated tape recorder concealed underneath his daugh-
ter's bed.20 The recorder taped a conversation between Brenda Sue
and her lover planning Joe's murder.21 "Joe's concerns proved to be
well founded. Within 48 hours of the recorded conversation, he was
found dead-bludgeoned to death in his own home. '22
The court commented that the taped conversation "played a critical
role in the state's case against the defendants ... [and] provided the
9. See Appendix B.
10. See Appendix B.
11. See Appendix B.
12. Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 473 So. 2d 1272
(Fla. 1985).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id; see Appendix B.
16. 831 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).
17. Id. at 1195.
18. Id. at 1180.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1179.
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most dramatic and compelling evidence of guilt. ' 23 "The so-called
whispering tape provided tangible proof of an ongoing relationship
between defendants, and supported the prosecution's theory that de-
fendants were plotting Joe's murder at least several days prior to the
event. '24 Although the "tapes, in short, were the linchpin of the
state's case against the defendants," the court held the tapes inadmis-
sible because neither party had consented to the taping.25
Federal statutes and statutes in most states restrict eavesdropping
and wiretapping to safeguard the individual's privacy. 26 Although
common threads run through the federal and state statutes, the crazy-
quilt pattern of eavesdropping statutes is often inconsistent and irra-
tional. Part I of this Article discusses the major features of the federal
statutes. Part II describes state constitutional privacy provisions and
eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes. Part III discusses privacy in
relation to eavesdropping and wiretapping: What is it? Why is it im-
portant? How is it lost? Part IV describes the reasons for invading
privacy: curiosity, social control, and economic or social advantage.
Part V discusses the inconsistencies and irrationalities in the law of
eavesdropping. Federal and state statutes and state constitutional
provisions protect against private or governmental interception of oral
and wire communications. Except for all-party consent, this protec-
tion against third party monitoring and taping should be preserved. A
dozen states allow monitoring or taping of private conversations only
with all-party consent. This all-party consent requirement should be
eliminated because it provides unwarranted protection. Under fed-
eral and state statutes, a police officer or a police informant can con-
duct electronic surveillance without a threshold level of proof as is
required under the Fourth Amendment. The statutes should be
changed to allow such surveillance only upon some type of prior re-
view and authorization. Appendix A lists the citations of relevant
state constitutional provisions and state statutes together with the text
of state constitutional privacy provisions. Appendix B is a chart con-
taining information on relevant federal and state constitutional provi-
sions and statutes. Appendix C contains statutory language from
those states requiring all-party consent for taping.
23. Id. at 1195.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1196.
26. See Appendix A.
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I. FEDERAL STATUTES
Wiretapping of telephone conversations and electronic surveillance
of oral conversations were practiced prior to World War 1.27 Private
individuals and law enforcement officers, at both the federal and the
state levels, made extensive use of wiretapping and electronic surveil-
lance during the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, and most of the 1960s until
Congress passed legislation curtailing the practices in 1968.28
Wiretapping was sanctioned early by the United States Supreme
Court. In 1928, in Olmstead v. United States,29 the Court ruled that
wiretaps of telephones in the defendants' homes and offices did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because the wiretaps were completed
without any physical entry.30 Olmstead and a number of other de-
fendants were convicted under the National Prohibition Act of im-
porting, possessing, and selling alcoholic beverages. 31 The convictions
were based in large part on information obtained by tapping the home
telephones of four of the defendants and the telephone of the main
office of the business.32 The taps were made by inserting small wires
along the telephone lines.33 For the home telephones, the wires were
inserted in nearby streets and the business telephone was tapped in
the office building basement. 34 Eight telephones were tapped, at least
six prohibition agents listened to conversations on the tapped tele-
phones over a five-month period and took 775 typewritten pages of
notes. 35
United States Supreme Court cases from 1952 and 1963 also permit-
ted police informants to use electronic eavesdropping devices without
the consent of the suspects. In On Lee v. United States, 36 the 1952
decision, a police informant wore a hidden microphone which trans-
mitted two conversations with On Lee to a Narcotics Bureau agent
who monitored the conversations.37 Chin Poy, the police informant,
was "an old acquaintance and former employee" of On Lee.38 The
first of two conversations occurred in On Lee's laundry and the sec-
27. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 172 (1967).
28. Id. at 172-210; PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 8-9, 110-23 (1995).
29. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
30. Id. at 464-66.
31. Id. at 455.
32. Id. at 456.
33. Id. at 457.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 456-57, 471.
36. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
37. Id. at 749.
38. Id.
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ond occurred on a New York City sidewalk. 39 The agent who had
monitored the conversations testified at trial and On Lee was con-
victed of selling opium.40 The Court held that the use of the police
informant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 41 In Lopez v.
United States, 42 the 1963 decision, an Internal Revenue agent investi-
gated German S. Lopez for possible excise tax evasion at an inn which
Lopez operated.43 The agent had two conversations with Lopez, dur-
ing the second of which Lopez allegedly offered to bribe the agent.44
Prior to a third conversation with Lopez, the agent was instructed to
record the conversation on a hidden recorder worn by the agent.45
The recording of the third conversation was introduced into evidence
at trial and Lopez was convicted. 46 The Court held that Lopez' consti-
tutional rights had not been violated.47
The United States Supreme Court overruled Olmstead almost forty
years later in Katz v. United States.48 In Katz, FBI agents attached a
listening and recording device to the outside of a glass-paneled tele-
phone booth.49 The agents using the device overheard Katz' conver-
sation concerning interstate betting.50 Katz was convicted after his
end of the conversation was introduced as evidence at his trial. 51 The
Katz majority held that "[t]he Government's activities in electroni-
cally listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the pri-
vacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth
and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. ' 52 The Court discarded the trespass model em-
ployed in Olmstead, reasoning that:
[Tihe Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a per-
son knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or of-
fice, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.53
39. Id.
40. Id. at 750.
41. Id. at 751.
42. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
43. Id. at 429.
44. Id. at 430.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 432.
47. Id. at 440.
48. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
49. Id. at 348.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 353.
53. Id. at 351-52.
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Justice Harlan joined in the majority opinion and added a concurring
opinion which in later cases has eclipsed the majority opinion as pre-
cedent. In his concurrence, Justice Harlan included a "twofold re-
quirement" for constitutional protection of conversations. 54 The
requirement was "first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 5 5
In passing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
196856 [hereinafter the "1968 Act"], Congress responded to Katz and
attempted to prevent the interception of oral and wire conversations
without the consent of at least one party to the conversation. 57 The
definition of "oral communication" under the 1968 Act tracked Justice
Harlan's famous two-part definition of constitutionally protected con-
versations from his Katz concurrence. 58 The 1968 Act required a
court order to intercept a conversation without the consent of any of
the parties to the conversation. 59 Evidence obtained from unauthor-
ized interception was inadmissible in court.60 The 1968 Act also pro-
vided criminal penalties for its violation and authorized civil
damages. 61
The 1968 Act was amended twice, by the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act of 198662 [hereinafter the "1986 Act"] and by the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 199463
[hereinafter the "1994 Act"]. The 1986 Act was necessary to protect
electronic communications transmitted in digital form and not audible
by the human ear. The interception of cellular and cordless tele-
phones were also of great concern. The 1986 Act changed the scienter
54. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
55. Id.
56. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §2510 (1994)).
57. REGAN, supra note 28, at 9. Regan explains that Congress first began to discuss privacy
protection for communications in the 1920s, but it was not until 1968 that Congress outlawed
wiretapping and bugging. Id. at 8-9. "This law was passed largely in response to the Supreme
Court ruling in Katz v. United States and because of congressional interest in organized crime."
Id. (citations omitted). "It was not until the Katz decision ... ruling that wiretaps were prohib-
ited by the Fourth Amendment, that law enforcement officials had an incentive to compromise
with civil liberties groups in crafting legislation." Id. at 188.
58. Compare Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, with
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1852 (1986)
(codified at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
63. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat.
4279 (1994) (codified at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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requirement from "willful" to "intentional" in recognition of the fact
that someone using a radio scanner to receive public communications
might inadvertently tune in to a cellular telephone conversation.
64
The 1986 Act also provided a reduced penalty for interception of a
cellular telephone conversation. 65 Because of the ease of intercepting
cordless telephone conversations, the radio portion of cordless tele-
phone conversations was specifically excluded from protection as a
"wire communication." 66
With the 1994 Act, Congress recognized the wide-spread use of cor-
dless telephones and deleted the 1986 Act exception from protection
for cordless telephones. 67 The 1994 Act noted that:
The cordless phone, far from being a novelty item used only at
"poolside," has become ubiquitous.... More and more communica-
tions are being carried out by people [using cordless phones] in pri-
vate, in their homes and offices, with an expectation that such calls
are just like any other phone call.68
The specific provisions of the 1968 Act as amended by the 1986 Act
and the 1994 Act are hereinafter referred to as the "Federal Act."
The Federal Act prohibits the intentional interception or disclosure of
wire and oral communications, except for those specifically identi-
fied.69 Someone acting under color of law may intercept a communi-
cation if the "person is a party to the communication or one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such intercep-
64. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 101(f), 100 Stat.
1852.
65. Id. § 101 (d)(2).
66. Id. § 101 (a)(1)(D); H. REP. No. 99-647, at 2 (1986); S. REP. No. 99-541, at 12 (1986).
67. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 202(a)(1),
100 Stat. 4290.
68. H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 17 (1994).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1994). The first section of the Federal Act contains the following
definitions for "wire communication," "oral communication," and "intercept:"
"[W]ire communication" means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the
use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or
other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including
the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person
engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or
foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce
and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication;
"[O]ral communication" means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting
an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circum-
stances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic
communication;
"[I]ntercept" means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, elec-
tronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device.
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tion. ' '7° In the alternative, a law enforcement officer may obtain a
court order authorizing an interception concerning evidence of certain
enumerated offenses.71 Another exception material to this Article is
that for a private individual. Someone not acting under color of law
may intercept a communication if:
[T]he person is a party to the communication or where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such inter-
ception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States or of any State. 72
The penalty for a garden-variety wiretapping or eavesdropping is a
fine or not more than five years imprisonment, or both.73 The fine
range is from $1,000 to $10,000. 7 4 One who intercepts a cellular or
cordless telephone conversation may be fined up to $5,000.75 Any
communication intercepted in violation of the Federal Act is inadmis-
sible.76 The Federal Act also authorizes civil relief for a garden-vari-
ety wiretapping or eavesdropping, 77 including equitable or injunctive
relief,78 either actual damages or statutory damages of the greater of
70. Id. § 2511(2)(c).
71. Id. § 2510. The offenses for which a court order may be obtained are listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516. Although the listed offenses are quite numerous, authorization is restricted to those
enumerated. The procedure for obtaining the court order is specified in great detail in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518.
72. Id. § 2511(2)(d).
73. Id. § 2511(4)(a).
74. Section 2511(4)(a) specifies that the penalty is a fine or five years imprisonment or both
and the United States Sentencing Guidelines set the amount of the fine. Id. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL section 2H3.1(a) designates "Interception of Communications or Eaves-
dropping" as a level nine base offense. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2H3.1(a)
(1998). U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL section 5E1.2(c)(3) lists the minimum and max-
imum fine for each offense level. Id. § 5E1.2(c)(3). The fine is mandatory unless the defendant
is unable to pay. Id. § 5E1.2(a). The offense level is increased to 12, with a $3,000 to $30,000
fine, if "the purpose of the conduct was to obtain direct or indirect commercial advantage or
economic gain." Id. §§ 2H3.1(b)(1), 5E1.2(c)(3).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(b). Section 2511(4)(b) specifies that the penalty for the first offense
of intercepting the radio portion of a cellular or cordless telephone conversation is a fine so long
as the interception "is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage or private commercial gain" and the radio communication is not "scram-
bled" or "encrypted." Id. Because the only penalty authorized is a fine, the interception is an
"infraction." Id. § 3559(a)(9). The fine for an infraction is a maximum of $5,000. Id.
§ 3571(b)(7). However, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL section 1B1.9 states that the
sentencing guidelines do not apply to an infraction. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1B1.9 (1998); see infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2515.
77. Id. § 2520(a).
78. Id. § 2520(b)(1).
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$100 per day or $10,000, 7 9 punitive damages, 80 attorneys fees,8' and
costs.
8 2
The Federal Act preempts state wiretapping and eavesdropping
statutes. Thus, state statutes must protect the individual's privacy at
least as much as the Federal Act, but the states may provide more
protection.83 The Federal Act governs admissibility of intercepted
communications in a federal prosecution. Thus, tapes of intercepted
conversations are admissible in federal court if in compliance with the
Federal Act even if the tapes would have been inadmissible under
state wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes.84
A recurring question has been whether a government informant can
participate in a conversation while wearing a bug and either tape or
transmit the conversation. The United States Supreme Court has con-
sistently said that use of an informant does not violate the non-con-
senting participant's constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure.85 As described above, the Court reached that decision in
1952 and 1963.86 The Court again sanctioned the use of police infor-
mants in United States v. White,87 a plurality opinion from 1971.
In White, a police informant wore a hidden radio transmitter which
allowed government agents to monitor the informant's conversations
with James White. 88 Four conversations occurred in the informant's
home and three others occurred in various locations-one in White's
79. Id. § 2520(c)(1)(B).
80. Id. § 2520(b)(2).
81. Id. § 2520(b)(3).
82. Id.
83. United States v. Feiste, 792 F. Supp. 1153, 1154 (D. Neb. 1991), affd, 961 F.2d 1349 (8th
Cir. 1992); People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1992); People v. Stevens, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, 93,
95 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Rivers, 660 So. 2d 1360, 1362 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1019
(1996); State v. Neisler, 666 So. 2d 1064, 1066-67 (La. 1996); Mustafa v. State, 591 A.2d 481, 483
(Md. 1991); Commonwealth v. Birdseye, 670 A.2d 1124, 1126 (Pa. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2552 (1996). For example, in Rivers, the Florida Supreme Court held that a court order for
wiretapping to investigate prostitution, at least where no violence was involved, should not have
been granted; the Federal Act does not list prostitution as one of the enumerated offenses for
which a court order may be obtained. 660 So. 2d at 1363.
84. United States v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 986-87 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Adams, 694
F.2d 200, 201-02 (9th Cir. 1982); Roberts v. Americable Int'l Inc., 883 F. Supp. 499, 503-04 (E.D.
Cal. 1995); United States v. DiFelice, 837 F. Supp. 81, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In Difelice, the de-
fendant argued that the tape of his telephone conversation was inadmissible because it was taped
without his consent, and the applicable Massachusetts statute requires all party consent. Id. at
81. Nevertheless, the court found the tape to be admissible. Id. at 82; see also Pratt, 913 F.2d at
987 (arguing for the same application of Massachusetts law).
85. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747,
751 (1952).
86. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 440; On Lee, 343 U.S. at 751.
87. 401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971) (White, J., plurality).
88. Id. at 747.
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home, one in a restaurant, and one in the informant's car. 89 During
the conversations in the informant's home, one agent monitored the
conversations while hidden in a kitchen closet and another agent si-
multaneously monitored the conversations from outside the inform-
ant's home.90 The agents testified concerning the monitored
conversations at White's trial and White was convicted for illegal drug
transactions.91 The plurality opinion held that the electronic surveil-
lance used to monitor White's conversations did not violate his Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.92 The
opinion pointed out that a police informant may take notes of his con-
versations with a suspect and testify concerning the conversations. 93
The opinion reasoned that there is no constitutional difference be-
tween these activities and an informant either surreptitiously record-
ing the conversations or transmitting the conversations for agents to
monitor or record. 94 Thus, the "person acting under color of law" in
the Federal Act may be a government informant. Private party infor-
mants also qualify and were used in the first two examples in the fol-
lowing section.
In his dissent, Justice Douglas opined that the White investigation
would have been hampered very little by requiring the agents to ob-
tain warrants authorizing the electronic surveillance because all of the
conversations were pre-arranged. 95 In a separate dissent, Justice
Brennan stated: "The threads of thought running through our recent
decisions are that these extensive intrusions into privacy made by elec-
tronic surveillance make self-restraint by law enforcement officials an
inadequate protection, that the requirement of warrants under the
Fourth Amendment is essential to a free society."'96
A. Determining When the Federal Act Comes into Play
The frequency with which surreptitious taping occurs highlights the
importance of the Federal Act. The balance of Part I gives examples
of surreptitious taping. Some common reasons for taping include
gathering information for use in criminal prosecution, politics, and
employment law disputes.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 754.
93. Id. at 751.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 758 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 761-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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1. Criminal Prosecution
A company's profits may rely heavily on illegal agreements. An FBI
investigation of a company's illegal actions may use an employee to
intercept information. 97 The FBI investigation of Archer Daniels
Midland Co. ("ADM") is an example of one such investigation. In
October 1996, ADM, which advertises itself as "supermarket to the
world," pleaded guilty to fixing prices, to dividing up lysine and citric
acid markets, and agreed to pay a $100 million fine.98 The FBI gath-
ered information against ADM from secret tapes made by former
ADM executive, Mark Whitacre. 99
The FBI may also choose a local business person as an FBI in-
former to investigate bribery charges against government officials. In
1996, information gathered by Howard Gary, a Florida investment
banker, led to prosecution of a number of Miami and Dade County
government officials for bribery and corruption in Operation Green-
palm. 100 Gary agreed to become an FBI informant after he was
named as a suspect in a bribery scheme. 101 As an informant, Gary
surreptitiously taped a Miami Commissioner receiving $100,000 as a
kickback.' 02
2. Politics
Politics is rife with taping; politicians are either taping or being
taped. The taping occurs either with or without the consent of one
party to the conversation. Because of the possibility for blackmail or
embarrassment, the non-consenting party would probably not have
spoken freely knowing that he or she was being taped.
97. Lawyer: FBI Monitored Agent Pitts 6,000 Times, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 31, 1996, at A-
8. Similarly, an FBI agent may sell state secrets and the FBI may use secret taping to gather
information regarding the agent's treason. Id. An FBI agent, Earl Edwin Pitts, was arrested on
December 18, 1996 on charges that he sold United States's secret information to the former
Soviet Union for more than $224,000. Id. The FBI gathered information on Pitts by surrepti-
tiously taping or observing him almost 6,000 times. Id.
98. Suing FBI Mole Could Be Legal Blunder for ADM, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 18,1996, at
C-1, C-9.
99. Id. at C-1. Whitacre claims he was fired for being a mole for the FBI. Id. ADM has filed
suit against Whitacre claiming he embezzled approximately $9,000,000 and violated a confidenti-
ality agreement. Id.
100. Roger Roy, FBI Informant Work Casts Pall over Banker's Business, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Apr. 20, 1997, at B-1.
101. Id.
102. Id. Gary was never charged but has apparently lost some investment banking municipal
bond business. One official admitted hesitancy in working with Gary for fear that Gary was
continuing his work as an FBI informant. ld. at B-6. "In December, Gary was excluded from a
$450 million sewer and water bond issue after Metro-Dade commissioners said the 'shadow of
scandal' might frighten bond buyers away." Id.
1998]
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On December 21, 1996, United States House of Representatives
Speaker Newt Gingrich confessed to ethics violations.10 3 That same
day Gingrich's cellular telephone conversation with his lawyers and
Republican leaders was taped by the Martins, a Florida couple, who
intercepted it on their police scanner. 10 4 In the conversation, Gingrich
discussed a Republican counterattack to the ethics charges. 10 5 The
parties to the conference call conversation were "scattered across the
country."'01 6 The Martins delivered the tape to a Democratic con-
gressman, possibly Jim McDermott, a member of the House Ethics
Committee. 0 7 The congressman delivered the tape to The New York
Times, which published a transcript of the conversation on January 10,
1997.108 John Boehner, Republican Conference Chairman, who was a
party to the cellular telephone call claimed, "Democrats appear to
have committed a felony in order to perpetrate their attack on Newt
Gingrich."' 0 9 As a consequence, Gingrich barely won re-election as
House Speaker that week. Taping the cellular telephone conversation
violates federal law, as does disclosing information from an illegally
intercepted cellular telephone conversation. 10 On April 25, 1997, the
Martins pleaded guilty and each was fined $500.111 A Justice Depart-
103. GOP Urges Investigation After Gingrich Call Taped, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 11, 1997,
at A-11.
104. Florida Couple Fined for Taping Gingrich, ORLANDO SENrINEL, Apr. 26, 1997, at A-13.
105. GOP Urges Investigation, supra note 103, at A-11.
106. Cellular Phones Are Handy but Vulnerable, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 12, 1997, at
A01, available in 1997 WL 4132674.
107. Gingrich Hearings to Take Place Inauguration Weekend, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 13,
1997, at A-7.
108. GOP Urges Investigation, supra note 103, at A-11.
109. Gingrich Hearings, supra note 107, at A-7.
Another representative in Congress was earlier taped while conversing on a cellular tele-
phone. Blaine Hardin, Texas Legislator Was Burned by Cellular Phone Talk Before Gingrich,
WASH. POST, Jan, 15, 1997, at A04. In 1990 in Amarillo, former Texas representative Bill
Sarpalius made a cellular telephone call while golfing. Id. Sarpalius called a "cute" 20 year old
to make a date, suggesting a trip together to Cancun, Mexico and offering assistance in her job
search. Id. "Let me help you. I've got all kinds of contacts in the job I have." Id. The 75 year
old ham radio operator who intercepted the call received a $255 fine and 36 year-old Linus Lane
Baker who disclosed the tape to the media received a $250 fine. Id. Baker, now an attorney and
then a journalism student, did not suspect he was committing a crime. Id. "I thought, man, this
is great. I thought I would get a Pulitzer Prize off this stuff .... I figured that if somebody
recorded this, it was legal, right?" Id.
In the early 1990s, three aids to Virginia Senator Chuck Robb disclosed a tape of a 1988
cellular telephone call made by Virginia Governor Doug Wilder. Cellular Phones Are Handy,
supra note 106, at A01. At the time of the disclosure, Robb and Wilder were fierce political
rivals. Id. On the tape, Wilder discussed "published reports alleging Robb attended cocaine
parties." Id. The aids reached plea agreements. Id.
110. GOP Urges Investigation, supra note 103, at A-11.
111. Florida Couple Fined, supra note 104, at A-13.
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ment investigation concerning publication of the conversation in the
newspapers is continuing.112
Everyone knows that President Nixon taped conversations in the
oval office. In 1996, Nixon's estate ended the twenty-two year at-
tempt to keep the tapes in the National Archives a secret. 113 The
newly released tapes reveal information previously unknown to the
public. Over a year before his resignation, Nixon discussed resigning
but was dissuaded by Alexander Haig, his chief-of-staff.114 In Septem-
ber 1971, faced with re-election, Nixon requested that the Internal
Revenue Service audit tax returns of wealthy Jewish contributors to
Democratic candidates.11 5 In June 1971, Nixon ordered a break-in at
the Brookings Institute to discover what information the Institute had
obtained on the Vietnam War.116
3. Employment Law Disputes
Employees are demanding more rights in the workplace; a number
are suing to enforce their rights. Employee taping seems to be on the
rise and can be significant in employment discrimination and sexual
harassment cases where the crucial evidence is conversations between
an employee and a manager.11 7 Surreptitious taping may be on the
rise because lessening job security may also lessen employee trust, and
because new technology makes secret taping easier. 118
Some Texaco employees successfully used taped information to
prove federal employment discrimination claims.1 9 In 1994, six Afri-
can Americans sued Texaco Inc. alleging racial discrimination.12 0 The
discrimination lawsuit had languished for two and one-half years until
Richard Lundwall, former senior coordinator for personnel services in
the finance department, turned over tapes he had made of 1994 execu-
tive meetings to an attorney for the plaintiffs.' 2 ' The taping was not
112. Florida Couple Plead Guilty to Intercepting Gingrich Call, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 24,
1997, at A-6.
113. New Tapes Shed Light on Nixon, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 19, 1996, at A-9.
114. Id.
115. Tapes Reveal President Nixon Pushed for Tax Audits of Wealthy Jews Who Contributed to
Rivals, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 8, 1996, at A-18.
116. Nixon Ordered Break-In at Think Tank, Tapes Show, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 1996,
at A-16.
117. More Workers Turn to Taping/As Job Cuts Rise and Workplace Loyalty Falls, More Em-
ployees are Secretly Tape-Recording Meetings-and Using the Tapes in Court, ORLANDO SENTI-
NEL, Apr. 19, 1997, at C-9.
118. Id.
119. Suit Alleges Racist Actions by Texaco, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 1996, at B-2.
120. Id.
121. Texaco Settles Race-Bias Suit, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 17, 1996, at A-1.
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illegal because the meetings were taped in Harrison, NewYork, 122 and
New York allows taping with one-party consent. On the tapes, Texaco
executives discussed destroying evidence and referred to African
American workers as "black jelly beans."'1 23 One of the executives
joked that "all of the black jelly beans seem to be glued to the bottom
of the bag. ' 124 On November 15, 1996, soon after the tapes appeared,
Texaco settled the race discrimination lawsuit for $115 million in dam-
ages, pay raises of at least ten per cent to 1,400 African American
Texaco employees, and formation of an "equality and tolerance task
force" comprised of three Texaco Employees, three members chosen
by the plaintiffs, and a chair agreed to by Texaco and the plaintiffs.12 5
The task force is to evaluate employment practices. William Rasp-
berry, an African American columnist commented, "How much of a
fuss would the top people be making if the embarrassing behavior
could have been kept secret?" 126
An unanswered question is whether federal wiretapping statutes
cover e-mail and voice mail messages. Michael Huffcut was the re-
gional supervisor of a McDonald's in Elmira, New York.127 Rose Has-
set worked in a McDonald's 60 miles away in Binghamton, New
York.12 8 In the fall of 1993, Huffcut and Hasset allegedly left "amo-
rous" messages for each other on their voice mails at work.129 An-
other area supervisor allegedly transmitted the voice mail messages to
his employer, the operator of a number of McDonald's franchises.130
The supervisor, allegedly at the employer's direction, played a tape of
the voice mail messages for Huffcut's wife.13' McDonald's later fired
Michael Huffcut because the Huffcuts had filed a one million dollar
federal lawsuit against McDonald's Corp., the area supervisor, and the
employer claiming the taping of the voice mail violated their privacy
rights. 132 McDonald's and the employer claimed that business pur-
poses justified the monitoring. 133 The parties settled, but if the case
122. Id.; Suit Alleges Racist Actions, supra note 119, at B-2.
123. Suit Alleges Racist Actions, supra note 119, at B-2.
124. Texaco Settles, supra note 121, at A-4.
125. Id. at A-1.
126. William Raspberry, Texaco's Lesson: Executives-Not Policies-Set Tone, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Nov. 17, 1996, G-3.
127. Ben Dobbin, Federal Suit Questions Worker Privacy Rights, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1995, at
D7.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.; Voice Mail Settlement Avoids Issue, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 9, 1996, at C-10.
133. Is Voice Mail a Secure Line?, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8, 1995, at 14N; Voice Mail Settlement,
supra note 132, at C-10.
[Vol. 47:837
THE LAW OF EAVESDROPPING
had gone to trial, the central issue would have been whether e-mail is
protected under federal wiretapping statutes. 34
The Federal Act does not provide the only protection against sur-
reptitious taping of private conversations. As Part II discusses, state
constitutional provisions and state statutes also provide protection
against a law enforcement officer or a private individual secretly re-
cording private conversations.
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROVISIONS AND STATE
STATUTES
In addition to the Federal Act, state constitutional privacy provi-
sions and statutes place limits on eavesdropping and wiretapping in a
crazy-quilt pattern. The state constitutions of Alaska, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina,
and Washington contain privacy provisions; the New York Constitu-
tion prohibits unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph
communications; and the Florida Constitution prohibits unreasonable
interception of private communications. 135 State constitutions contain
search and seizure provisions substantively similar to the Fourth
Amendment. 136 Every state, except for Vermont, has some type of
eavesdropping or wiretapping statute, as does the District of Colum-
bia. 137 Appendix B lists states with constitutional privacy provisions
and eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes.
A. State Constitutional Provisions
How do state constitutional provisions apply to taping conversa-
tions and how do they differ from the state eavesdropping statutes?
Of the ten states with constitutional privacy provisions, reported deci-
sions of Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, and
Washington have considered one or both of these questions. 138 Mas-
134. Voice Mail Settlement, supra note 132, at C-10.
135. For the wording of those state constitutional provisions, see Appendix A.
136. For citations of those state constitutional provisions substantively similar to the Fourth
Amendment, see Appendix A.
137. For citations to those statutes, see Appendix A. More information on those statutes is
contained on the chart comprising Appendix B.
138. See infra notes 140-202, 236-52, 278-90 and accompanying text. For example, a 1975 Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decision presented a prima facie violation of the California constitutional
privacy provision by law enforcement officers. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 224 (Cal. 1975).
The White opinion began with the following two questions:
Do the state and federal constitutions permit police officers, posing as students, to en-
roll in a major university and engage in the covert practice of recording class discus-
sions, compiling police dossiers and filing 'intelligence' reports, so that the police have
'records' on the professors and students? Is this 'intelligence gathering' by the police
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sachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Vermont have considered
these questions while applying the state constitutional search and
seizure provisions. 139 What follows is a closer examination of these
state constitutional provisions.
1. Alaska
The Alaska statute requires only one party to consent to the inter-
ception of a communication. 140 However, in State v. Glass,14' the
Alaska Supreme Court construed the privacy provision of its constitu-
tion to prohibit "the secret electronic monitoring of conversations
upon the mere consent of a participant."14 2 In Glass, an informant
wearing a radio transmitter entered the Glass home to purchase her-
oin.143 Meanwhile, police officers outside the Glass home were moni-
toring and taping the conversation.14 4 The court decided that Alaska
could provide additional protection for conversations because the
Alaska Constitution contained a specific privacy provision. 45 The
court reasoned that "the transcendent values preserved by constitu-
tional guarantee are of greater societal moment than the use of that
evidence to obtain a criminal conviction.' 46 Were the court to allow
the Glass taping, law enforcement officers might also target and sur-
reptitiously record conversations of innocent individuals "who have
covering discussions in university classes and in public and private meetings of univer-
sity-sponsored organizations, constitutionally valid when such reports 'pertain to no
illegal activity or acts'?
Id. The California Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment sustaining the defendant's
demurrer and remanded the case for trial. Id. at 235. The court noted that privacy could yield to
a compelling government interest; however, assuming facts as stated in the complaint to be true,
the classes and organizational meetings involved no illegal activities. Id. at 234.
White was decided more that twenty years ago and concerned police informants listening and
taking notes rather than electronically intercepting or recording conversations. Id. at 224. Even
so, White may indicate that a California court would apply California's constitutional privacy
provision to prohibit law enforcement taping of conversations where law enforcement officers
are on a vague fishing expedition.
A related question is whether a student may secretly tape a class lecture. This author has not
found any case in which this issue was raised. One would guess that a court faced with this issue
might hold that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a classroom, either for the pro-
fessor or for the other students. In a more private setting, like a professor's office, and where
fewer people are involved, there might be an reasonable expectation of privacy.
139. See infra notes 203-35, 253-77 and accompanying text.
140. ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.310 (a)(1) (Michie 1962).
141. 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978).
142. Id. at 879.
143. Id. at 874.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 878.
146. Id.
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incurred displeasure, have not conformed or have espoused unpopular
causes.
'147
In later decisions, the Alaska Supreme Court held that taping of a
suspect both after an arrest and by an officer while in uniform did not
violate the Alaska Constitution. In Palmer v. State,'148 John W. Palmer
was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and was taken
to trooper headquarters where he was given breathalyzer and sobriety
tests. 149 Palmer's performance on the tests was videotaped. 150 When
Palmer challenged the videotape under the state constitution, the
court held that even if Palmer had an expectation of privacy, it was
not one that society would recognize as reasonable.151 City and Bor-
ough of Juneau v. Quinto152 was another drunk driving case. The of-
ficer who stopped Marcelo Quinto, Jr. was wearing a small tape
recorder on his belt. 53 The officer turned the tape recorder on after
he stopped Quinto and as he approached Quinto's car. 154 The tape
recorder kept recording until after the officer arrested Quinto. 155 As
in Palmer, the court held that the tape was properly admitted because
Quinto had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the state
constitution. 156
Glass leaves many unanswered questions. Is Glass limited to the
home? Would the Alaska Constitution permit taping in the home or
in another location with the consent of a private party participant?
2. Florida
Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution contains a search
and seizure provision which prohibits "unreasonable interception of
private communications by any means.' 57 In State v. Sarmiento, 58
the Florida Supreme Court considered whether "the warrantless, elec-
tronic interception by state agents of a conversation between defend-
ant and an undercover police officer in defendant's home is an
unreasonable interception of defendant's private communications in
147. Id.
148. 604 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1979).
149. Id. at 1107-08.
150. Id. at 1108.
151. Id. at 1107-08.
152. 684 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1984).
153. Id. at 128.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 129.
157. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 12.
158. 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981).
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violation of article I, section 12, Florida Constitution. ' 159 An under-
cover police officer was in a bar when he asked Sarmiento's girlfriend
about purchasing heroin.' 60 The girlfriend invited the officer to
Sarmiento's trailer at 10:30 p.m. that evening. 161 The officer went to
the trailer that evening wearing a radio transmitter. 62 Two officers
outside the trailer were monitoring the conversation when the under-
cover officer bought the heroin from Sarmiento.' 63 The court found
that Sarmiento had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his own
home and ruled the Florida eavesdropping statute unconstitutional
"insofar as that statute authorizes the warrantless interception of a
private conversation conducted in the home."'1 64 The court stated
that:
We are unwilling to impose upon our citizens the risk of assuming
that the uninvited ear of the state is an unseen and unknown lis-
tener to every private conversation which they have in their homes.
That is too much for a proud and free people to tolerate without
taking a long step down the totalitarian road. The home is the one
place to which we can retreat, relax, and express ourselves as human
beings without fear that an official record is being made of what we
say by unknown government agents at their unfettered
discretion.' 6 5
An amendment to the Florida Constitution did away with
Sarmiento.'66 In 1983, article I, section 12 was amended to add the
following language as the last sentence of the section: "Articles or in-
formation obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in
evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under
decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th
Amendment to the United State Constitution."'1 67 This means that an
informant or police officer would be able to tape a conversation be-
cause the United States Supreme Court has long held that an inform-
ant or police officer may tape a conversation if the officer is a party to
the conversation or with the consent of a party to the conversation.
Article I, section 23 guarantees a right to privacy; 68 however, the
Florida Supreme Court has held that article I, section 23 does not ex-
159. Id. at 644.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 645.
165. Id. (quoting State v. Sarmiento, 371 So. 2d 1047, 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)).
166. FLA. CONST. art. I., § 12 (amended 1982).
167. Id.
168. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23; see Appendix A.
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pand the protection afforded a suspect in the search and seizure
context.16
9
3. Hawaii
Hawaii relies heavily on decisions of the United States Supreme
Court involving interception of communications in interpreting its
own state constitution's right to privacy. In State v. Lester,170 decided
by the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1982, a suspect cooperating with po-
lice taped a conversation between himself and Donald Lester in a
public park.17' Lester, the suspect, and others had agreed to have
Lester's wife murdered, with the $7,000 price paid by Lester. 172 Les-
ter incriminated himself on the tape. 173 The court ruled that article I,
section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, a search and seizure provision
prohibited "unreasonable ... invasions of privacy."'1 74 This "is to be
construed in light of the language of Katz."'1 75 The court noted that
"[p]articipant or consensual monitoring has withstood constitutional
scrutiny by the U.S. Supreme Court on the basis that no eavesdrop-
ping is involved since the government agent is free to testify to what
was heard and the tape merely preserves his credibility.' 76 The court
also cited with approval to Lopez and White, two United States
Supreme court cases involving informant taping.177 Not surprisingly,
the Hawaii Supreme Court held that taping Lester did not violate the
Hawaii Constitution. 78
4. Illinois
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court also referred approvingly to
Lopez and White in People v. Beardsley.179 The court mentioned arti-
cle I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution 180 in passing and declared,
''we are not holding that the limitations on one's conduct imposed by
section 14-2 of our eavesdropping statute are coextensive with those
imposed on governmental action by the fourth amendment... or by
the provisions of section 6 of article I of the Illinois Constitution of
169. State v. Jimeno, 588 So. 2d 233, 233 (Fla. 1991).
170. 649 P.2d 346 (Haw. 1982).
171. Id. at 349.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. HAw. CONST. art I, § 7; see Appendix A.
175. Katz, 649 P.2d at 353.
176. Id. at 350-51.
177. See supra notes 42-47, 87-96 and accompanying text.
178. Katz, 649 P.2d at 353.
179. 503 N.E.2d 346 (Itt. 1986); see infra notes 348-73 and accompanying text.
180. See Appendix A.
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1970."1181 The court held that the recording of a conversation by one
physically present was not eavesdropping.182
5. Louisiana
In 1982, in State v. Reeves,183 the Louisiana Supreme Court initially
interpreted the state's constitutional privacy provision to require a
warrant for participant recording of a conversation; on rehearing the
following year, the court reversed itself.184 Charles W. Reeves, an em-
ployee of the Louisiana Department of Elections and Registration,
was allegedly involved in a scheme in which employees of the depart-
ment contributed money to a political candidate and were reimbursed
by filing false travel expense reports with the department. 185 Pilley,
an employee whom Reeves supervised, reported the scheme and
agreed to wear a radio transmitter to the voting warehouse where
Reeves and Pilley worked. 186 While Pilley was inside the warehouse,
investigators were outside in two cars. 187 One car had a radio receiver
and tape recorder and the second car had a device which allowed the
investigator in the car to monitor the conversation inside the ware-
house. 188 After denying before a grand jury that he had discussed the
false travel expense reports, Reeves was convicted of two counts of
perjury. 89 The prosecution introduced tape recordings and tran-
scripts of conversations obtained through Pilley at the perjury trial.' 90
In Reeves, the Louisiana Supreme Court examined the wording of
the privacy provision of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution and its legis-
lative history in concluding that law enforcement officers may monitor
a conversation with the consent of a participant only after obtaining a
warrant.' 9 1 On rehearing, the court had to determine: "(1) Whether
the defendant's conversations were 'communications' within the
meaning of Article 1, § 5 and (2) Whether the manner in which the
conversations were intercepted constituted an 'invasion of pri-
vacy."" 192 The court first found that Reeves's conversations were
communications and then found that there was no invasion of privacy
181. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 351.
182. Id. at 350.
183. 427 So. 2d 403 (La. 1982), reh'g granted, 427 So. 2d 410 (1983).
184. 427 So. 2d 410, 418.
185. Id. at 411.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 404.
191. Id. at 404-06, 409-10.
192. Id. at 412; see Appendix A.
[Vol. 47:837
THE LAW OF EAVESDROPPING
because Reeves had no reasonable expectation of privacy.193 The
court reasoned that when Reeves discussed the scheme, he risked
both that the conversation might be repeated and that the conversa-
tion might be taped. 194 The court noted that a tape is more accurate
than testimony concerning the conversation. 195 In refuting the argu-
ment that surreptitious taping upon the consent of one participant
chills open conversation, the court explained that no chilling effect
had been discovered, even though the Federal Act allows such tap-
ing. 196 Louisiana allowed such taping, at least until the 1982 Reeves
decision. 197
In a 1993 case, another defendant made a claim under the privacy
provision of the Louisiana Constitution. In State v. Peterson,198 Fen-
ton Peterson claimed that a police officer violated his expectation of
privacy under Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution when the
officer tape recorded his inculpatory statement after he was ar-
rested.199 The officer hid a tape recorder in his waistband and re-
corded Peterson's comment that "'W.C.' had 'fronted' him the
cocaine. °200 Peterson made the comment after he entered the police
building annex narcotics office. 201 The Louisiana Court of Appeals
quickly dismissed Peterson's claim, finding that Peterson did not have
an expectation of privacy in the police station following his arrest.20 2
6. Massachusetts
The Massachusetts wiretapping and eavesdropping statute allows
taping of a conversation only with the consent of all parties to the
conversation.20 3 As in other states requiring all-party consent, the
statute allows a law enforcement officer to tape a conversation if the
officer participates or if the officer has the consent of a party to the
conversation. 20 4
In Commonwealth v. Blood,20 5 James Blood and several others
planned to steal gold bars worth $3,000,000 from a refining com-
193. Id. at 411.
194. Id. at 413, 417-18.
195. Id. at 418.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 417-18.
198. 619 So. 2d 786 (La. 1993).
199. Id. at 789.
200. Id. at 788.
201. Id. at 787-88.
202. Id. at 789.
203. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (West 1997).
204. Id. § 99(D)(1)(c); Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1032 (Mass. 1987).
205. 507 N.E.2d 1029 (Mass. 1987).
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pany.20 6 One of the conspirators agreed to tape conversations of the
conspirators in exchange for a favorable sentence on other pending
charges.20 7 The taped conversations occurred in the homes of two of
the conspirators. 20 8 Blood was arrested, tried, and convicted. 20 9 On
appeal the issue was "the sufficiency, in light of art. 14 [the search and
seizure provision of the Massachusetts Constitution], of that portion
of the statutory design which renders admissible the evidentiary fruits
of warrantless electronic surveillance of organized crime where police
have obtained the consent of at least one, but not each, party to a
conversation. 2 10 The court pointed out that article 14 of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution was adopted in 1780 to guard against the
remembered activities of the British.211 "In like manner, the consent
exception puts the conversational liberty of every person in the hands
of any officer lucky enough to find a consenting informant. What was
intolerable in 1780 remains so today.1212 Fearing that "the statutory
exception has swallowed up the rule," the court held that taping the
conversations surreptitiously violated article 14 and the tapes should
have been excluded. 213
In Commonwealth v. Panetti,214 another interesting case from Mas-
sachusetts, "the chief of police of Lenox, entered a crawl space under
the defendant's first-floor apartment on Housatonic Street with the
permission of the owner of the property" and overheard a drug trans-
action.215 The court held that even though the chief was lawfully in
the crawl space, the interception of the conversation violated article
14.216 The court reasoned that "[t]he crawl space is not analogous to
an adjoining hotel or motel room. The subjective expectation of pri-
vacy here [in Panetti's home] is more reasonable than that present in
the motel-hotel room cases. '2 17
7. Michigan
The Michigan Constitution has no privacy provision, but has a
search and seizure provision in Article 1, § 11 similar to that of the
206. Id. at 1030.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1030-31.
209. Id. at 1031.
210. Id. at 1031-32.
211. Id. at 1035.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1038.
214. 547 N.E.2d 46 (Mass. 1989).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 48.
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Fourth Amendment. 18  In People v. Beavers,219  the Michigan
Supreme Court held that, without a warrant, the police may not inter-
cept a private conversation with one party consent.220 In Beavers, a
police informant wore a radio transmitter when he went to Beaver's
apartment.221 Beaver's son answered the rear door of the apartment
and let in the informant. 222 The informant purchased ten dollars
worth of heroin and left. 223 Meanwhile, two police officers sat in an
unmarked car with a radio receiver listening to the conversation be-
tween the informant and Beavers concerning the heroin sale.224 The
Beavers court reviewed the plurality opinion in United States v. White,
which allowed police informant participant monitoring. 225 The Bea-
vers court relied on Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in White rather
than Justice White's plurality opinion.2 26 Like Justice Harlan, the
Beavers court distinguished between a participant in a conversation
subsequently repeating the conversation and the conversation being
simultaneously monitored with the consent of less than all partici-
pants, especially where the monitored conversation took place in the
non-consenting participant's home. 227 The court found that because
none of the warrant exceptions applied, the search and seizure provi-
sion of the Michigan Constitution would prohibit the two officers from
testifying, while allowing the informant to testify.228
Sixteen years later the Michigan Supreme Court overruled Beavers
in People v. Collins,229 holding "that the warrantless participant moni-
toring in this case violated no reasonable expectation of privacy on the
part of the defendant, and that there is no compelling reason to inter-
218. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 11. Section 11 provides:
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or
things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from
evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any
other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling
house in this state.
Id.
219. 227 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1975), overruled by People v. Collins, 475 N.w.2d 684, 685 (Mich.
1991).
220. Id. at 516.
221. Id. at 512.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 517.
225. Id. at 513; see supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
226. Id. at 515.
227. Id. at 514-15.
228. Id. at 516.
229. 475 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 1991).
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pret Const. 1963, art. 1, § 11 as affording greater protection for this
defendant than is provided under the Fourth Amendment. '230 In Col-
lins, W.C. Collins had allegedly offered the informant $500 for the
informant to testify falsely in a criminal case involving Collins's
wife. 231 The informant called Collins from the state police office with
the police taping the call; the police also taped a conversation of the
informant and Collins in Collins's car.232 The Collins court refused to
distinguish Beavers because the Beavers heroin sale occurred in Bea-
vers's home.233 "Even if a person's home is where he has the most
reasonable expectation of privacy, that expectation is no longer rea-
sonable when the home becomes a site for planning criminal activ-
ity."'234 The court also noted that when the Michigan eavesdropping
statute was adopted in 1966, eavesdropping with one-party consent
was not "otherwise prohibited by law ... [and the statute allows
eavesdropping] not otherwise prohibited by law by a peace officer or
his agent of this state or federal government while in the performance
of his duties. '235
8. Montana
In 1972, the following provision was added to the Montana Consti-
tution: "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of
a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a com-
pelling state interest. '2 36 In State v. Brackman,237 the Montana
Supreme Court held that the privacy provision of the Montana Consti-
tution prohibited a police informant from recording a conversation
with Dale Brackman.2 38 Two individuals who allegedly owed Brack-
man money reported Brackman to the police department for threat-
ening them.2 39 They agreed to become police informants, with one
wearing a radio transmitter.240 The police officers instructed the in-
formants to discuss the matter with Brackman.2 41 The two twice
spoke with Brackman in the parking lot of the shopping center where
230. Id. at 698.
231. Id. at 685.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 695 n.40.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 696 n.45.
236. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
237. 582 P.2d 1216 (Mont. 1978), overruled by State v. Brown, 755 P.2d 1364 (Mont. 1988).
238. Id. at 1222.
239. Id. at 1217.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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Brackman worked. 242 While the three spoke, police officers moni-
tored and recorded the conversations. 243 Brackman was charged with
intimidation, a felony, and moved to suppress the tapes.244 The court
recognized no compelling state interest in law enforcement's surrepti-
tious monitoring and recording of private conversations, noting that
such surveillance would be permitted after obtaining a warrant; if
there was a fear for the informant's safety, the informant could wear a
radio transmitter but no information obtained could be used against
the suspect unless a warrant had first been granted.245
Ten years later in State v. Brown, 246 the Montana Supreme Court
overruled Brackman without explaining why it was overruling a ten-
year-old precedent. 247 The Brown court held that "warrantless con-
sensual electronic monitoring of face-to-face conversations by the use
of a body wire transmitting device, performed by law enforcement of-
ficers while pursuing their official duties, does not violate ... the pri-
vacy section of the Montana Constitution. ' 248 The monitored
conversations concerning a large quantity of marijuana occurred in a
car in a parking lot and in the informant's room at a local motel.249
The court reasoned that Katherine Brown had no reasonable expecta-
tion that her conversations with the police informant would be kept
private by the informant and, further, that the recording of Brown's
conversations with the informant was not excessively intrusive.250 The
court noted that Brown erred in trusting that the informant would not
repeat or record their conversations.251 The court reasoned that the
informant could testify about the conversations and the recording of
the conversations would be more accurate than the informant's
testimony.252
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1221-22.
246. 755 P.2d 1364 (Mont. 1988).
247. Id. at 1369.
248. Id. The Montana statute requires all parties to consent to the interception of a communi-
cation but allows recording by "duly elected or appointed public officials or employees when the
transcription or recording is done in the performance of official duty." Morr. CODE ANN. § 45-
8-213 (1995). The Brown court specifically ruled that "[t]he exception applies to law enforce-
ment officers while performing their duty," rejecting Brown's argument that the statutory ex-
ception was unconstitutionally overly broad. 755 P.2d at 1368.
249. Brown, 755 P.2d at 1366.
250. Id. at 1370-71.
251. Id. at 1371.
252. Id. at 1370-71. The dissenting justice criticized the majority for overruling Brackman and
failing to recognize the additional privacy accorded by the state constitution's explicit privacy
provision. Id. at 1371-72 (Hunt, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice reasoned that the plain
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9. Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Constitution has no privacy provision, but has a
search and seizure provision in Article 1, § 8 that is similar to the
Fourth Amendment. 53 In Commonwealth v. Brion,254 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that "Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution precludes the police from sending a confidential in-
former into the home of an individual to electronically record his con-
versations and transmit them back to the police. ' 255 A confidential
informant had purchased about fifteen grams of marijuana from
Michael Brion in Brion's home while wearing a body wire.256 The
court differentiated Brion from Commonwealth v. Blystone257 and
Commonwealth v. Henlen258 because of the location of the taping.2 59
In Blystone, a murder was committed in an open field.2 60 Blystone
described the murder to a confidential informant while the two were
in a truck, and the police were surreptitiously monitoring and record-
ing the conversation.2 61 In Henlen, a prison guard secretly taped his
interrogation by a Pennsylvania State Trooper investigating the theft
of inmate property.2 62 The guard was charged with illegal interception
under the Pennsylvania statutes.263 The courts found that neither
Blystone nor the Pennsylvania State Trooper had reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy.2 64
In Commonwealth v. Myers,265 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
was asked to determine whether an informant and boyhood friend
could secretly tape a conversation with Robert Myers on the porch
language of the constitutional privacy provision would seem to protect the privacy of conversa-
tions. Id.
253. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8. Section 8 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any per-
son or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Id.
254. 652 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1994).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. 549 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1988), aff d on other grounds sub nom. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494
U.S. 299 (1990).
258. 564 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1989).
259. Brion, 652 A.2d at 289.
260. Blystone, 549 A.2d at 84.
261. Brion, 652 A.2d at 288 (citing Blystone, 549 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1988)).
262. Henlen, 564 A.2d at 905.
263. Id.
264. Blystone, 549 A.2d at 87-88; Henlen, 564 A.2d at 907.
265. 676 A.2d 662 (Pa. 1996).
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outside his rural trailer home.266 The informant sought information
concerning two robberies of a steakhouse.267 In ruling that the tape
should have been suppressed, the court decided that Brion controlled
because Myers had a reasonable expectation of privacy and a reason-
able expectation that his conversation would not be intercepted. 268
10. Vermont
The Vermont Constitution has no privacy provision, and Vermont is
the only state without a wiretapping or eavesdropping statute. Ver-
mont does have a search and seizure provision in chapter I, Article 11
of its constitution that is similar in substance to the Fourth Amend-
ment, and has been applied to prohibit surreptitious taping in the
home, but not in a parking lot.269
In State v. Blow,270 a police informant purchased marijuana at
Michael Blow's home while the police monitored the conversation. 271
The Vermont Supreme Court held that "obtaining evidence by elec-
tronic monitoring in a defendant's home without his consent and with-
out prior court authorization violates Article 11."272 In State v.
Brooks,273 decided approximately one month prior to Blow, the Ver-
mont Supreme Court emphasized that the touchstone of whether par-
ticipant electronic monitoring violates the Vermont Constitution is
whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.274 In Brooks, a
suspect in a series of commercial burglaries became a police inform-
ant.275 The informant taped a telephone conversation with Edward
Brooks and also wore a radio transmitter to a meeting in a shopping
center parking lot.276 The court held that "warrantless electronic par-
266. Id. at 663.
267. Id. at 662.
268. Id. at 665. In two other cases, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that Brion would
not be given retroactive effect. Commonwealth v. Walko, 670 A.2d 1153 (Pa. 1996); Common-
wealth v. Metts, 669 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1995).
269. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 11. Article 11 provides:
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions,
free from search or seizure; and therefore warrants, without oath or affirmation first
made, affording sufficient foundation for them, and whereby by any officer or messen-
ger may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person
or persons, his, her or their property, not particularly described, are contrary to that
right, and ought not to be granted.
Id.
270. 602 A.2d 552 (Vt. 1991).
271. Id. at 553.
272. Id. at 556.
273. 601 A.2d 963 (Vt. 1991).
274. Id. at 965.
275. Id. at 963.
276. Id.
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ticipant monitoring of face-to-face conversations, in cases such as this
one, where defendant, located in a public parking lot, had no reason-
able expectation of privacy, does not violate the protections of Article
11 of the Vermont Constitution. '277
11. Washington
The Washington Supreme Court has recently applied that state's
constitutional privacy provision in two cases concerning surreptitious
interception of a conversation with the consent of one participant. In
a 1992 case, the court held that a challenged portion of the Washing-
ton eavesdropping statute did not violate the privacy provision of the
Washington Constitution because the constitution allowed surrepti-
tious recording upon the consent of one participant. 278 In a 1994 case,
the court held that police officers did not violate the state constitu-
tional privacy provision when they listened to an informant's end of a
telephone conversation with the informant's consent.27
9
In State v. Salinas,280 a county police chief authorized the intercep-
tion and recording of conversations concerning illegal cocaine transac-
tions.281 The authorization was made pursuant to the state
eavesdropping statutes which allowed such recordings in cases involv-
ing illegal drugs after following the procedure detailed in the stat-
utes.282 A paid police informant wore a radio transmitter allowing
conversation with Ruben Salinas to be recorded.283 The informant
and Salinas negotiated in a restaurant, over the telephone, and in a
parking lot.284 Salinas challenged the statute allowing police authori-
zation as violative of the privacy provision of the state constitution. 285
The Washington Supreme Court rejected this challenge. 286
277. Id. at 965.
278. State v. Salinas, 829 P.2d 1068, 1071-72 (Wash. 1992); see Appendix A.
279. State v. Corliss, 870 P.2d 317, 321 (Wash. 1994).
280. 829 P.2d 1068 (Wash. 1992).
281. Id. at 1070.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1070-71.
286. Id. at 1072. The Washington Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in a decision
issued one month prior to Salinas. In State v. Kadorian, 828 P.2d 45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992),
Kadorian challenged the statutes allowing one party consent in conversations involving con-
trolled substances as violative of the Washington Constitution. Id. at 46. The court held that the
statutes were constitutional and noted that the statutes included a number of safeguards, includ-
ing the requirement that the interception be authorized by a supervising officer. Id. at 47, 48; see
Appendix C.
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In State v. Corliss,287 an informant spoke to Allan B. Corliss using a
pay telephone outside the police department and a telephone in an
office within the police department.288 While the informant was on
the telephone, he tipped the receiver to allow a police officer to listen
to the conversation. 28 9 The Washington Supreme Court held that al-
lowing the officer to listen to the telephone conversation did not vio-
late the Washington Constitution.290
B. The Ebb and Flow of State Constitutional Protection
State constitutional protection for conversations has ebbed and
flowed in various states with no apparent pattern. 291 Four states now
protect conversations under their respective state constitutions
(Alaska, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont) and another
four states did so at some time in the past (Florida, Michigan, Mon-
tana, and Louisiana).2 92 The Alaska decision announcing constitu-
tional protection for conversations dates from 1978.293 Analogous
decisions from Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont are much
more recent; 1987, 1994, and 1991, respectively.294 A common thread
running through many of the decisions has been that the protected
conversation took place in the home. In six of the eight states, the
case in which the protection was announced involved a conversation
occurring in a home.
Is there a pattern to the ebb and flow? In 1994, one commentator,
Melanie Black-Dubis, saw that there had been an initial expansion of
the state constitutional protection for conversations, followed by a
287. 870 P.2d 317 (Wash. 1994).
288. Id. at 318-19.
289. Id. at 319.
290. Id. at 321.
291. See supra Part II.A. The state constitutional privacy protection for conversations has
ranged from providing the same privacy protection as the state statute (Louisiana, Michigan,
Montana, and Washington), to providing more privacy protection than the state statute (Alaska,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania). Vermont, the only state without an eavesdropping statute,
provides some protection through the search and seizure provision of its constitution. See Ap-
pendix A. Florida, Hawaii, and Illinois have followed decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in interpreting constitutional privacy provisions. For various periods of time, Florida
(1981 to 1983), Louisiana (1982 to 1983), Michigan (1974 to 1991), and Montana (1978 to 1988)
interpreted their respective state constitutions to provide additional protection against police
informant recording of conversations. See supra Part II.A.
292. See supra Part II.A.
293. See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (1978).
294. See Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029 (Mass. 1987); Commonwealth v. Brion,
652 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1994); State v. Blow, 602 A.2d 552 (Vt. 1991).
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contraction. 295 She saw that a number of states had recognized pro-
tection for conversations under their respective state constitutions, but
the states had later decided against recognition.296 The factors refer-
enced by the courts as a basis for initially recognizing constitutional
protection were "textual differences, legislative history, consideration
of federal and state precedent, the privacy of the home, the effect on
freedom of speech, and the effect on law enforcement practices. '297
She theorized that states took "corrective action" to erase additional
constitutional protection; upon further consideration the states de-
cided that the factors referenced in passing in the earlier statutes were
not adequate to support state constitutional protection.298 She pre-
dicted that the protection now afforded under case law interpretations
of the Alaska, Massachusetts, and Vermont Constitutions was suscep-
tible to being withdrawn.2 99
The predicted ebb in Alaska, Massachusetts, and Vermont has not
occurred, and Pennsylvania has since recognized constitutional pro-
tection for conversations in the home.300 Beginning with 1978, and
ignoring the three year period of 1981 through 1983, the state consti-
tutional protection for conversations has remained fairly constant.30'
In each of the years from 1978 to 1981 and from 1984 to the present,
three or four states have protected conversations under their state
constitutions.302
The privacy of the home, rather than an explicit constitutional pri-
vacy provision or the nature of the crime involved, seems to be the
indicator of additional protection under a state constitution. Half of
the states recognizing additional protection now do so under a search
and seizure provision (Massachusetts and Vermont) and half recog-
295. Melanie L. Black-Dubis, The Consensual Electronic Surveillance Experiment: State
Courts React to United States v. White, 47 VAND. L. REV. 857, 887-88 (1994).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 873.
298. Id. at 888.
299. Id. at 873-74, 884-85.
300. Commonwealth v. Brion, 652 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1994).
301. See supra Part II.A.
302. See supra Part I1.A. From 1975 to 1978, Michigan was the only state recognizing consti-
tutional protection. From 1978 to 1981, Michigan was joined by Alaska and Montana. In 1987,
Massachusetts added itself to this list. Montana dropped out in 1988, leaving Massachusetts,
Michigan, and Alaska until 1991. In 1991, Michigan dropped out and Vermont joined, leaving
Massachusetts, Alaska, and Vermont. In 1994, Pennsylvania joined Massachusetts, Alaska, and
Vermont. In the three year period of 1981 through 1983 the constitutional protection for conver-
sations remained constant in Michigan, Alaska, and Montana but was chaotic in Florida and
Louisiana. In 1981, Florida recognized privacy and was joined by Louisiana in 1982; however, in
1983, the Florida Constitution was amended in response to Sarmiento and on the rehearing of
Reeves, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed itself.
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nize additional protection under a privacy provision (Alaska and
Pennsylvania). 30 3 Cases from Alaska, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
and Vermont in which additional protection was recognized all in-
volve conversations occurring in the home. 304 Of the four states which
had recognized additional protection, one relied on a search and
seizure provision (Michigan) and three relied on privacy provisions
(Florida, Montana, and Louisiana). 30 5 In Florida and Michigan, the
location of the conversation was in the home, while in Montana and
Louisiana, the conversation occurred in locations other than the
home.306
A majority of the cases from the eight states involve illegal drugs
(Alaska-Glass, Pennsylvania-Brion, Michigan-Beavers, Ver-
mont-Blow, Montana-Brown, Florida-Sarmiento). Three cases
involved robbery or burglary (Pennsylvania-Myers, Vermont-
Brooks, and Massachusetts-Blood). Reeves (Louisiana) involved
false travel expense reports, Collins (Michigan) involved giving false
testimony, and Brackman (Montana) involved a dispute over money
owed.
The ebb and flow of state constitutional protection might relate to
the types of offenses involved. Let us assume for a moment that only
things one knew about the cases were that many involved illegal drugs
and half of the states that once protected conversations no longer do
so. Based on that assumption one might guess that the states that cut
back on protection did so in illegal drug cases. The dissenting opinion
in Beavers is illustrative of the reasoning one might expect in an opin-
ion announcing that a state would no longer protect drug related con-
versations under the state constitution:
Because of the inherent necessity for privacy in drug sales and the
small size of the product, the law enforcement officer has a uniquely
difficult task. A sale may take place anytime, anywhere, and be in-
visible to the observer. Case history reveals that many, perhaps
most, sales take place in someone's dwelling place. The business is
operated from within living quarters, as here.
Therefore, the very nature of the illegal traffic demands the use of
agents and informants if it is to be controlled. However, one may
make a "buy" but be met in court by a series of witnesses who swear
that the defendant was somewhere else and the purchaser is lying,
303. See Appendix A.
304. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978); Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029
(Mass. 1987); Commonwealth v. Brion, 652 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1994); State v. Blow, 602 A.2d 552 (Vt.
1991).
305. See Appendix A.
306. State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981); People v. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d 511 (Mich.
1975); State v. Brackman, 582 P.2d 1216 (Mont. 1978); State v. Reeves, 427 So. 2d 403 (La. 1982).
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perhaps to save his own skin. The buyer cannot usually bring any-
one with him to verify his testimony. The lone buyer is also in phys-
ical danger.30 7
Montana and Florida are states that seem to fit this assumption. In
Montana, the Brackman court announced constitutional protection in
a case that involved a dispute over money owed. The Brown court
overruled an earlier case and involved a large quantity of marijuana.
In Sarmiento, a Florida court which announced constitutional protec-
tion involved a heroin sale. Subsequently, the Florida Constitution
was amended two years later in response to Sarmiento. The other
states do not fit the assumption. Louisiana originally granted protec-
tion in Reeves, a false travel expense reports case, but later reversed
the protection. Similarly, Michigan announced protection in a case
that involved a heroin sale; but later erased the protection in Collins,
which involved giving false testimony. Three of the four states recog-
nizing constitutional protection for conversations announced their de-
cisions in illegal drug cases. The Alaska case involved a heroin sale
(Glass); the Pennsylvania case involved a marijuana sale (Brion); and
the Vermont case involved a marijuana sale (Blow). Thus, although
the impetus in some states for eliminating constitutional protection
might have been distaste for illegal drug offenses, the assumption does
not hold true in a number of the states.
C. State Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Statutes
Of the forty-nine states with some type of eavesdropping or wire-
tapping statute, the statutes of some thirteen states and the District of
Columbia parallel the provisions of the Federal Act, while the statutes
of another sixteen are similar to some provisions of the Federal Act to
a greater or lesser extent. This information is shown in the chart in
Appendix B. All but three states impose criminal sanctions for viola-
tion of the state statute and thirty-five states provide for civil relief.30 8
The civil relief generally includes award of actual or statutory dam-
ages of $100 per day up to a maximum of $1,000 to $10,000, whichever
307. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 517-18 (Coleman, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion also
quoted with approval from a United States Supreme Court case:
[A] government agent obtained narcotics during transactions completed in defendant's
home. The agent obtained entry "by misrepresenting his identity and stating his will-
ingness to purchase narcotics."
Acknowledging that "the home is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment
protections" the Court said when the home becomes a market place for unlawful busi-
ness, "that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store,
a garage, a car, or on the street."
Id. at 519 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 207, 211 (1966)).
308. See Appendix B.
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is greater, punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs. 30 9 The statutes
of eleven states provide for injunctive relief and the statutes of seven
states provide for equitable relief.310
The Federal Act allows an in-person conversation or telephone con-
versation to be taped with the consent of one of the participants; the
majority of the states similarly allow one-party consent.311 Fourteen
states require all-party consent to tape certain types of conversa-
tions.312 The statutes of eleven states require consent of all partici-
pants to in-person and telephone conversations, at least where none of
the participants is a law enforcement officer or informant.313 Of the
eleven states, California, Illinois, and Washington allow taping with
the consent of one party private participant if a crime is involved.314
Two additional states require all-party consent to certain types of con-
versations. 315 Connecticut requires consent of all parties to a "private
telephonic conversation. '' 31 6 Oregon requires consent of all parties to
a conversation but allows taping of a wire communication with the
consent of one party; however, Oregon allows taping of a conversa-
tion with one-party consent if a felony endangering human life is in-
volved.31 7 This information is summarized in chart form in Appendix
B, and the exact wording of the statutes is found in Appendix C.
Private parties are treated much differently than law enforcement
officers or informants in the states requiring all-party consent to tap-
ing. Six of the eleven states allow one-party consent, so long as the
consenting party is a law enforcement officer or informant.31 8 The
five remaining states place limitations on electronic surveillance under
309. See Appendix B.
310. See Appendix B.
311. See Appendix B.
312. See Appendix B.
313. See Appendix C. Those eleven states are California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
314. See Appendix B.
315. See Appendix B.
316. See Appendix C.
317. See Appendix C.
318. See Appendix C. Those states are California, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, and Montana. In Massachusetts, police officers are required to obtain a warrant prior to
taping, at least when taping in the home. See supra notes 99-102 and accompany text.
For example, one Massachusetts case involved a blend of private and police activity. In Com-
monwealth v. Santoro, 548 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 1990), telephone conversations between Santoro
and another private individual were recorded illegally without Santoro's consent. Id. at 863.
Subsequently, the police seized the tape of the conversations while executing a search warrant at
a home other than Santoro's. Id. at 863-64. The court held that even though the conversations
had been illegally intercepted, the tape of the conversations should not be suppressed; the police
were not involved in the taping and the Massachusetts statute does not require suppression of all
illegally intercepted conversations. Id. The court reasoned that excluding the conversations
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870 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:837
color of law.319 Illinois allows a law enforcement officer or informant
to tape a conversation concerning certain enumerated felonies for the
protection of the law enforcement officer or informant.320 Maryland
allows a law enforcement officer or informant to tape a conversation
concerning certain enumerated crimes or a hostage situation.321
Maryland also allows a law enforcement officer to wear a body wire,
but not to tape a conversation, if needed to safeguard the officer's
safety. 322 New Hampshire allows a law enforcement officer to wear a
body wire, presumably to safeguard the officer's safety; upon authori-
zation from the state attorney general's office, a New Hampshire law
enforcement officer may tape a conversation concerning certain enu-
merated offenses. 323 Oregon allows a law enforcement officer to rec-
ord a conversation based on one-party consent if the incident involves
certain felonies, there are exigent circumstances precluding obtaining
a court order or the incident involves a felony endangering human
life.324 Pennsylvania allows a law enforcement officer or informant to
tape a conversation upon authorization of the state attorney general's
office or in a hostage situation.325 Washington allows the taping of a
conversation concerning a controlled substance on the consent of one-
party and prior written authorization. 326 Similarly, Connecticut allows
taping of a private telephonic conversation and Oregon allows taping
would have no deterrent effect because the police were not involved in the interception and the
suppression of the conversations would protect criminals. Id. at 864.
319. See Appendix C.
320. See Appendix C.
321. See Appendix C.
322. See Appendix C.
323. See Appendix C.
324. See Appendix C. These statutory exceptions to all party consent were unsuccessfully
challenged in three cases. State v. Bass, 868 P.2d 761 (Or. 1994); State v. Casteel, 857 P.2d 204
(Or. 1993); State v. Evans, 832 P.2d 460 (Or. 1992).
325. See Appendix C. However, the taping may require a warrant, at least where it occurs in
the suspect's home. See supra notes 254-59 and accompanying text.
326. See Appendix C. In State v. Knight, 904 P.2d 1159 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied,
914 P.2d 65 (Wash. 1996), Knight argued that the Washington statute allowing taping of a con-
versation concerning a controlled substance violated the equal protection clause because a con-
versation not involving a controlled substance could not be taped except upon the consent of all
parties. Id. at 1163. The court dismissed the equal protection challenge finding that the distinc-
tion was justified. Id. at 1163-64. According to the court, controlled substance offenses are prev-
alent, the offenses are routinely investigated by an undercover officer to a greater extent than
other offenses, and the challenged statutes protect the safety of the undercover officer investigat-
ing controlled substance offenses. Id.
In State v. Salinas, 853 P.2d 439 (Wash. 1993), the Washington Supreme Court held that be-
cause proper authorization for use of a body wire had not been obtained, all evidence, including
the officer's visual observations, were required to be excluded. Id. at 441.
THE LAW OF EAVESDROPPING
of a conversation, so long as the consenting party is a law enforcement
officer or informant.327
In 1988, a criminal defendant successfully challenged the Louisiana
statute which had required the defendant to obtain all-party consent,
but which had allowed a law enforcement officer to tape a conversa-
tion on the consent of one party. Prior to Kirk v. State,328 Louisiana's
statutes were similar to those of California, Delaware, Florida, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, and Montana. The predecessor to Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes Annotated section 15:1303, allowed a law enforcement
officer or informant to tape a private conversation but otherwise re-
quired the consent of all parties.329 Philip Kirk, Jr. challenged the dis-
parity of treatment between himself and an informant on equal
protection grounds. The court commented that:
Kirk presented the following argument in favor of his right to make
the recordings: the charges in federal court were based on an al-
leged scheme between him and employees of Photon, Inc. to de-
fraud the corporation; the Photon employees had actually devised
the scheme and were the only witnesses to the alleged scheme; the
Photon employees had recorded conversations with him at the be-
hest of government investigators; and recording of conversations by
him or his investigator with the same Photon employees was critical
to his entrapment defense. Kirk contended that it was fundamen-
tally unfair to allow the prosecutor to tape conversations and to pro-
hibit him from doing so when the true content of those
conversations would be a crucial credibility issue at trial. 330
The court agreed with Kirk and held the Louisiana statute
unconstitutional. 331
D. Case-Law Exceptions to All-Participant Consent
Eleven states require all-party consent to the taping of in-person
and telephone conversations. 332 State courts in four of the eleven
states have created case-law exceptions to the requirements of all-
party consent and allowed participants to tape conversations. Those
states are Florida, Illinois, Michigan, and Maryland. As discussed be-
low, the Florida case-law exception is limited to the peculiar facts of
the case in which the exception was created. Illinois and Michigan
courts interpret statutory language to allow participant taping across
327. See Appendix C.
328. 526 So. 2d 223 (La. 1988).
329. Id. at 224.
330. Id. at 225.
331. Id. at 227.
332. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
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the board. A Maryland state court created a novel interpretation to
the requirement that the conversation be "willfully" intercepted.
1. Florida
Florida has a constitutional right of privacy 333 and Florida Security
of Communications statutes protect the privacy of communications. 334
Inciarrano is the Florida case in which the Florida Supreme Court cre-
ated a case-law exception to the statutory requirement of all-party
consent.335 Briefly, Phillips, the murder victim, tape recorded Inciar-
rano committing the murder.336 Florida law made it a third-degree
felony for Phillips to tape record his conversation with Inciarrano un-
less Inciarrano consented to the taping.337 The law also excluded any
illegally intercepted conversations from evidence. 338 One would think
that because of the wording of the Florida statutes, Inciarrano could
successfully argue that the tape should be suppressed because it had
been obtained illegally, even though he admitted it was his voice on
the tape.339 However, the trial judge denied Inciarrano's motion to
suppress.
Inciarrano pleaded no contest and appealed the denial of his mo-
tion to suppress. 340 On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal,
feeling constrained by the plain wording of the statutes and prior case
law, reversed. 34' The Florida Supreme Court then had to decide
whether to create a case-law exception to the Florida statutes or let a
cold-blooded murderer go free. The court phrased the issue as
"whether the tape recording made by a victim of his own murder must
be excluded from evidence pursuant to chapter 934" and held "that
under the circumstances of this case the subject tape recording does
not fall within the statutory proscription of chapter 934."342 The court
concluded that the statutes did not apply because Inciarrano had no
333. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; see Appendix A.
334. FLA. STAT. chs. 934.01 to 934.09 (1995).
335. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
336. Inciarrano v. State, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 1985).
337. FLA. STAT. chs. 934.03, 934.06.
338. Id.
339. Id. ch. 934.09(9); Brian Dickerson, Murder Tape Is Allowed as Evidence, NAT'L L.J., July
22, 1985, at 5.
340. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1276. In reaching its decision, the trial court noted "the quasi-
public nature of the premises within which the conversations occurred, the physical proximity
and accessibility of the premises to bystanders, and, the location and visibility to the unaided eye
of the microphone used to record the conversations." Id. at 1274.
341. Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
342. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1273-74.
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reasonable expectation of privacy.343 This conclusion was unsup-
ported by any analysis to offer guidance in future cases. The court
reasoned:
Inciarrano went to the victim's office with the intent to do him
harm. He did not go as a patient. The district court, in the present
case, correctly stated: "One who enters the business premises of an-
other for a lawful purpose is an invitee. At the moment that his
intention changes, that is, if he suddenly decides to steal or pillage,
or murder, or rape, then at that moment he becomes a trespasser
and has no further right upon the premises. Thus, here, if appellant
ever had a privilege, it dissolved in the sound of gunfire." Accord-
ingly, we hold that because Inciarrano had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, the exclusionary rule of section 934.06 does not
apply.344
The two concurrences "flesh out" the majority opinion, though in
quite different ways. Justice Overton wrote:
I concur and write to emphasize that when an individual enters
someone else's home or business, he has no expectation of privacy
in what he says or does there, and chapter 934 does not apply. It is
a different question, however, when the individual whose conversa-
tion is being recorded is in his own home or office.345
In his concurrence, Justice Ehrlich was much more critical of the
majority's reasoning:
Privacy rights attach to individuals, not to actions .... [T]o hold, as
the majority does, that the commission of a criminal act waives a
privacy right requires an entirely new legal definition of privacy
rights which would, in turn, shake the foundation of fourth amend-
ment analysis .... It would be more judicially honest to admit the
error and recede from Walls and Tsavaris and to hold that the stat-
ute is inapplicable. The victim no more "intercepted" the conversa-
tion than he "intercepted"the bullets that ended his life. . . . If
criminal acts waive privacy rights, as the majority implies, police
have the right and duty to intrude without a warrant into a bedroom
where the owner/resident is smoking marijuana, reasoning that the
fourth amendment protection has "gone up in smoke." 346
343. Id. at 1276.
344. Id. at 1275-76 (citations omitted). Four Florida Supreme Court Justices joined in the
opinion and three concurred, two joining in one concurrence and one authoring another
concurrence.
345. Id. at 1276 (Overton, J., concurring).
346. Id. at 1277 (Ehrlich, J., concurring). In State v. Walls, 356 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1978), the
alleged victim was in his home when he recorded "extortionary threats" made by two individu-
als. Id. at 295. The Florida Supreme Court held that because the threats were "oral communica-
tion" under chapter 934, they could not be taped without the consent of the two individuals. Id.
at 296. The court also noted that there was no harm done by suppressing the tape-recording
because the victim could testify as to the threats. Id. at 297. In State v. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d 418
(Fla. 1981), Dr. Louis Tsavaris telephoned the medical examiner concerning the results of the
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What Justice Ehrlich seems to suggest is that Florida interprets its
statute as requiring "all of the parties to the communication [to] have
given prior consent to such interception,' 347 thus, allowing a partici-
pant to a conversation to lawfully record it.
2. Illinois
In People v. Beardsley,348 a 1986 Illinois Supreme Court case, Rob-
ert Beardsley was stopped for driving twelve miles over the speed
limit.349 Beardsley recorded his subsequent conversation with the of-
ficer by holding a microphone below the door panel of his car. 350
When the officer realized that Beardsley was recording the conversa-
tion, the officer asked Beardsley to turn off the tape recorder and
warned Beardsley that he could be charged with eavesdropping. 35'
The officers arrested Beardsley and placed him in the back seat of the
patrol car but allowed Beardsley to retain possession of the tape re-
corder.352 The two officers and Beardsley waited in the patrol car un-
til a tow truck arrived for Beardsley's car. 353 While Beardsley was in
the back seat, he recorded the conversation of the two officers sitting
in the front seat of the patrol car. 354 Beardsley was convicted of
eavesdropping. 355
The issue before the Illinois Supreme Court in Beardsley was
whether Beardsley could be convicted of eavesdropping. 356 The court
applied the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Lopez
decedent's autopsy. Id. at 420. A sheriff's detective was in the room with the medical examiner
when the medical examiner took the call from Tsavaris by speaker phone. Id. The medical
examiner recorded the call. Id. The Florida Supreme Court held that the recording was made in
violation of the Florida statute requiring all parties to consent to the recording of a conversation.
Id. In reaching its decision, the court noted that the Florida statute had been amended in 1974
to require consent of all parties prior to an interception. Id. at 422.
On the floor of the Florida House of Representatives, the only recorded debate on the
two-party consent requirement of section 934.03(2)(d) was this comment by Represen-
tative Shreve:
(What this bill does) is to prevent, make it illegal, for a person to record a conversation,
even though he's a party to it, without the other person's consent. With no further
debate, the bill passed the House 109-1.
Id. (footnote omitted).
347. FLA. STAT. ch. 934.03(2)(d) (1995).
348. 503 N.E.2d 346 (I11. 1986).
349. Id. at 347.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 347-48.
353. Id. at 348.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
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and held that "clearly our eavesdropping statute should not prohibit
the recording of a conversation by a party to that conversation or one
known by the parties thereto to be present. '357 The court reasoned
that the officers knew that their conversation was not private and that
Beardsley could hear everything they said. Beardsley could have
taken notes of the conversation or even testified concerning what the
officers said. The court opined, however, that a simultaneous trans-
mission of the conversation to someone outside the patrol car would
have been different because:
[O]ur holding in this case should not be construed as holding that
the same result would necessarily prevail if the defendant here
would have been equipped with a transmitter instead of a recorder
and, therefore, the conversation by the officers would, by this
means, have been overheard or intercepted by another.358
The reasoning of the court is logical. If Beardsley could makes notes
of the conversation and testify as to what the officers said, why should
he not be able to record the conversation? A tape of the conversation
would be more accurate than either notes or Beardsley's recollection
of the conversation.
The Illinois statute had previously defined eavesdropping as inter-
cepting "all or any part of an oral conversation without the consent of
any party thereto. ' 359 Prior to Beardsley, the statute had been
amended to prohibit interception without "the consent of all of the
parties to such conversation. '360 Two Justices concurred in the judg-
ment, reasoning that the officers had consented to the recording; the
officers knew that Beardsley had the recorder, they had previously
told him he could be charged with eavesdropping, and yet they did not
confiscate the recorder before placing Beardsley in the patrol car.
361
In addition, the officers could have conversed outside the patrol car
while Beardsley was handcuffed in the back seat of the patrol car.
362
The Beardsley concurring opinion criticized the majority's interpreta-
tion of the statute, pointing out that the majority's interpretation did
violence to the plain language of the Illinois eavesdropping statute.
363
"The majority's construction ignores the mandatory language which
replaced the word 'any' with the word 'all'; it also renders meaningless
two other portions of the statute, while at the same time it fails to
357. Id. at 351.
358. Id. at 352.
359. 38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 14-2(a) (1965).
360. 38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 14-2(a)(1) (1983); Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 351-52.
361. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 354-55.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 352-54 (Simon, J., concurring).
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enforce the plain intent of the law."' 364 The statute had been amended
in 1975 to require all-party consent.365 This occurred the year after
the Watergate hearings, and as one Illinois state senator reminded the
Illinois legislature during debate on the amendment: "[W]here elec-
tronic eavesdropping occurred which one party, of course, consented
to it, but the others did not,... I think that is a truly reprehensible
circumstance .... [T]he acquiescence or permission of all parties in-
volved[ ] ought to be the public policy of this State. '366
In a 1994 case, People v. Herrington,367 the Illinois Supreme Court
relied on Beardsley. In Herrington, the alleged sexual abuse victim
was at the police station when he called Jeffrey Herrington at his
job.36 8 The police taped the conversation with the alleged victim's
permission.369 The court held that the taping did not violate the Illi-
nois eavesdropping statute because the statute allows a participant to
record a conversation. 370 The court reasoned that the tape memorial-
ized the conversation accurately, the person to whom Herrington in-
tended to speak consented to the recording, and the conversation was
not transmitted to any third party.371 The dissenting justice noted that
the statute plainly and clearly requires consent of all parties to a con-
versation, and that the court's holding was "in direct conflict with the
explicit language of the eavesdropping statute. '372 The dissenting jus-
tice also noted that, whereas in Beardsley the officers knew Beardsley
had a tape recorder and impliedly consented to the taping, Herrington
had no reason to assume that the conversation with the alleged victim
was not private.373
3. Maryland
In Hawes v. Carberry,374 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
accepted Hawes' argument that he could not be civilly liable under
Maryland's Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Law because he did
not know that the law prohibited surreptitious taping of a conversa-
tion to which he was a participant.375 Daniel Hawes, an attorney li-
364. Id. at 352.
365. 38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 14-2(a)(1) (1977).
366. Id. at 353 (quoting from S. 79-1159, Reg. Sess. (I11. 1975)).
367. 645 N.E.2d 957 (Ill. 1994).
368. Id. at 958.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 959.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 959-60 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
373. Id.
374. Hawes v. Carberry, 653 A.2d 479 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
375. Id. at 483-84.
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* censed in Virginia but not in Maryland, obtained a judgment in a
Virginia court against Mr. Carberry and others. 376 On March 11, 1992,
at approximately 6:00 to 6:30 p.m., Hawes went to Mr. and Mrs.
Carberry's home to obtain information about the other defendants.
377
Hawes and the Carberrys stood in the doorway of the Carberry home
while they discussed the judgment.378 Unknown to the Carberrys,
Hawes taped the conversation.379 On March 14, 1992, Hawes filed
suit in Maryland state court to enforce the Virginia judgment. 380 A
transcript of the Hawes/Carberry March 11 conversation was attached
to a motion filed in the suit.381 On March 5, 1993, the Carberrys filed
suit against Hawes, alleging that the secret taping of the conversation
violated the Maryland Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Law.
382
During the trial, Hawes represented himself. He asked the following
question of himself: "What experience have you had with respect to
wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes in the past?" 383  He
responded:
The simple answer is none. Before I received notice of this action
and the criminal charges, I had never had occasion to read the wire-
tapping and eavesdropping law of any state much less Maryland.
And my knowledge of it was what I had obtained from other attor-
neys, which was basically that federal law gives a person the right to
make a record of his own conversation with other people. Subse-
quent to these charges having been made and this case being filed,
I've had occasion to research the law in more depth and now I know
more about Maryland's law. But at the time any of this happened, I
had been in Maryland maybe four times in the last ten years all
related to this one case, and I have no prior knowledge of anything
related to this before having being served. And I believed that fed-
eral statute authorized me to do what I was doing.384
Mr. Hawes argued that he could not be held civilly liable because he
was not aware that Maryland law prohibited taping without the con-
sent of all parties. On appeal, the court held that the word "willfully"
in the Maryland statute required the Carberrys "to show that Mr.
Hawes intended to violate the Carberrys' rights under the [Maryland]
Act. ' 385 Because the Carberrys did not show this, the trial court
376. Id. at 481.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 480.
382. Id. at 480-81.
383. Id. at 482.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 483-84.
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should have granted judgment for Hawes. The court held that: "While
[the Carberrys] proved that [Hawes] was a Virginia lawyer, it could
not be legitimately inferred from this fact that he knew the wiretap
law of all 50 states or even that he knew the relevant law in Maryland
or, for that matter, any other jurisdiction in the Washington metropol-
itan area. '386
4. Michigan
In Sullivan v. Gray,387 a Michigan Court of Appeals case, Thomas
Sullivan had been negotiating with James Gray for the sale of Sulli-
van's car dealership to Gray when their negotiations broke down.388
Subsequently, Sullivan and Gray became parties in a lawsuit concern-
ing the proposed sale.389 Gray recorded a telephone conversation
with Sullivan relating to the breakdown of their negotiations and Gray
used a transcription of the recorded telephone conversation in the
dealership litigation. 390 Gray recorded his conversation with Sullivan
although Michigan law provides that: "Any person who is present or
who is not present during a private conversation and who wilfully uses
any device to eavesdrop upon the conversation without the consent of
all parties thereto ... is guilty of a felony."' 391 Michigan law defines
"eavesdrop" as to "overhear, record, amplify or transmit any part of
the private discourse of others without the permission of all persons
engaged in the discourse. '392
Relying most heavily on the language, "private discourse of others,"
the Sullivan court refused to hold Gray liable, interpreting the statu-
tory language to allow a participant to record the conversation. 393
The court interpreted the words "is present" to include someone phys-
ically close to the conversants but not a party to the conversation. 394
"We believe the statutory language, on its face, unambiguously ex-
cludes participant recording from the definition of eavesdropping by
limiting the subject conversation to 'the private discourse of others.'
The statute contemplates that a potential eavesdropper must be a
third party not otherwise involved in the conversation being eaves-
386. Id.
387. 324 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
388. Id. at 59.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. (quoting from MICH. Comp. LAws § 750.539c).
392. Id. (quoting from MICH. CoMp. LAws § 750.539a(2)) (emphasis added).
393. Id. at 60.
394. Id.
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dropped on."' 395 The court reasoned that a party to a conversation
may always later take notes of the conversation, repeat the conversa-
tion, or testify about what was discussed; a tape recording is more
accurate than relying on one's memory or notes.396
The Sullivan court acknowledged that its interpretation of the stat-
utes created "one anomaly. ' 397 "While a participant may record a
conversation with apparent impugnity, his sole consent is insufficient
to make permissible the eavesdropping of a third party. Thus, while a
participant may record a conversation, he apparently may not employ
third parties to do so for him. ' 398 The court then explained away the
apparent anomaly reasoning that a participant is speaking directly to
another participant in a conversation and, because of the participants'
relationship, can gauge whether the conversation will be repeated. 399
The court distinguished the status of a participant from that of a third
party; a participant who does not know that the conversation is being
overheard by a third party has no basis to judge whether the third
party will repeat the conversation. 4°°
.The Sullivan dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
the statute. Judge Brennan stated that: "Rather, if the Legislature had
intended that the statute not apply to participants, I think that it
would have stated that intention in clear language. '40 1 The dissent
warned of the pervasiveness of electronic eavesdropping and empha-
sized the role of the courts to protect the secrecy of private conversa-
tions by enforcing the plain language of the statutes. 40 2 The dissent
reasoned that because an unaltered recording is the most accurate rec-
ord of a conversation, more credence would be given to a recording
than to testimony concerning the parties' dealings. 40 3 The non-record-
ing party is at a disadvantage for several reasons. A tape can easily be
altered and the recording party can select the conversations or por-
tions of conversations favoring the recording party while excluding
other recordings. 40 4
In Sullivan, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated in obiter dictum
that Michigan law would prohibit a participant to consent to the re-
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 60-61.
401. Id. at 61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 62.
403. Id.
404. Id.
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cording of a conversation by a third party. This hypothetical came
alive in Dickerson v. Raphael.40 5 "This case involves the surreptitious,
nonconsensual recording, simultaneous transmission, and later broad-
cast of plaintiff's private conversation with her children by certain de-
fendants, who were not themselves parties to the conversation. 40 6
Dorothy Dickerson, a long-time member of the Church of
Scientology, sued Sally Jessy Raphael for playing four portions of an
audio recording of her conversation with family members on a na-
tional broadcast of the Sally Jessy Raphael television show.40 7 The
television show flew Dickerson family members from out-of-state to
Ann Arbor Michigan and paid a company to secretly video and audio
tape Dorothy Dickerson's conversation with family members.40 8 One
Saturday Dorothy's son and daughter and the daughter's husband ar-
rived unexpectedly at the Scientology office where Dorothy
worked. 40 9 When the family members went to a nearby public park to
talk, the daughter was wearing a microphone under her sweater.410
The microphone picked up the family conversation and transmitted it
to a nearby van where the conversation was recorded.411 The court
noted that the visual image could be captured on videotape without
running afoul of Michigan law because the family discussion took
place in a public park.412
In Dickerson, the trial court denied Dorothy Dickerson's motion
for a directed verdict.413 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the
denial and remanded the case for determination of damages. 414 The
court held that Michigan law prohibited a third party from recording
and broadcasting a conversation. 415 The court pointed out that Doro-
thy's family and the show's producers knew that Dorothy would not
have consented to the taping and that Dorothy had already refused to
appear on the Sally Jessy Raphael television show.416 The conversa-
tion concerned a private personal matter-the family's concern over
405. 564 N.W.2d 85 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
406. Id. at 87.
407. Id. at 87-88.
408. Id. at 87.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 87-88.
411. Id. at 88.
412. Id. at 90 n.4.
413. Id. at 89.
414. Id. at 92.
415. Id. at 89. The court differentiated this case from People v. Collins, 475 N.W.2d 684
(1991), which involved a police informant. Dickerson, 564 N.W.2d at 91; see supra notes 229-35
and accompanying text.
416. Dickerson, 564 N.w.2d at 90.
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Dorothy's increasing involvement in Scientology. 417 No one in the
park, other than family members, was close enough for the length of
time required to eavesdrop, other than through electronic means, on
the family's conversation. 418
The Dickerson court found that Michigan law clearly prohibited ra-
dio transmission of the family conversation to the nearby van.419 Ap-
parently, the show producer could have given the daughter a tape
recorder to hide under her sweater together with the hidden
microphone.420 Then the daughter could have recorded the family
conversation and turned the tape over to the producer. That way the
producer could have obtained the same information without violating
Michigan eavesdropping law.
III. PRIVACY
Parts III and IV provide the necessary backdrop to an understand-
ing of federal and state eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes and
state constitutional privacy provisions. The statutes and constitutional
provisions implicitly recognize privacy as a concept deserving of pro-
tection. Although fundamental, the concept must be weighed against
other interests such as the individual's natural curiosity, social control,
and economic and social advantage.
A. What is Privacy?
What is privacy? The number of definitions of privacy is roughly
equivalent to the array of scholars writing about privacy.421 The array
of definitions may be due in part to the variety of personal matters
covered by the term. Three "mechanisms of privacy" recognized by
one scholar are "privacy-as-seclusion," "privacy-as-informational-con-
417. Id. at 87.
418. Id. at 90. The court opined that participants in a conversation may waive their privacy
"by clear, unequivocal conduct estopping its assertion" just as the common law right of privacy
may be waived. Id. at 89.
419. Id. at 90.
420. For example, in a number of John Grisham's best-selling novels, electronic surveillance
allows gathering of crucial information. The information forms a portion of the thread of a
tenuous and often far-fetched plot. For example, in THE CLIENT, the attorney straps a tape
recorder to the chest of her eleven-year-old client so the client can tape his conversation with
two FBI agents outside the presence of his attorney. JOHN GRISHAM, THE CLIENT 123-37 (paper
ed. 1994). The attorney threatens to play the tape if the FBI agents lie. Id.; see also infra note
505.
421. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 3 (1992); REGAN, supra note 28,
at 3; Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1980); Spiros Simitros,
Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PENN. L. REV. 707, 708 (1987).
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trol," and "privacy of autonomous personal life. '422 The subject of
this Article, eavesdropping and wiretapping, is most closely associated
with informational control and seclusion. The protection afforded by
eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes may allow the individual to
control the dissemination of information. Seclusion is key in deter-
mining the type of information protected because the statutes gener-
ally protect only those statements said in private.
Eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes generally maximize the
boundaries of personal information over which the individual has con-
trol. The statutory scheme emphasizes privacy and at times places a
higher value on privacy than on a law enforcement officer obtaining
information for use in a criminal prosecution, or on an individual ob-
taining evidence for use in a civil lawsuit. In a dozen states, a private
conversation may not generally be recorded without the consent of all
participants.423 Under the federal wiretapping statutes and the eaves-
dropping and wiretapping statutes of many states, a private conversa-
tion may not be recorded without the consent of at least one
participant; however, the conversants lose their expectation of privacy
if their conversation is loud enough to allow it to be overheard un-
aided by any electronic audio interception device. 424
Thus, the eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes are grounded in
secrecy as a positive value. Under the statutory scheme, protection
does not vary based on the subject matter of the private conversation.
A private conversation can as easily concern expressions of intimacy
as it can hide evidence of a crime, of prohibited discrimination, or of a
tort law violation. In fact, a defendant is guilty of a serious crime in
the typical criminal case in which a motion to suppress the tape of a
conversation is raised.
Commonwealth v. Parella425 illustrates a situation in which the hus-
band was almost certainly guilty of murdering his estranged wife, yet
the Pennsylvania statutes allowed the husband to suppress the most
incriminating piece of evidence. At the trial level, the court sup-
pressed a recording made by the husband's live-in girlfriend of a meet-
422. William C. Heffernan, Privacy Rights, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 737, 745-46 (1995). Tort
law is usually associated with protection for the first two mechanisms of privacy, while constitu-
tional law is associated with protection for privacy of autonomous personal life. Id. at 757.
Although Heffernan sees his three mechanisms of privacy as a "coherent whole," others claim
that there is no separate right of privacy. Id. at 746. The reductionists claim that what may be
termed a right to privacy, is an amalgamation of interests protected by a collection of other
rights. Gavison, supra note 421, at 421-23.
423. See Appendix B.
424. See Appendix B.
425. 610 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
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ing between the husband and the estranged wife the night of the wife's
death. 426 The girlfriend was not a party to the conversation. 427 After
the tape was suppressed, the prosecution appealed, alleging that the
suppression of the tape "seriously impair[ed] its ability to present its
case and prove the charges of criminal homicide. '428 The suspect
lived in a second floor apartment over the Mountain House Tavern.
429
When the suspect informed the girlfriend that he would be meeting
his estranged wife in the apartment, the girlfriend concealed one com-
ponent of a Fisher Price Baby Monitor in the drop ceiling of the bed-
room of the suspect's apartment. 430  She placed the receiver
component of the baby monitor on a porch of the tavern next to a
tape recorder and below the apartment window. 431 The girlfriend
turned on the receiver and tape recorder at the time she expected a
meeting between the suspect and his estranged wife. 432 The suspect
was prosecuted for criminal homicide in connection with the death of
his estranged wife the night the tape was made.433 The court held that
the taping violated Pennsylvania law because neither of the partici-
pants had consented to the taping.434 The court emphasized that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Superior Court
both held that a conversation may be intercepted only with the con-
sent of all parties, and that the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Elec-
tronic Surveillance Act also requires all-party consent.435
In her article, Privacy and the Limits of Law, Ruth Gavison gives a
detailed and comprehensive discussion of privacy.436 Gavison views
privacy as being comprised of three elements: secrecy, anonymity, and
solitude. 437 She states that one loses privacy "as others obtain infor-
mation about an individual [loss of secrecy], pay attention to him [loss
of anonymity], or gain access to him [loss of solitude] . 438 In Privacy
426. Id. at 1008.
427. Id. at 1007.
428. Id. at 1008.
429. Id. at 1007.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 1008.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 1011.
435. Id. at 1012.
436. Gavison, supra note 421, at 423-24.
437. Id. at 433.
438. Id. at 428. In contrast, many scholars focus on privacy as comprising one or two of
Gavison's three elements. Several focus on privacy as the individual's control over personal
information. For example, in THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY, privacy is defined as "the restriction of
others' access to information about oneself." JAMES RULE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 23
(1980). Arthur Miller defines privacy as "the individual's ability to control the circulation of
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and Its Invasion, Deckle McLean paints a similar picture of privacy
but uses different terminology. 439 McLean describes four types of pri-
vacy: "access-control privacy," "room-to grow privacy," "safety-valve
privacy," and "respect privacy. '440 McLean's access-control privacy
includes both lack of physical access to an individual and the individ-
ual's control over personal information; thus it draws on Gavison's
elements of secrecy and solitude. 441 McLean's remaining three
"types" of privacy would be better described as values of privacy and
will be discussed below.
Gavison's privacy construct provides a useful framework for dis-
cussing the interception of oral communications. One might picture
Gavison's three elements as interlocking spheres arranged in a trian-
gle formation; the spheres overlap such that one area in the center of
the formation is common to all three spheres. Privacy is lost when any
part of the formation is pierced. The individual may suffer a loss of
only one element of privacy, of any two elements of privacy, or all
three elements of privacy, depending on the location of the loss of
privacy. One element of privacy is lost when an invasion occurs in a
information relating to him." ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS,
DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 25 (1971). Charles Fried sees privacy as "the control we have over
information about ourselves." Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968), reprinted in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 203, 209 (Ferdinand David Schoe-
man ed., 1984) (emphasis in original). Alan Westin defines privacy as the "[c]laim of individuals,
groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others." WESTIN, supra note 27, at 7. Westin states that individ-
ual privacy is comprised of the four states of solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve. Id. at
31-32. Westin's "solitude" is the same as Gavison's "solitude," where the individual is totally
alone, but the way the two authors value solitude is distinct. For Westin, solitude resembles a
penal situation of solitary confinement, while for Gavison, solitude is a positive, desirable state.
WESTIN, supra note 27, at 31; Gavison, supra note 421, at 428-29. Westin's "anonymity" coin-
cides with Gavison's "anonymity." Intimacy marks an individual's relationship with a particular
set of individuals-for example, a spouse, the family, or a close-knit group of friends. WESTIN,
supra note 27, at 31-32; Gavison, supra note 421, at 444-56. Westin's "reserve" is McLean's
safety-valve privacy. Compare WESTIN, supra note 27, at 32, with McLEAN, infra note 439, at
125-26. For an explanation of safety-valve privacy, see infra notes 220, 222, 232 and accompany-
ing text.
Priscilla Regan, Julie Inness, and Hyman Gross each focus on access to the individual as well
as the individual's control over personal information. Regan defines privacy as "the right to
control information about and access to oneself." REGAN, supra note 28, at 4. For Inness, pri-
vacy is "the state of the agent having control over a realm of intimacy, which contains her deci-
sions about intimate access to herself (including intimate informational access) and her decisions
about her own intimate actions." INNESS, supra note 421, at 56. Gross believes the "[l]oss of
privacy occurs when the limits one has set on acquaintance with his personal affairs are not
respected." Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in PRIVACY 169, 170 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
439. DECKLE McLEAN, PRIVACY AND ITS INVASION (1995).
440. Id. at 6, 52.
441. Id. at 52.
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portion of any one of the three spheres which does not intersect with
either of the other two spheres. Two elements of privacy are lost si-
multaneously when an invasion occurs inside the intersection of any
two of the spheres. All three privacy elements are lost simultaneously
when the invasion occurs inside the intersection of all three spheres.
In the earlier cited example, where LaSane abducted Weinstein
from a restaurant parking lot, Weinstein immediately lost her ano-
nymity and solitude; LaSane was paying attention to her and had
gained access to her.442 At some later point, she also lost her secrecy
when she began to tell LaSane personal details about herself, in hopes
of dissuading him from hurting her.443 Because she knew she was in a
life or death situation, chances are that Weinstein exposed some of her
most intimate personal information from her core self in hopes of sav-
ing herself from being murdered. In turn, LaSane relinquished his an-
onymity and solitude when he abducted Weinstein. Later, LaSane
also relinquished his secrecy. In the conversation captured on Wein-
stein's tape, LaSane disclosed secret personal information about him-
self, such as his age and first name.444
B. Why is Privacy Important?
Why is privacy important? Most scholars view privacy as a concept
pertaining to the individual. Gavison sees the following values in pri-
vacy: "a healthy, liberal, democratic, and pluralistic society; individual
autonomy; mental health; creativity; and the capacity to form and
maintain meaningful relations with others. '445 McLean describes pri-
vacy as providing the individual room to grow, a safety valve, and re-
spect;446 these values are impossible without the existence of one or
more of Gavison's elements. Solitude provides the individual room to
grow, or, in other words, an opportunity to contemplate past exper-
442. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
443. Gladwell, supra note 8, at Al.
444. Id. at A12.
445. Gavison, supra note 421, at 442. As does Gavison, Inness sees privacy's value in promo-
tion of intimate relationships with others and, as does McLean, in respect for the individual.
"[P]rivacy is valuable because it acknowledges our respect for persons as autonomous beings
with the capacity to love, care and like-in other words, persons with the potential to freely
develop close relationships." INNESS, supra note 421, at 95. Fried states that privacy is necessary
for "the relationships of love, friendship and trust." Fried, supra note 438, at 210-11. Jeffrey
Reiman views privacy as the cornerstone of individual autonomy: "Privacy is a social ritual by
means of which an individual's moral title to his existence is conferred." Jeffrey H. Reiman, Pri-
vacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39 (1976), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 300, 310 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984)
(emphasis in original).
446. MCLEAN, supra note 439, at 54.
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iences, develop new ideas, and mature. 447 Secrecy within a circle of
family or close friends acts as a safety valve; it allows the individual to
vent frustrations, discuss personal problems, and explore hidden emo-
tions.448 Invasion of one's privacy, whether it be secrecy, anonymity,
or solitude, may result in loss of respect or dignity; it may make one
feel vulnerable, ashamed, distressed, or embarrassed. In Privacy and
Freedom,449 Alan Westin lists "personal autonomy," "emotional re-
lease," "self-evaluation," and "limited and protected communication"
as privacy values; 450 the first is the same value noted by Gavison, the
third is part of Deckle's individual room to grow value, and the second
and fourth are subsumed in Deckle's safety-valve value.
Like Gavison, Priscilla Regan acknowledges the importance of pri-
vacy to the individual and argues that privacy is equally important to
society.45 1 The thesis of Regan's book, Legislating Privacy,452 is that
Congress was slow in passing wiretapping and eavesdropping legisla-
tion, mainly because privacy was framed in terms of the privacy of the
individual, and the forces opposed to federal legislation spoke of the
threat to law enforcement investigation should the legislation be
passed.453 Regan argues that the "common value," the "public value,"
447. Id. at 124-25; see Constance T. Fischer, Privacy and Human Development, in PRIVACY 37,
43 (William C. Bier ed., 1980). "[Privacy provides] an opportunity to get in touch with one's self
while not worrying centrally about other people's judgments;.., is also a condition for imagining
different possibilities-of freeing one's self from perceived contingencies .... [ and allows one to]
experience a sense of unity, not only with other people, but with events and the world at large."
Id. Stanley Benn sees room to grow privacy as vital for an individual "engaged on a kind of self-
creative enterprise." Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 223, 242-43 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed.,
1984). The enterprise might not succeed if the individual's privacy is invaded. Id.; see also Rob-
ert S. Gernstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76, 77-78 (1978), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 265 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
448. MCLEAN, supra note 439, at 125-26. Fried sees the privacy of a close circle of friends or
family as the opportunity to voice "unpopular or unconventional" views without fear of rebuke,
shaming, or ridicule. Fried, supra note 438, at 210.
449. WESTIN, supra note 27.
450. Id. at 33-39.
451. REGAN, supra note 28, at xiv. Like Regan, Gavison has a dual focus on the individual
and on society:
TWo clusters of concern are relevant here. The first relates to our notion of the individ-
ual, and the kinds of actions we think people should be allowed to take in order to
become fully realized. To this cluster belong the arguments linking privacy to mental
health, autonomy, growth, creativity, and the capacity to form and create meaningful
relations. The second cluster relates to the type of society we want. First, we want a
society that will not hinder individual attainment of the goals mentioned above. For
this, society has to be liberal and pluralistic. In addition, we link a concern for privacy
to our concept of democracy.
Gavison, supra note 421, at 444.
452. REGAN, supra note 28.
453. Id. at xi-xii, 16, 19.
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and the "collective value" of privacy make privacy important to soci-
ety.454 Regan states that privacy has a common value because "all
individuals value some degree of privacy and have some common per-
ceptions about privacy. '455 She also states that privacy has a public
value because of its value to "the democratic political system. '456 She
also notes that privacy has a collective value because "technology and
market forces are making it hard for any one person to have privacy
without all persons having a similar minimum level of privacy. '457
In reviewing values of privacy, privacy seems to be more fundamen-
tal to the individual and to society than any of the rights specifically
protected under the United States Constitution. Some scholars view
secrecy as negative. 458 In contrast, Gavison and McLean recognize
secrecy as positive.459 Secrecy should be viewed as positive because it
is the most critical factor enabling the individual to maintain the pri-
vacy of personal information.
The type of personal information the individual discloses generally
depends on the quality of relationship the individual has with the sec-
ond person to whom the information is disclosed. The more intimate
the relationship, the more likely that intimate information will be dis-
closed. With a less intimate relationship, it is less likely that the infor-
mation disclosed will be as intimate. Alan Westin describes the most
intimate of an individual's personal information as located within a
"core self" and other personal information as located in one of the
concentric spheres surrounding the core self.460 The information in
the sphere closest to the core self is slightly less intimate than that
contained in the core self.461 The next outer most sphere contains
slightly less intimate information and succeeding outer spheres con-
tain less intimate information than the next smaller sphere.462 Nor-
mally, the individual will not disclose the extremely intimate personal
information in the individual's core self and the individual will dis-
close the personal information in the next sphere only to a spouse or
intimate friend or relative; however, the individual may disclose per-
454. Id. at 213.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 215.
459. Id. at 214.
460. WESTIN, supra note 27, at 33.
461. Id.
462. Id.
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sonal information to a stranger if the individual feels able to disclose
personal information without loss of anonymity.463
One individual's concept of privacy may be different from that of a
second individual. McLean discusses the different levels of privacy
desired by introverts and extroverts. 464 The extroverted three-
quarters of the population favors secrecy to control dissemination of
personal information it desires to keep private.4 65 Introverts also
favor secrecy. On the other hand, Gavison's solitude and anonymity
may be intensely desired by an introvert but viewed as negative by an
extrovert.466 Solitude is essential for an introvert who draws energy
from being alone; an introvert might well prefer to remain anonymous
at times. In contrast, an extrovert thrives on interaction with others
and will remain anonymous less often than the introvert.467 McLean
hypothesizes that legal protection for privacy will emphasize concern
for secrecy over any concern for solitude or anonymity because ex-
troverts are far in the majority.4 68
C. How is Privacy Lost?
How is privacy lost? The lost may be voluntary, as when informa-
tion, anonymity, or solitude is freely given up by the individual. Two
individuals conversing in seclusion may give up their privacy through
carelessness or indifference. For example, an individual has a naive
understanding of the world to believe that a heated discussion in a
paper-thin walled apartment or office will remain private. On the
463. Id. Other authors note the corresponding relationship between the degree of intimacy of
the information and the relationship the individual has with the person to whom the disclosure is
made. Richard Wasserstrom observes that the closeness of interpersonal relationships may be
gauged by the type of information one is comfortable in disclosing. Richard A. Wasserstrom.
Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN
ANTHOLOGY 317, 324-25 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984). Intimate personal informa-
tion may be communicated to a close friend but not to a casual acquaintance. Id. Ferdinand
Schoeman echoes this observation:
It is... very awkward to be going about one's business and be confronted with a plea
or expectation for personal involvement which, by hypothesis, is unoccasioned by the
relationship. Although sometimes welcome, generally such pleas are disturbing for
they seem to give us less control over where we will expend our emotional resources.
The reason for being reserved in these situations is not fear of being harmed by the
content of one's revelations, but rather a realization that such situations call for some-
thing personally important to be given without first assuring that it is freely given.
Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRI-
VACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 403, 404 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
464. McLEAN, supra note 439, at 66-69.
465. Id. at 68.
466. Id. at 66-67.
467. Id. at 67.
468. Id. at 68-69.
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other hand, an individual may have a positive desire to reveal private
information. For example, an extrovert may freely reveal personal in-
formation publicly; however, an introvert may consider the same in-
formation too intimate to reveal to anyone other than close friends or
relatives. The loss is involuntary when privacy is invaded without the
individual's consent. Where the individual voluntarily relinquishes a
claim to privacy, the individual is responsible for its loss. Where the
loss is involuntary, the loss is not the responsibility of the
individual. 469
The following case illustrates the voluntary loss of privacy occa-
sioned by one speaking in a loud enough voice so that a third party
can overhear the conversation without the aid of any electronic inter-
ception device. In Commonwealth v. Louden,470 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found that "once the conversation, threats and argu-
ments between the Loudens and the screams of the children became
audible to the [neighbors], through a dividing wall in their home, the
Loudens lost whatever expectation of privacy they had that their se-
cret discussions and conversations would not be overheard. '471
The Loudens operated a day care in their home, one-half of a
double house.472  Mr. Louden's mother and step-father (the
Kuloviches) lived in the other half of the double house. Mr. Louden's
sister visited the Kuloviches every day.473 While visiting the
Kuloviches, the sister heard "obscene language ... arguing over ex-
plicit sexual issues . . . [and] threats being made at the children"
through the common wall between the two halves of the building.474
The sister contacted the authorities but "was advised that no action
could be taken ... unless parents complained or a child was hurt. '475
The sister placed a tape recorder in the hallway in the Kuloviches'
home and began to record activity from the Loudens' home which
could be heard through the common wall.476 The Loudens were ar-
rested for endangering the welfare of a child, but were successful in
having the tapes suppressed at the trial level.477 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ruled that the Loudens did not have any expectation
469. See Gross, supra note 438, at 171.
470. 638 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1994).
471. Id. at 959.
472. Id. at 954.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 954, 957-58.
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of privacy in the tapes because the sounds were audible through the
common wall and that the tapes should not have been suppressed. 478
IV. CURIOSITY, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND ECONOMIC OR
SOCIAL ADVANTAGE
If privacy is so vital to the individual, what are the countervailing
forces leading to its invasion? Westin points to curiosity and social
control.479 Another force not noted by Westin is the individual's de-
sire to obtain secret information to give a tactical economic or social
advantage. This Part will review the roles of curiosity, social control,
and economic or social advantage. In addition, this Part will draw on
newspaper accounts and court cases to represent the reasons for inva-
sion of privacy, and to illustrate the pervasiveness of eavesdropping.
A. Curiosity
Curiosity is an ancient, almost primeval force. The individual has
the urge to ferret out secret information. 480 While the individual
desires secrecy, anonymity, and solitude, there is an individual urge to
investigate the unknown and communicate new found information.481
For example, the ten to twenty million scanner owners in the United
States can use their scanners to keep abreast of what is happening in
their local communities. 482 Law enforcement broadcasts, fire depart-
ment broadcasts, broadcasts from agents in the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms, aircraft communications, and even communi-
cations in the drive-through lane in fast food restaurants attract scan-
ner enthusiasts. 483 One scanner enthusiast recommends taking a
scanner on vacation to monitor action behind the scenes at theme
parks .484
478. Id. at 959.
479. WESTIN, supra note 27, at 29-30.
480. In their famous 1890 law review article, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis complained
of the newspapers being filled with "idle gossip" and "details of sexual relations" to appeal to
one's "prurient taste." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 196 (1890).
481. Alan Westin calls curiosity and surveillance universal tendencies. WESTIN, supra note 27,
at 19-21.
482. J.T. Ward, Can They Ban Your Scanner?, POPULAR COMM., Apr. 1997, at 32.
483. Marc Saxon, Scanning the Wild Blue Yonder, POPULAR ELECrRONICS, Apr. 1997, at 27,
69 (aircraft communications, drive-through lanes at fast food restaurants, communications of
ATF agents); Bonnie Zygmunt, Glued to the Scanner, POPULAR COMM., Apr. 1997, at 34 (law
enforcement communications); How I Got Started Scanning-Maybe It's Hereditary!, POPULAR
COMM., Apr. 1997, at 53 (fire and police department communications).
484. Bill Mauldin, Radio Resources: Interesting Thoughts and Ideas for Enjoying the Hobby: A
Visit to Disney World, POPULAR COMM., Apr. 1997, at 27. Mauldin suggests that the scanner
enthusiast keep the scanner out of sight or be forced to check it until the visit is over. Id. at 29.
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Some people seem to enjoy learning private details of someone
else's life. An Arizona woman liked to listen to her eight-band 150-
170 megacycle radio while doing housework.485 Suspicious of drug
dealing, she reported certain conversations to the Arizona Depart-
ment of Public Safety ("DPS"). 486 The conversations were coming
from a car radio telephone.487 All told, she monitored the conversa-
tions for approximately a month and the DPS monitored the conver-
sations for another five weeks before three men were arrested on drug
charges.488
One California man claimed he just liked "to listen to people. '489
When a police officer stopped the man and searched his van, the of-
ficer discovered "electronic equipment, 24 audio cassettes with names
of women handwritten on them, a scanner, and a tape recorder. 490
Apparently, the man had been using the equipment to record
women's cordless telephone conversations. 491 The man was convicted
of violating the California Penal Code which prohibits malicious inter-
ception of a cordless telephone conversation without the consent of all
parties.492
Each mode of communicating private information quickly spawned
ways of intercepting the information, which then necessitated legisla-
tion to guard against the interception. The term "eavesdropping" eas-
ily conjures up a picture of some curious individual who centuries ago
stood under the eaves of another's home in an attempt to hear private
information. 493 A method for tapping the telephone quickly followed
the invention of the telephone. 494 Scanners have picked up cordless
and cellular telephone conversations for a number of years.
Everyone realizes that conversations may be overheard by eaves-
dropping.495 However, many people are not aware of other technol-
485. United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 194-95 (9th Cir. 1973).
486. Id. at 195.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. People v. Stevens, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, 93 (Ct. App. 1995).
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. REGAN, supra note 28, at 110.
494. WESTIN, supra note 27, at 172. The public began using the telephone in the 1880's and
tapping soon followed. Id. The telephone was patented in 1876 and a telephone scrambler de-
vice was patented in 1881. REGAN, supra note 28, at 110-11.
495. Eavesdropping is still one way of intercepting valuable information. In November 1994 a
jail guard overheard part of a conversation between O.J. Simpson and his "minister of God"
former professional football player Rosie Grier. See Vincent J. Schodolski, Latest O.J. Buzz:
What Did He Say?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 18, 1994, at A-17. Simpson and Grier were seated
in the jail visitation room separated by a sheet of Plexiglass and the guard was sitting in a control
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ogy capable of easily intercepting conversations even though this
technology has been in existence for at least thirty years. In his 1967
book, Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin described surveillance tech-
nology then in existence.496 Telephone taps did not require any physi-
cal invasion of telephone wires.497 Landline telephones could be
tapped with an induction coil.498 To intercept a landline telephone
conversation, the induction coil is located a few feet away from the
telephone or from any of the lines serving that telephone alone. Thus,
landline telephone conversations may be intercepted by someone us-
ing an induction coil in the waiting room outside a private office or
outside a building where the telephone or telephone lines are within a
few feet of the induction coil.499
Westin also described surveillance equipment which, when em-
ployed outside of a building, is capable of intercepting conversations
from inside the building without any physical intrusion.50 0 Contact
microphones attached to a building pick up sound waves carried
through windows, walls, and heating, plumbing and air conditioning
equipment. 501 Directional microphones pick up conversations a hun-
dred or so feet away.502 These can be used to intercept conversations
outdoors or through open windows. An ultrasonic wave may be
bounced off a window or a thin wall of a room in which a conversation
is taking place and received by the sending device.50 3 The wave picks
up the vibrations from the window or wall.50 4 A more commonly
known method of intercepting conversations is to plant a room with
"bugs." The tiny microphones pick up any conversation in the room
and transmit the conversation to a receiver located somewhere
booth behind a sheet of Plexiglass a few feet away. Id. Simpson and Grier were talking quietly
to each other over a visitation room telephone when Simpson "slammed the phone down and hit
his fist against the counter .... Mr. Simpson appeared to be crying. He appeared to be very
upset .... He was yelling .... It was very loud, in a raised voice." Id. According to several
newspaper reports Simpson shouted, "I did it!" See Grier: Talks with O.J. Confidential, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 10, 1994, at A-5; Ito Delays Decision on Privacy of O.J. 's Conversation,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 17, 1994, at A-5.
496. WESTIN, supra note 27.
497. Id. at 77-78.
498. Id. at 78. The induction coil is the size of a two inch cube and intercepts telephone
conversation by drawing off the telephone voice signal from the telephone's magnetic field. Id.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 75-77.
501. Id. at 76.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 75-77 n.9.
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outside the room. 50 5 Another surveillance device is "bionic ears."
The bionic ears allow a conversation to be intercepted where the per-
son conversing is located at a greater distance than that at which con-
versations may easily be overheard by the naked ear.50 6
Federal law makes it a crime to manufacture, possess, or sell "any
electronic, mechanical, or other device, knowing or having reason to
know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the
purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications. ' 507 Thus, the sale or use of induction coils, bugs,
and long distance and parabolic microphones is illegal because there is
no legitimate legal use.508 The sale and use of scanners is legal be-
cause their primary use is to intercept conversations on frequencies
freely accessible to the public. Even though illegal, eavesdropping
505. In three John Grisham novels, bugging appeared as a plot device enabling one or more of
the characters to obtain otherwise secret information. JOHN GRISHAM, THE FIRM (paper ed.
1991); JOHN GRISHAM, THE RAINMAKER (1995); JOHN GRISHMAN, THE PARTNER (1997). In
THE FIRM, the homes and cars of the associate attorneys and the offices of the law firm were
bugged. JOHN GRISHAM, THE FIRM 102-05, 334-36 (paper ed. 1991). In THE RAINMAKER, the
opposing counsel bugged the plaintiff attorney's law office telephone. JOHN GRISHAM, THE
RAINMAKER 303-06 (1995). In THE PARTNER, the associate planted a bug in the law firm confer-
ence room and taped several months worth of conversations. JOHN GRISHAM, THE PARTNER
246, 262 (1997); see also supra note 420.
506. In two recently decided Florida cases, police officers used bionic ears to intercept the
defendants' conversations. Stevenson v. State, 667 So. 2d 410, 411 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
Brandin v. State, 669 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Stevenson and Brandin stem from same police operations in which police officers were surveil-
ling a "known narcotic area" in Escambia County, Florida. Stevenson, 667 So. 2d at 411;
Brandin, 669 So. 2d at 281. In both cases, the police officers observed the defendants conduct
which appeared to be drug transactions and picked up part of their conversation by using bionic
ears. Stevenson, 667 So. 2d at 411; Brandin, 669 So. 2d at 281. Although it was 9:15 p.m. and
dark, they were able to see the defendants using "light intensified" or "fight-enhancing" binocu-
lars. Stevenson, 667 So. 2d at 411; Brandin, 669 So. 2d at 281.
In Stevenson, the law enforcement officer used bionic ears to listen to a conversation outside a
van stopped on a public street fifty to seventy five feet away. Stevenson, 667 So. 2d at 411. On
appeal, the court held that Stevenson did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy; the
intercepted conversation was not a protected "oral communication" because there was no socie-
tal expectation of privacy. Id. at 411-13. "Here, [Stevenson's] van stopped in the road just north
of an intersection. The intercepted communication was made in an open, public area rather than
in an enclosed, private, or secluded area.... [T]he parties.., met on a public street and did not
attempt to enter the van to converse." Id. at 412.
In Brandin, the officer overheard Brandin talk to two individuals through his truck window
while the truck was stopped in the evening in the middle of a public street. Brandin, 669 So. 2d
at 281. On appeal, the court held that there were sufficient facts to justify an investigatory stop
even without considering the conversation heard through use of bionic ears. Id. at 281, 282. The
court affirmed the trial court denial of the motion to suppress the intercepted conversation "be-
cause, disregarding the intercepted conversation, the totality of the circumstances created a basis
for well-founded suspicion sufficient to support the search." Id. at 281.
507. 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (1994).
508. See id.
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equipment is available by mail order. The April 1997 issue of a popu-
lar magazine includes advertisements for a "Window Bounce Laser
Listener," a "Long Range 'Ultrasonic Ear,' a "micro-miniature wire-
less mike," and a "super snooper big ear." 50 9
The major differences between intercepting a landline telephone
conversation, on one hand, and a cellular or cordless telephone con-
versation, on the other hand, are the equipment used and the distance
at which the conversation can be intercepted. Scanners are readily
available at retail at the local electronics store. The Federal Commu-
nications Commission adopted a regulation, effective April 26, 1994,
which bans the manufacture or importation of scanners capable of
picking up cellular telephone conversations.5 10 The regulation does
not ban the use of scanners manufactured before that date51' and it is
apparently relatively easy to alter a later model scanner to pick up the
frequencies designated for use by cellular telephones. Scanners
designed to omit the frequencies designated for use by cellular tele-
phones sometimes intercept cellular telephone conversations anyway.
A statement from Radio Shack comments: "In some cases, proximity
to cellular-telephone towers and other transmission phenomena may
result in cellular-phone conversations being received on frequencies
other than those allocated to cellular phones. '512 Even though inter-
ception of cordless telephone conversations was criminalized, effective
October 25, 1994, manufacture, importation, and sale of scanners ca-
pable of intercepting the frequencies designated for cordless tele-
phones are still legal.5 13
509. These devices are advertised by Information Unlimited and Electronic Rainbow Ind.,
Inc. POPULAR ELECrRONICS, Apr. 1997, at 72, 83.
The window bounce laser listener is available at $10.00, for plans, or at $149.50, for kit and
plans. Id. at 72. "Aim at window and listen to sounds from reflected light. CAUTION - Not for
illegal use." Id.
The long range ultra-ear is available at $8.00, for plans, or at $149.50, for kit and plans. Id.
"Parabolic Mic [sic] can hear a distant whisper! BUG Mother Nature! 20 [inch] dish uses satel-
lite technology to capture distant sounds." Id.
The kit for the micro-miniature wireless mike is advertised at $34.95. Id. at 83. "So small you
could hide this one on some real bugs! It's the smallest we've ever seen. With it's [sic] super
sensitive mike it transmits a whisper or a room of conversation to an FM radio .... with a proper
antenna it transmits about 1h mile.... Size .35 [inches] x .9 [inches]." Id.
The super snooper big ear is available at $10.95, for the kit, or $29.95, already built. Id. "Lis-
ten through walls, hear conversations across the room. Add a parabolic reflector and hear
blocks away. The big ear can be hidden about anywhere.... SIZE: 1.75 [inches] x 1 [inch]." Id.
510. 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.37(f), 15.121(a) (1996).
511. Id.
512. Jim Stratton, Scanner Wasn't Supposed to Pick up Call, but It Did, ORLANDO SENrINEL,
Jan. 18, 1997, at A-15.
513. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
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Eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes are designed to guarantee
privacy of communications. With the technology available, whether
legal or illegal, the privacy promised by the statutes is largely illusory.
With the current level of technology, a targeted individual cannot es-
cape surveillance and interception of the individual's private conver-
sations. Technology has obliterated the barriers which had
guaranteed privacy. These barriers included physical structures and
distance. There are no longer obstacles to collecting information.
B. Social Control
Social control is a force as ancient as curiosity through which society
seeks to hunt out and punish non-conforming behavior. Information
concerning an otherwise private conversation may be gathered in one
of two ways. A participant informer may relay information or a non-
participant may overhear and relay information. Informers may be
private individuals or police informants. If the information is ob-
tained by a private individual, the individual may seek to exact con-
forming behavior through social sanction or litigation. In the
alternative, the individual may turn the information over to law en-
forcement for criminal prosecution.514
In a number of cases a citizen monitored a neighbor's cordless tele-
phone conversations and turned in the neighbor to the police when
the conversations indicated that the neighbor was a drug dealer.515 In
New York, an off-duty police officer overheard a drug-related conver-
514. Jewell's Agent Friend Was Wired During Conversation After Bombing, ORLANDO SENTI-
NEL, Oct. 28, 1996, at A-5. Sometimes the informer is acting both as a private informer and as a
police informer. On July 29, 1996, a longtime friend of Richard Jewell invited Jewell to the
friend's apartment for dinner. Id. The friend was also a Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent
and taped the nearly two hour dinner conversation. Id. The tape shed no light on who planted
the July 27 bomb that exploded in Centennial Olympic Park. Id. The taping was legal because
Georgia allows taping with one party consent. See Appendix B.
515. United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1992); Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Carr, 805 F. Supp. 1266 (E.D.N.C. 1992); State v. McVeigh, 620 A.2d
133 (Conn. 1993); State v. Mozo, 655 So. 2d 1115, 1116 (Fla. 1995); State v. Neisler, 666 So. 2d
1064 (La. 1996); State v. Carston, 913 P.2d 709 (Or. 1996); State v. Pendergrass, No. 01C01-9306-
CR-00169, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 1995), rev'd on other
grounds, 937 S.w.2d 834 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Smith, 438 N.w.2d 571 (Wis. 1989).
In Smith, a citizen intercepted the neighbor's cordless telephone conversations using a Bearcat
scanner. 978 F.2d at 173. Instead of learning, as expected, that the neighbor had participated in
break-ins at the citizen's home, the citizen learned that the neighbor was trafficking in cocaine.
Id. The citizen turned in the neighbor to the police. Id.
In Tyler, the Berodts, using a cordless telephone, monitored conversations on the Tylers cor-
dless telephone even though the two homes were more than four blocks away. 877 F.2d at 705.
The Berodts turned in Scott Tyler to the police on suspicion of illegal activity. Id. at 705-06. The
police suggested the Berodts tape some of the conversations. Id. Thereafter, the police filed
criminal charges against Tyler. Id.
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sation over his cordless telephone.516 The officer recorded several of
the conversations that came from a neighbor's apartment and turned
the tapes over to a drug task force.517 In yet another case, a woman
listened to a police scanner she got for Christmas when she overheard
a murder being planned. 518
Sometimes the interception is unplanned and, in a number of cases,
conversations were picked up over an AM/FM radio or short wave
In Carr, the citizen suspected a neighbor was a drug dealer because of the unusual amount of
activity at the neighbor's apartment. 805 F. Supp. at 1267 n.2. The citizen informed the police of
the suspicion. Id. The police recorded 42 tapes of conversations using a portable hand-held
scanner. Id. at 1268.
In McVeigh, a citizen suspected a neighbor of drug dealing because of cordless telephone
conversations the citizen had intercepted by using a scanner. 620 A.2d at 135. When the citizen
reported the conversations to the police, the police set up a Bearcat scanner and tape-recorded
the neighbor's conversations for approximately a week. Id.
In Florida, police detectives were using a scanner to intercept cordless telephone calls near an
apartment complex. Mozo, 655 So. 2d at 1116. When they picked up a suspicious conversation,
they continued to monitor the same radio frequency and taped calls. Id. They obtained a search
warrant for an apartment in the complex based on the intercepted information and the unusual
amount of activity observed at one apartment. Id.
In Neisler, a citizen had seen a neighbor using a cordless telephone in his yard. 666 So. 2d at
1065. Using a scanner to intercept the cordless telephone conversations, the citizen believed the
neighbor was planning a drug transaction. Id. The citizen informed a police officer of the con-
versation and let the officer hear the conversation picked up by the scanner. Id. The police
began scanning the neighbor's cordless telephone conversations before receiving a wire tap or-
der. Id. at 1065-66.
In Carston, a citizen called the police to report information about a drug transaction. 913 P.2d
at 710. The citizen had picked up the information from a cordless telephone while using his
scanner. Id. The police used the intercepted information to locate the drug transaction. Id. at
710-11.
In Pendergrass, two concerned citizens informed the police that Pendergrass was dealing
drugs. 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 188 at *3-*5. Based on the tips, the police intercepted
Pendergrass' cordless telephone conversations from a location across the street from her apart-
ment. Id. The police used a scanner and recorded nine audio cassettes of conversations during a
week of surveillance. Id.
In Smith, a citizen reported to police that he had overheard a drug-related cordless telephone
conversation over his scanner. 438 N.w.2d at 572. The citizen recognized a voice in the conver-
sation as his neighbor's. Id. The police came to the citizen's home and taped the neighbor's
conversations. Id.
516. People v. Fata, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349 (App. Div. 1990).
517. Id.
518. Scanner Picks Up, Prevents Plot to Kill Woman's Husband, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 31,
1994, at A-7. The overheard cordless telephone conversation was between a neighbor and the
neighbor's boyfriend. Id. They were planning to have the boyfriend murder the neighbor's hus-
band, make the murder look like part of a break in, and collect the insurance on the neighbor's
husband. Id.
Are you sure you want to go through with this? ... Do you really love me enough to
kill for me? . . . Yes, I do. Do you have any doubts? . . . If you come through the
window, Kenny will hear you, and he'll come and that's when you shoot him.
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radio inadvertently. 519 Once the intercepted conversation piques the
interceptor's curiosity, the interceptor often keeps listening to the
conversation and may even record it. If the intercepted conversation
contains information of a crime, the interceptor may turn the informa-
tion over to the police. For example, in State v. Bidinost,520 some chil-
dren in an Ohio home were playing with a baby monitor and
disconnected the transmitter. 521 The baby monitor receiver began to
pick up the neighbors' cordless telephone conversations. 522 The other
side of the conversations could not be overheard. 523 One of the neigh-
bors had been arrested the previous day for sexually abusing the chil-
dren.524 The police and the prosecutor instructed the children's
mother to tape record the conversations. 525
C. Economic or Social Advantage
Besides idle curiosity and social control, certain secret information
may be sought for a strategic reason. One set of authors defines pri-
vacy as an individual's control over personal information and then di-
519. State v. Howard, 679 P.2d 197 (Kan. 1984); Sharon v. Sharon, 558 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct.
1990); State v. DeLaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985). In Howard, the citizen picked up conversa-
tions from a cordless telephone. 679 P.2d at 198. The citizen tape recorded some of the conver-
sation, which involved drugs, and reported the conversation to the Kansas Bureau of
Investigation ("KBI"). Id. An agent of the KBI asked the citizen to record any further conver-
sation and the agent provided blank tape. Id. The citizen recorded conversations for more than
a month. Id.
In Sharon, the son in the family was listening to a program on his short wave radio when he
heard the voices of his mother and her friend. 558 N.Y.S.2d at 469. Apparently the radio picked
up a conversation from a cordless telephone his mother was using upstairs in the house. Id. The
son tape recorded the conversation. Id. In the mother and father's divorce proceeding, the
father wanted to introduce the tape recorded conversation into evidence. Id.
In DeLaurier, a citizen reported to the police that her son had been fiddling with an AM radio
when the son picked up a cordless telephone conversation concerning a drug transaction. 488
A.2d at 690. The police department monitored the same frequency on the police department's
AM radio and recorded conversations involving "the sale of marijuana, cocaine, gambling and
prostitution." Id.
520. 644 N.E.2d 318 (Ohio 1994).
521. Id. at 326.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id. at 321.
525. Id. at 326. At trial, the prosecution used the tapes to impeach the credibility of defend-
ant Bidinost's father and sister. Id. at 325-26. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
because the cordless telephone conversations fit the definitions of both an "oral communication"
and a "wire communication" under Ohio law, the interception was prohibited and the recorded
conversations should have been suppressed. Id. at 327. However, use of the recorded conversa-
tions was not reversible error because the prosecution had presented "overwhelming" evidence
of Bidinost's guilt and the recorded conversations were used only to impeach defense witnesses.
Id. at 330.
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vides privacy into "aesthetic privacy" and "strategic privacy. '526
Aesthetic privacy is akin to McLean's respect of privacy. A loss of
aesthetic privacy subjects an individual to embarrassment or loss of
dignity. Thus, the individual is damaged when another views an
otherwise private activity. Strategic privacy is akin to Gavison's "se-
crecy"; the secret information is a means to a goal and its disclosure
may make the goal unattainable. 527 For example, if LaSane's desire
for Weinstein's automobile and his plan to carjack it had been discov-
ered, Weinstein might still be alive.
A business may wish to learn the trade secrets or business plans of a
competitor. An industry giant might gain competitive advantage by
prematurely learning of government actions affecting the industry.
An estranged spouse might seek potentially embarrassing information
to gain advantage in a divorce or custody proceeding. Disclosure of
newsworthy and sometimes sensational heretofore secret information
by the press sells newspapers. Private parties often wish to gather in-
formation to substantiate claims to use in their defense. An employer
may wish to tape employees to improve efficiency 528 and an employee
may wish to tape workplace conversations to gather information for
use in future litigation. 529
526. RULE, supra note 438, at 22-23.
527. Id. at 22. Morton Levine makes a similar distinction but talks about "privacy" instead of
aesthetic privacy and "secrecy" instead of strategic privacy. Morton H. Levine, Privacy in the
Tradition of the Western World, in PRIVACY 3, 19 (William C. Bier ed., 1980). "[P]rivacy... is the
maintenance of a personal life-space within which the individual has a chance to be an individ-
ual, to exercise and experience his own uniqueness." Id. "Secrecy ... involves keeping to one-
self information which one feels would render one vulnerable to some kind of damage, either
practical damage or damage to self-esteem." Id.
Inness also distinguishes between privacy and secrecy; privacy encompasses "intimate infor-
mation" with "intimate" concerning the individual's "expression of love, liking and care," while
secrecy encompasses non-intimate information. INNESS, supra note 421, at 61, 91. She sees pri-
vacy as a fundamental right but sees secrecy as something not necessarily positive; disclosure of
certain non-intimate information is morally wrong while disclosure of other non-intimate infor-
mation is not. Id. at 60-61. Inness neither defines the line between these two types of non-
intimate information nor discusses the scope of legal protection for private or secret information.
528. In Arkansas, husband and wife owners of a liquor store lived next door to the store.
Deborah L. Jacobs, Are You Guilty of Electronic Trespassing? Surveillance of Employees,
MGMT. REV., Apr. 1994, at 21, 21-22. Because they suspected an employee had been involved in
a recent theft, they recorded employee telephone calls using an extension phone in their home.
Id. The more than twenty-two hours of calls recorded over three months included a conversa-
tion between a female employee agreeing to sell merchandise to a customer at a reduced price,
as well as amorous exchanges between the two. Id. The couple fired the employee and, at some
point along the way, informed the employee's husband. Id. When the employee and the cus-
tomer sued, they received a $40,000 judgment plus legal expenses. Id.
529. An employee may secretly tape conversations at work, planning to use the tape in litiga-
tion. Christopher Coulter worked for Bank of America as an automatic teller machine techni-
cian. Coulter v. Bank of America, Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 767 (Ct. App.
1994). He recorded over 160 conversations between himself and supervisors or co-workers at
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A company's profits may rely heavily on company trade secrets or,
perhaps, illegal agreements. Illegally intercepting information on a
company's trade secrets may be lucrative; an employee may be
tempted to intercept information on a company's illegal actions. A
recent newspaper article reported that, "in California, there have been
tales of corporate spies-for-hire who cruise Silicon Valley highways to
steal secrets for executives talking on their car phones." 530
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis' famous 1890 law review article,
The Right to Privacy, was the product of some over zealous newspaper
reporting concerning the wedding of Warren's daughter.531 Appar-
ently the newspapers had previously carried articles describing Mrs.
Warren's entertaining "in highly personal and embarrassing detail,"
something unseemly in a time in which "a lady and a gentleman kept
their names and their personal affairs out of the papers. 532
Also, a journalist might wish to use a tape to back up a newspaper
article. In October 1996, John Stossel, host of the ABC televison pro-
gram, "20/20," was facing Maryland felony charges for allegedly
secretly taping Dr. Grace E. Ziem, a Baltimore physician. 533 Deborah
Stone, an ABC associate producer, and her sister-in-law, Julie Stone,
visited Dr. Ziem's office on July 10, 1996 as patients.534 Dr. Ziem is a
multiple chemical sensitivity expert who treats patients suffering from
exposure to chemicals. 535 Stossel allegedly sent the two women to
tape their visit for use on an ABC "junk science" news special.536 An-
other ABC producer told a Mount Sinai Medical Center researcher
about the taping and the researcher told Dr. Ziem.537 Dr. Ziem filed
the bank, all by secreting two tape recorders in his pockets. Id. Coulter subsequently filed a
lawsuit against the bank and thirteen employees. Id. at 768. He backed up his claims with 17
tapes containing the over 160 conversations. Id. The court awarded the bank and 11 employees
$132,000 in damages against Coulter in their cross complaint for invasion of privacy. Id. at 767-
68. In affirming the damage award against Coulter, the court relied on the California Privacy
Act which prohibits taping a conversation without prior consent of all participants. Id. at 770;
see CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 1988).
Taping a conversation has many advantages over someone retelling it. The tape is more accu-
rate, captures the exact wording of the conversation, and includes the speaker's tone of voice.
Without the taping, the credibility of the person retelling the conversation might be in dispute;
leaving the jury to speculate whether the parties really said that.
530. Cellular Phones Are Handy, supra note 106, at AO.
531. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 480, at 193.
532. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960).
533. Scott Higham & Robert Schrott, Baltimore Doctor Stings ABC Team; "20/20" Group
Faces Wiretap Charges After Alleged Bogus Interview, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 18, 1996, at 1A,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Balsun file.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Id.
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felony charges under a Maryland statute which prohibits taping with-
out the consent of all parties.538 In December 1996, the case was dis-
missed for lack of evidence.539
V. PRIVACY PROTECTION AGAINST EAVESDROPPING
AND WIRETAPPING
On the one hand, privacy is a fundamental idea. As described in
Part III, privacy has value to the individual (promoting individual au-
tonomy, mental health, creativity, respect, and emotional release) and
to society (promoting a healthy democratic society). Privacy is an idea
more fundamental to the individual and to society than any of the
rights specifically protected under the United States Constitution.
Eavesdropping statutes recognize the importance of privacy in conver-
sations and provide an apparent bright-line test to determine which
conversations are deserving of protection.5 40 A conversation over-
heard by a third party via an electronic listening enhancement device
is protected, while a conversation heard by the naked ear is not pro-
tected. The statutes specify whether one-party or all-party consent is
necessary for participant taping. A non-conversant is not permitted to
use technology to intercept private conversations without a court or-
der. The wiretapping statutes have succeeded in stopping widespread
use of electronic surveillance devices.541 Wiretapping statutes are
beneficial because they have lessened the occurrence of a practice
which would threaten privacy.
On the other hand, privacy is an evolving idea. It changes both be-
cause of society and because of technology. For centuries there has
been eavesdropping, but there were no statutes passed that outlawed
eavesdropping until fairly recently. If perceived as a problem, the
eavesdropper was dealt with through social sanction. Within a small
community, everyone knew everything about everyone else. If eaves-
538. Id.
539. Kate Shatzkin, Wiretapping Charges Won't Be Pursued; Baltimore Doctor Said ABC
News Team Taped Interview Secretly, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 7, 1996, at 2B, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Balsun file.
540. See Appendix A. The test is "deceptively easy" because there is no context given to
gauge what is "reasonable." Is "reasonable" gauged by a theoretical version of privacy or by
reality (privacy covering those conversations not intercepted)? Did police surveillance result in
information? Was police surveillance likely to result in information? If "reasonable" is gauged
by a theoretical version of privacy, what is privacy? "Privacy" could refer to an ideal based on
longstanding tradition dating from before the emergence of technology. "Privacy" could be
based on what today's "reasonable person" would consider reasonable, given the capabilities of
electronic surveillance. "Privacy" could be based on what most people think should be pro-
tected as private.
541. WESTIN, supra note 27, at 44.
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dropping information was spread, it was not as detrimental to the indi-
vidual because everyone in the community had more of a context
within which to judge the truthfulness and reliability of the informa-
tion and the small community could judge the character of the person
spreading the information. With the move to the city, conversations
may be overheard because of the close proximity in which people live
and work. In a large city, neighbors may pick up information but
would not have the context in which to place the information.5 42 As
technology evolves, so does society's idea of what is acceptable and
reasonable. Society seems increasingly more comfortable with partici-
pant taping; however, society accepts the fact that wiretapping or bug-
ging without a court order is illegal, perhaps in part because it has
been illegal for almost thirty years. Technology is far outstripping pri-
vacy. With participant taping, a line has to be drawn or technology will
continuously alter society's idea of what is acceptable intrusion until
there is no privacy left. Given natural tendencies of curiosity and sur-
veillance, a targeted individual has no privacy.
Technology has changed the individual's actual privacy. It would be
dangerous, however, to base what is legally protected as private on
technology. This term, the United States Supreme Court cautioned
against tying Fourth Amendment privacy to "the social norms of a
given historical moment. '543 Technology makes it relatively easy to
wiretap the individual's telephone conversation and electronically
eavesdrop on a close friend's conversation. If an individual is alone,
even if talking on the telephone, privacy is expected. Privacy is also
expected if two close friends are talking in low voices in a room with
the door closed. For those who must be sure their conversation is not
being overheard, Westin describes the ultimate in protection against
eavesdropping.5 44 For top secret discussions, a "floating room" is built
542. Id.; Gavison, supra note 421, at 466.
543. Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1417 (1997). In Wisconsin, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not permit a blanket exception to the
knock-and-announce requirement when police officers are executing a search warrant in a felony
drug investigation. 117 S. Ct. at 1420-21.
[C]reating exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule based on the 'culture' surround-
ing a general category of criminal behavior presents at least two serious concerns.... It
is always somewhat dangerous to ground exceptions to constitutional protections in the
social norms of a given historical moment. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of reasonableness 'is to preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of
persons and the inviolability of their property that existed when the provision was
adopted-even if a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all
sorts of intrusion 'reasonable.'
Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
544. WESTIN, supra note 27, at 83.
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within a room.545 The floor, ceiling, and walls of the inner are free
from bugs and made completely of glass so that any subsequently in-
troduced electronic eavesdropping equipment may be easily de-
tected.546 Most people do not have to go to the length of only
conversing within a floating room; chances are that most in-person
conversations behind closed doors are not overheard. However, the
possibility of interception rises if the individual is conversing on the
telephone, or the person with whom the individual is speaking, is us-
ing a cordless or cellular telephone.
The reason that technology is not a good basis for a legal recogni-
tion of privacy is that technology is continually diminishing the indi-
vidual's actual privacy. If the legal recognition of privacy were to be
based on actual privacy, one would only have privacy in a floating
room. Privacy under the eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes
should flow from a common expectation of what should be private.
The individual's concept of privacy which should be the basis for legal
protection has not changed. As discussed in Part III, privacy is impor-
tant to the individual and to society because it serves numerous funda-
mental values.
A. Spheres of Privacy
If this were a perfect world and one were to visualize the area in
which an individual could enjoy solitude, anonymity, and secrecy,
what would the area look like? One might picture the individual in-
side two concentric spheres. Inside the inner sphere, the individual
could enjoy solitude, the individual would be anonymous, and the in-
dividual could keep information secret. The inner sphere would be
contained within a larger sphere which would provide privacy for tele-
phone conversations. Ideally, the inner sphere would allow nothing
from the outside to access the individual and the outer sphere would
not allow non-participants access to telephone conversations.
Unfortunately, this is not a perfect world. Privacy must be balanced
to some extent against curiosity, social control, and economic or social
advantage. An introverted, reclusive individual who craves privacy
may desire a much larger inner sphere than an extrovert would. It
may be unrealistic to expect the privacy sphere of someone who
desires a great deal of privacy to be coextensive with the legal protec-
tion recognized under wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes.
545. Id.
546. Id.
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How might one visualize the privacy permitted by eavesdropping
and wiretapping statutes? One might picture the individual protected
by two concentric spheres of privacy delineated by eavesdropping and
wiretapping statutes. The spheres would be similar in configuration
but different in dimension than the concentric spheres of an ideal
world. The inner sphere delineates the boundary of privacy protec-
tion for oral communications against interception by the government
and by private individuals. This sphere also defines privacy against
physical governmental intrusion. The larger outer sphere delimits the
privacy accorded landline, cordless, and cellular telephone conversa-
tions against interception by the government and by private individu-
als under wiretapping statutes.
How are conversations protected within the inner sphere? Two
people may be within the innermost sphere having a conversation pri-
vate from any third party. For example, A and B are in an office with
the door closed and C is outside the office. It is illegal for C to surrep-
titiously monitor the conversation by using a radio receiver to receive
the conversation via a bug concealed in the room. It is also illegal for
C to tape record the monitored conversation. For many individuals,
the ideal inner sphere of privacy is somewhat more extensive than the
privacy provided for oral conversation under the eavesdropping stat-
utes. For example, A and B may have expected their conversation to
be private and inaccessible by C; however, it is legal for C to record
any part of A and B's conversation audible outside the office by the
naked ear. A and B may desire their conversation to remain private
even though it would be legal for C to record.
The inner sphere of privacy is perforated with numerous exceptions.
With physical searches, law enforcement officers may enter a home in
hot pursuit of a fleeing criminal,547 seize items in "plain view, '548 look
through your garbage, 549 peer in your windows,550 walk through your
property, 551 stop you on the street, 552 have a drug dog sniff your lug-
gage,553 and stop your car on the highway for the most minor traffic
violation.554 As noted below, law enforcement officers may use vision
547. Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
548. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
549. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
550. Harris, 390 U.S. at 236. Assuming an officer is not violating one's Fourth Amendment
rights by being in a particular location, the officer may observe anything "plainly visible." Id.
This would include looking in someone's windows.
551. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
552. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
553. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
554. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
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enhancement technology, such as flashlights and binoculars, to search
for physical evidence. In contrast, there is no similar exception to the
privacy protection for oral conversations. Oral conversations are pro-
tected if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.555 Since United
States v. Katz,55 6 location does not control whether the individual's
privacy is protected. However certain locations, such as the home,
traditionally have been associated with individual privacy. Because of
this tradition, the implicit presumption is that the home is usually a
source of privacy and courts have generally held that there is no ex-
pectation of privacy outside the home.557
Does it make any difference whether, when one is picturing the in-
dividual's sphere of privacy, one is imaging himself or herself, rather
than another individual within the sphere? Professors Slobogin and
Schumacher co-authored a 1993 law review article entitled Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases:
An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by
Society. '558 One hypothesis they tested was "that searches or seizures
of one's own property or person are perceived as more intrusive than
those of others. '559 Survey subjects rated the intrusiveness of various
search and seizure scenarios.5 60 In some of the scenarios, the subjects
were asked to assume that they were personally involved while other
scenarios involved other persons.561 The subjects did perceive search
and seizure scenarios in which they were personally involved, as more
intrusive than search and seizure scenarios involving other persons.562
The professors commented that "[j]udges, especially the Justices on
the Supreme Court, are unlikely to have experienced any type of po-
lice intrusion, much less the type of intrusion they are asked to ana-
lyze in a particular case. ' 563 The professors referred to a court's
555. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
556. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
557. For example, Florida courts have recognized an expectation of privacy in the home but
not in a private business office, a back yard, a parking lot, a motel room, a truck, an informant's
home, and a restaurant. Carol M. Bast, Eavesdropping in Florida: Beware a Time-Honored but
Dangerous Pastime, 21 NOVA L. REv. 431, 449-58 (1996). Courts have consistently held that
there is no expectation of privacy in the back of a patrol car. Carol M. Bast & Joseph B.
Sanborn, Jr., Not Just Any Sightseeing Tour: Surreptitious Taping in a Patrol Car, 32 CRIM. L.
BULL. 123, 127-28 (1996).
558. 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993).
559. Id. at 734.
560. Id. at 737.
561. Id. at 762-63.
562. Id. at 759.
563. Id. at 760.
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tendency to view a search and seizure scenario from a third person
rather than a first person perspective as a "distancing effect. '564
Which conversations are protected within the outer sphere? The
outer sphere protects telephone conversations. For example, if A
were in New York having a telephone conversation with B in Califor-
nia, and neither party has consented to interception of the conversa-
tion, A is protected against C, a non-party, wiretapping the
conversation anywhere between New York and California. The pro-
tection applies to any telephone conversation, whether A and B are
using landline telephones, cellular telephones, or cordless telephones.
The protection applies regardless of whether C may easily intercept
the conversation using a scanner. However, any portion of a tele-
phone conversation audible by the naked ear is not protected. What if
A were in A's office conversing on the telephone in a loud voice and
C were seated outside A's office, with C able to overhear A's end of
the conversation? Under those circumstances, it would be legal for C
to tape record A's end of the telephone conversation.
The protection afforded by the outer sphere is uniquely different
than that provided by the inner sphere. While the inner sphere is per-
forated by numerous exceptions, the outer sphere is not. Wiretapping
and eavesdropping statutes give protection against both state and pri-
vate action. and allow no exceptions. A police officer cannot legally
tape a telephone conversation without either the consent of at least
one of the participants or a court order. Why do wiretapping and
eavesdropping statutes have no exception for state action? Perhaps
one reason is the distancing effect described by Professors Slobogin
and Schumacher. Legislators and judges do not fear physical intru-
sion, but they do fear someone bugging them.
Informant consent has pierced a gaping hole in both spheres. The
United States Supreme Court has held that, without a court order, law
enforcement agents may monitor and record a private conversation by
using an informant fitted with a body wire.565 The Federal Act and
the eavesdropping statutes of all but six states sanction unlimited
monitoring and recording of private conversations where one of the
participants is a law enforcement officer or police informant.5 66 The
eavesdropping statutes of the remaining six states allow limited moni-
toring and recording under color of law.567
564. Id.
565. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
566. 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (1994); see Appendix C.
567. See Appendix C.
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Police informants or police officers are treated much differently
from private individuals under the Fourth Amendment and the eaves-
dropping and wiretapping statutes. To conduct a search under the
Fourth Amendment, police officers must obtain a warrant based on
probable cause or must have available some exception to the search
warrant requirement. 568 The Fourth Amendment does not restrict
searches by private individuals.5 69 Thus, the Fourth Amendment is
more restrictive of police activity than of the activity of private indi-
viduals. Eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes are inconsistent with
the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure
because the statutes place restrictions on individual activity as well as
police activity. All-party consent statutes show the greatest inconsis-
tency because they are much more restrictive of individual activity
than of police activity.
How is the fit of the eavesdropping statutes reflective of the concept
of privacy? The Federal Act and statutes of many states protect oral
communications if the speaker has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.570 The test seems to be easy to apply but may not fit a particular
individual's definition of privacy. Loss of privacy is voluntary when
done by the privacy holder. It is involuntary when done by others.
The ideal is an inner sphere with no perforations. However, the ideal
of a privacy sphere containing the individual and permitting no access
from outside must be tempered by reality. Assuming a risk analysis,
the one who has the information is in the best position to safeguard it.
If one chooses unwisely the manner, location, or time of disclosure,
one should not have a legal remedy even if one feels violated. Con-
sent is an "absolute defense" to invasion of privacy, but the invasion
may not exceed the scope of the consent.571 In other words, the pri-
vacy holder should anticipate the expected consequences of the
holder's actions.572 This is true at least where one speaks in a loud
enough voice so that a third party can overhear the conversation with-
out the aid of any electronic interception device. Is this really true
where one is the target of one with access to sophisticated equipment?
568. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
569. Of course, private individuals may be subject to civil and criminal liability for their search
activities.
570. See Appendix A.
571. Laura B. Pincus & Clayton Trotter, The Disparity Between Public and Private Sector
Employee Privacy Protections: A Call for Legitimate Privacy Rights for Private Sector Workers,
33 AM. Bus. L.J. 51, 63 (1995). Research failed to discover any case law concerning conditional
consent and wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes. However, it seems logical to impose liabil-
ity for violating any conditions under which consent to taping was given just as conditional con-
sent is honored in relation to the common law right to privacy.
572. Id.
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How large should the contours of the inner and outer spheres be to
guarantee privacy for oral, non-telephonic conversations? Concep-
tually, doesn't the individual model privacy on an eavesdropping
model? This author suggests that privacy for oral conversations
should be based on the eavesdropping model. Thus, conversations
should be private if they cannot be overheard by the naked ear. The
eavesdropping model is already reflected in eavesdropping statutes.
Under the eavesdropping statutes, it is illegal for C, a non-participant,
to record A and B's conversation unless C can hear the conversation
with the naked ear. The anomaly between audio surveillance permit-
ted by statute and constitutionally permissible search and seizure cuts
in favor of the statutory restrictions on audio surveillance. Except for
the all party consent requirement discussed below, the additional pro-
tection afforded oral conversations under eavesdropping statutes
should be preserved; however, greater restriction should be placed on
participant taping under color of law.
Where a crime is being planned or committed, are the police justi-
fied in using informants? Have we stepped over the boundary line
and become a coercive society where the informant forms a "close"
relationship with the suspect and gains the suspect's trust? Use of in-
formants presents the following advantages. Taping by the informant
is not inherently more unfair than the informant testifying to the in-
formation learned and the tape is more accurate than the testimony.
Taping assures that the informant is not double crossing the police.
The informant may be wearing a concealed microphone with the con-
versation simultaneously being transmitted to law enforcement of-
ficers. If so, the law enforcement officers may step in, if needed, to
safeguard the informant's safety.
The arguments against allowing informant taping parallel the argu-
ments supporting two party consent. Allowing an informant to tape
fosters mistrust of government and the party whose conversation has
been intercepted feels "violated." The police may pressure potential
informants into collecting information. Informants may actively
deceive or tempt rather than simply record information. The disclo-
sure of the informant's role leads to a loss of trust. The individual
who has been secretly taped feels violated, deceived. Where the in-
formant intends from the beginning to entrap the individual, it is
worse than a former friend turned enemy reporting on a conversation.
No finding of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion is required
under the Federal Act or in most states prior to informant taping. In-
formant taping promotes conviction of dangerous felons, but also al-
lows breach of the private individual's privacy. Informant taping
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allows law enforcement to negotiate around Fourth Amendment hur-
dles and obtain the same information. The United States Supreme
Court informant case, United States v. White,573 was a plurality, rather
than a majority, decision and the use of informants to tape conversa-
tions has been severely criticized.
Society would love to make inroads into the innermost sphere of
privacy to collect evidence of criminal behavior. If one were to use a
result analysis, one would conclude that the use of informants is justi-
fied where a crime is detected. However, the individual is harmed
where law enforcement targeting through use of an informant leads to
the individual's loss of privacy, especially where the individual is inno-
cent and the informant fails to obtain evidence of a crime. Use of
police informants places safety-valve privacy under attack. The attack
may be severe, especially if the use of a police informant is directed to
obtaining a criminal conviction. Most eavesdropping and wiretapping
statutes allow police officers or police informants to go on fishing ex-
peditions and tape conversations without any prior evidence of crimi-
nal activity. Innocent non-conformists or individuals who are
members of unpopular organizations might be selected for
surveillance.
Surreptitious informant interception and recording of conversations
is offensive, though pervasive. As under the Fourth Amendment, a
greater restriction should be placed on participant electronic surveil-
lance under color of law than on private activity. A greater restriction
is needed because of the immense power of the government, the po-
tential for abuse of this power, and the attendant criminal penalties.
Eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes should mirror the Fourth
Amendment by requiring law enforcement to demonstrate a certain
level of proof of criminal activity before allowing participant taping
under color of law. Ideally, eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes
should be amended to require a court order based on probable cause
prior to participant taping. The state statutes of Illinois, Maryland,
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Oregon contain ex-
amples of other, less desirable, options. 574 These options include re-
573. 401 U.S. 745 (1971); see supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
574. See Appendix C. As explained in Part II, a dozen states require all-party consent to tape
a private conversation. Yet, of these dozen states, eight allow surreptitious taping upon the
consent of a police informant or officer participant. See Appendix B. The remaining five all-
party consent states (Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington) place
certain limits on surreptitious taping under color of state law. See Appendix C. Illinois restricts
such taping to certain types of crimes and requires prior notification of the state attorney. See
Appendix C. The resulting tape is inadmissible except where a participant suffers great bodily
injury or where the tape is used to impeach a witness. See Appendix C. Maryland allows such
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stricting taping under color of law to certain types of crimes and prior
authorization by the state attorney, attorney general, or a supervisory
law enforcement officer.575
How large should the contours of the outer sphere be to guarantee
privacy for telephone conversations? One inconsistency in the Fed-
eral Act was eliminated in 1994.576 Now landline, cellular, and cor-
dless telephone conversations are protected against interception
under the Federal Act. 577 Because the Federal Act preempts state
wiretapping statutes, any inconsistently worded state statutes are ef-
fectively amended to provide at least the same level of protection.578
Prior to 1994, the Federal Act afforded protection to landline and cel-
lular telephones but did not protect cordless telephones. 579 Society
accepts that wiretapping landline telephones and bugging oral conver-
sations without court order are illegal; however, the average citizen
does not perceive that using a scanner to listen to the neighbor's cor-
dless telephone conversation is wrong. Factors leading to this percep-
tion are the wide availability of scanners and the average citizen's
personal experience of inadvertently picking up cordless or cellular
telephone conversations through a baby monitor or on a cordless tele-
phone.5 80 Society's recognition of the illegality of wiretapping
landline telephones and bugging of oral conversations is due in part to
the Federal Act and its predecessors (the 1968 Act and the 1986 Act)
which have made most electronic surveillance devices illegal. Scan-
ners used to intercept cellular and cordless telephone conversations
are excepted from this ban.5 81 Interception by scanner is common
taping if related to certain serious crimes. See Appendix C. New Hampshire requires a prior
determination by the attorney general's office of reasonable suspicion of certain crimes. See
Appendix C. Pennsylvania allows such taping in a hostage situation or upon prior approval of
the state attorney general's office. See Appendix C. Washington limits such taping to illegal
drug offenses and requires either reasonable suspicion of danger to the consenting participant or
prior authorization by a law enforcement officer in a supervisory capacity. See Appendix C. In
addition, Oregon, a one party consent state, limits taping under color of law. See Appendix C.
Oregon allows such taping if related to a felony or if exigency would not allow the officer to
obtain a prior court order. See Appendix C. For the text of applicable portions of the state
statutes, see Appendix C.
575. See Appendix C.
576. 18 U.S.C. §2510 (4)(b)(i), (ii) (1994).
577. Id.
578. See, e.g., United States v. Van Horn, 579 F. Supp. 804 (D.D.C. 1984).
579. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (4)(b)(i), (ii).
580. The author has discussed the interception of cordless telephone conversations with un-
dergraduate students in legal writing classes. In the spring of 1997, at least two students out of a
class of 25 said that they had inadvertently picked up cordless or cellular telephone conversa-
tions while using a cordless telephone. The students expressed surprise that intercepting cor-
dless and cellular telephone conversations is illegal.
581. See supra note 510.
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place, uses no expensive equipment, is not time consuming, and re-
quires no special knowledge. The legal fiction is that one is charged
with knowledge of criminal statutes. However, there is a problem
with making criminal what is not perceived as a criminal act by the
average citizen. This becomes even more a problem as the gap widens
between criminal statutes and the average citizen's perception of a
"wrong."
Binoculars, on one hand, and scanners, on the other hand, are simi-
lar. They are similar in that binoculars and scanners are readily avail-
able, are easily and commonly used, are legal, and are used to enhance
the senses. Binoculars and scanners have innocent and not so inno-
cent uses. Binoculars are used to see things not otherwise visible.
Binoculars may be used to identify birds while on a nature hike or to
pick out the visual details at a sporting event, the opera, or a concert.
On the other hand, binoculars may be used to look inside someone's
home through half drawn curtains. Similarly, scanner enthusiasts en-
joy monitoring police and fire department radio transmissions to learn
of police and fire department activities. On the other hand, scanners
are capable of easily monitoring the neighborhood's cordless tele-
phone conversations.
Surreptitious interception and recording of cordless telephone con-
versations is offensive, though pervasive. While for many years the
interception of cordless telephone conversations was legal, the Fed-
eral Act suddenly provides protection far in excess of the technologi-
cal protection included with the garden-variety cordless telephone. A
cordless or cellular telephone user may believe that the telephone
conversation will not be intercepted or, even if some telephone calls
are, this one will not be. Under the eavesdropping model, scanner
interception of cordless and cellular telephone conversations should
be illegal. However, criminal penalties should only apply to acts that
are clearly wrong. Unless scanners are made illegal, perhaps there
should only be injunctive relief available to protect cordless and cellu-
lar telephone calls which are not scrambled, encrypted, or similarly
protected.
If there is no objective reasonable expectation of privacy, one who
intercepts a cordless or cellular telephone conversation should not be
subject to criminal prosecution and civil damages. The Federal Act
should be amended to give the same level of protection to cordless
and cellular telephones as that provided oral communications. Cor-
dless and cellular telephone communications should not have legal
protection where the user has taken no affirmative steps to ensure
privacy. Steps to ensure privacy might include using a digital, rather
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than an analog, cordless or cellular telephone, or one which scrambles
or encrypts transmitted conversations. Legislation might provide safe
harbors of protection for cellular and cordless telephone conversa-
tions which are scrambled, encrypted, or similarly protected, with at-
tendant criminal and civil liability for their interception.
B. One-Party Versus All-Party Consent
Should participant tape recording be equated to participant listen-
ing or third-party eavesdropping? It is difficult to distinguish between
appropriate and inappropriate participant recording. Although elec-
tronic surveillance is widespread, it does not occur as often as one
might think, judging by the frequency of bugging in current fiction and
movies.582 Two-party consent provides unwarranted protection. Par-
ticipant taping should be allowed, especially where the tape captures
evidence of substantial harm to one of the participants, as in Inciar-
rano and LaSane. Does the Inciarrano/LaSane-type situation happen
very often? How could an exception to the requirement of all-party
consent be drawn up to avoid the horrible case presented by Inciar-
rano? Does the drafted exception have the potential of being abused
by the prosecution and will it encourage eavesdropping?
Inciarrano583 illustrates the internal inconsistencies in all-party con-
sent statutes. Florida requires all-party consent for interception by
private parties and provides no exception for a murder victim to tape
relevant conversations. 584 The issue in Inciarrano was whether ille-
gally intercepted tapes were admissible. 585 Florida took the result ori-
ented approach and allowed the tape to be admitted on the judicially
creative ground that Inciarrano had no expectation of privacy.586 In-
582. See supra notes 420, 505. In the 1994 movie DISCLOSURE, the female boss sexually ha-
rasses the male employee. DISCLOSURE (Warner Bros. 1994). When he spurns her, she sues
him, claiming sexual harassment, and he countersues claiming the same thing. Id. A crucial
piece of evidence is a tape of a conversation between the boss and the employee. Id. The
conversation was accidentally recorded on someone's answering machine when the employee hit
the telephone redial button and the boss interrupted him before he could hang up the handset.
Id. The recording was made during an encounter in which the female boss blatantly tried to
seduce the male employee. Id. This is the only piece of evidence against the boss. Id.
The 1996 movie, THE JUROR, centers around the prosecution of a Mafia boss. THE JUROR
(Columbia Pictures 1996). A mobster threatens to harm a female juror's son if she does not vote
not guilty and swing the jury in the same direction. Id. The mobster gives her a pendant to wear.
Id. The pendant contains a bug which transmits the conversations from the jury room to the
mob. Id.
583. 447 So. 2d 386 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1984).
584. FLA. STAT. ANN. §934.01 (1995).
585. Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
586. Id. at 389-90.
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ciarrano was truly a hard case because the tape was the only evidence
against Inciarrano. 587
Illinois statutes contain carefully worded exceptions to all-party
consent.588 The Illinois statutes allow informant or law enforcement
officer participant taping upon prior notification to the appropriate
county state attorney's office. 589 The resulting tape is inadmissible un-
less the informant or officer is physically harmed or the tape can be
used for direct impeachment of a witness. A private-party participant
is allowed to record if the participant has reasonable suspicion that
another party is committing a crime against the interceptor, or the
interceptor's immediate household and evidence of the crime may be
gained by taping.590 Inciarrano would have been an easy case if the
Florida statutes contained similar exceptions.
The reasons for allowing taping on the consent of one private par-
ticipant far outweigh the reasons requiring all participants to consent.
The principle arguments supporting two-party consent are that surrep-
titious taping will have a chilling effect on conversation and that it is
unfair. Those who focus on the chilling effect emphasize that surrepti-
tious taping will make people feel that they cannot say what they re-
ally mean, let off steam, complain, tell jokes, or criticize without
running afoul of the "thought police." "Big brother" will be monitor-
ing what you say and you will be punished if your speech is not politi-
cally correct. Another facet of the argument is that taping without the
other person's consent is ethically and morally wrong. There must be
some devious purpose if one has to tape without receiving the other
party's consent. Why not just ask for consent if you want to gather
information or have the taping serve as a memory aid? Discovering
later that the conversation has been taped will be regarded as a be-
trayal of confidence.
The reasons for allowing one participant to tape are many. The
many legitimate reasons for taping include aiding one's memory, hav-
ing an accurate record, gathering information of a crime or tort, and
defending oneself. The reasons for a law enforcement officer or in-
formant to tape are to gather evidence and to ensure physical safety.
After all, how else could you protect yourself against charges such as
sexual harassment or employment discrimination? How can law en-
forcement otherwise gather evidence of certain crimes? It is irrational
587. Id. at 388.
588. See Appendix A.
589. Id.
590. See Appendix C.
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to allow someone to testify about a conversation, 591 but to not allow a
tape recording of the same conversation to be admitted into evidence.
A tape recording is much more accurate than someone testifying as to
that person's recollection of what happened and captures statements
in context. A tape might be vital where the testimony of witnesses is
so conflicting that you know someone is lying. What would have hap-
pened if Clarence Thomas or Anita Hill had taped their conversa-
tions? A damaging tape would have kept him off the United States
Supreme Court. If he had taped a particular conversation that she
testified to in detail, he could use the tape to impeach her credibility.
The statute requiring two-party consent follows someone's per-
ceived idea of morality and sweeps too broadly, potentially capturing
public-minded citizens within its grasp. Wiretapping and eavesdrop-
ping statutes are the only "search and seizure" proscription against
private action. Otherwise state action has to be involved to have evi-
dence excluded. Criminals like Inciarrano are the ones to benefit if
the plain language of all-party consent statutes is followed. Inciarrano
could have sued for civil damages and filed felony charges against
Phillips, had Phillips survived. Public figures and those involved in
criminal activity, like Inciarrano, have the right to believe that a confi-
dence may be betrayed. They are the ones who will be more careful
anyway and will perhaps guard themselves against surreptitious inter-
ception. Otherwise, if there is nothing illegal going on, the likelihood
of someone taping a private conversation is small. It is usually too
cumbersome to set up a taping and it is too difficult to infiltrate a
group and gain its confidence. The risk that someone will tape a con-
versation is approximately the same or less than the risk that the party
will divulge the contents of a confidential conversation.
Some people foolishly trust the other party to the conversation not
to record the conversation and have the unpleasant surprise later of
learning that the conversation was recorded. Other people, who may
or may not have something to hide, are shrewd enough to know that
things that are not said cannot be taped. In 1990, a daughter testified
from her repressed memory that years before she had seen her father
murder her best friend, then eight years old.592 The father was tried
and convicted.593 Before trial, the daughter went to visit the father in
prison.594 In the prison visitation room, the daughter asked the father
591. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 803-04 (allowing over 24 exceptions to the exclusion of hearsay
evidence).
592. Franklin v. Duncan, 884 F. Supp. 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1995), affd, 70 F.3d 75 (9th Cir. 1995).
593. Id. at 1446-47.
594. Id. at 1451.
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to admit he had murdered her friend.595 The father pointed to the
sign on the wall, "Conversations May Be Monitored" and refused to
answer. 596 At trial, the daughter was allowed to testify about her fa-
ther's refusal to answer. 597 On appeal, a federal judge ruled that the
conviction could not stand.598 One of the errors ruled reversible by
the judge was the admittance into evidence of comments on the fa-
ther's refusal to answer the daughter's question.5 99
Does the all-party consent requirement coincide with the public's
expectations? Many people in all-party consent states may not realize
the state has such a requirement. Inadvertently, they may thus subject
themselves to being prosecuted and to being sued civilly. For most
other crimes with similarly severe punishment, there is at least a feel-
ing that the action is wrong. In contrast, participant taping of a con-
versation may be entirely innocent. People's idea of morality is
changing. Surreptitious taping is not perceived by many to be wrong.
This is the electronic age. Like Inciarrano's victim, most people
would not imagine that clicking on a tape recorder without asking the
other person for consent would be illegal. For an action that many
people do not realize is illegal, the punishment is severe. Disclosure is
also illegal and carries the same penalties.
Why do states need interception of communications to deal with
criminally and civilly? Most "bad" interception is already dealt with
in other criminal statutes or there is a tort action available. For exam-
ple, someone can be charged with blackmail or be sued for invasion of
privacy. Because it is very difficult to draw the line between legiti-
mate and illegitimate reasons for taping, it would be almost impossible
to draft an appropriate statute.
The two-party consent requirement is irrational and state statutes
should be amended to eliminate it. If not eliminated, two-party con-
sent should be subject to a carefully worded exception which would
allow a crime victim to tape the perpetrator's incriminating state-
ments. The wording of the Illinois statute could be considered as a
model. 600  Another amendment to the state statutes should
decriminalize surreptitious taping so long as one party consents.
595. Tamar Lewin, Judge Upsets Murder Conviction Focused on 'Repressed Memory', N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1995, at A18.
596. Franklin, 884 F. Supp. at 1445.
597. Id.
598. Id. at 1439.
599. Id. at 1446-47.
600. See Appendix C.
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Many all-party consent jurisdictions allow interception of oral and
wire communications with the consent of a police officer participant
or an informant, at least to a limited extent. In most all-party consent
states, a private party participant must obtain consent of all partici-
pants before taping, whereas a police officer or police informant par-
ticipant may tape with impunity. The greater restriction on private
party participant taping than taping under color of law is irrational
and should be eliminated.
V. CONCLUSION
The constitutional provisions and statutes creating this crazy-quilt
pattern of privacy are inconsistent and irrational. There is less protec-
tion against physical intrusion by law enforcement than against audio
intrusion by law enforcement or by private individuals. Law enforce-
ment would not be allowed to search a home without a warrant, but it
could have an informant gather the same information. Eavesdropping
and wiretapping statutes impose severe civil and criminal penalties for
eavesdropping; no similar penalties apply to physical intrusion. A
participant may repeat but may not tape in all-party consent states,
even though a tape is more accurate. Generally, law enforcement
agencies are treated more favorably than private individuals. Law en-
forcement agencies may obtain court orders enabling them to inter-
cept conversations without the consent of any party; private
individuals may not. In a number of all-party consent states, private
individuals are prohibited from taping, but an informant participant
may tape. Court orders are not available for crimes not listed under
the eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes, but informants may be
used; law enforcement can obtain a court order to intercept a conver-
sation with no party consenting. State prohibitions against electronic
surveillance without all-party consent can be avoided by joint federal/
state investigation. Cordless and cellular telephone calls are protected
even though they are relatively easy to intercept with a scanner.
60 1
Eavesdropping statutes generally apply to audio, but not video inter-
ception. Thus, in many jurisdictions, a private individual may video-
tape a sexual encounter so long as the audio is turned off, but they
may not audio tape the encounter. 60 2
601. Carol M. Bast, Cordless Telephones: If You Can't Say Something Nice, You Might Want to
Send a Letter, 32 CRIm. L. BULL. 403, 403 (1996).
602. For example, in Miami Shores, someone videotaped two police officers, one married,
"hugging and kissing." Too Close for Comfort-Kissing Cops Caught in the Act, ORLANDO SEN-
TINEL, Jan. 18, 1997, at D-3. The videotape became public in January 1997. Id.
1998]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The incoherence between constitutionally permissible searches, on
one hand, and limited electronic surveillance permitted by statute, on
the other hand, is one inconsistency to which the title of this Article
refers.60 3 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees against governmental physical intrusion, though not
against physical intrusion by a private individual; 60 4 federal and state
statutes and state constitutional provisions protect against private or
governmental interception of oral and wire communications.
The difference between the interception of conversations and ob-
taining other information under the Fourth Amendment is the role of
technology. Use of technology to intercept conversations is largely
prohibited, while the use of technology is permitted to obtain other
information. For example, binoculars and flashlights are simple con-
stitutionally permitted devices which enhance one's vision. Binoculars
allow someone to spy on another individual at a distance and flash-
lights allow observation of people and objects not otherwise visible at
night. Other constitutionally permitted devices include helicopters,
airplanes, pen registers, location beepers, and aerial photographic
cameras. The United States Supreme Court has held that, without a
search warrant, law enforcement agents may fly a helicopter or air-
plane over your home, 60 5 use a pen register to monitor the telephone
numbers you have called,60 6 monitor a beeper placed in your car,607
and photograph your business using high powered aerial photogra-
phy.608 In contrast, the Federal Act does not permit the use of induc-
tion coils, parabolic microphones, bugs, and ultrasonic wave devices to
intercept private conversations.
Wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes place a higher value on pri-
vacy than obtaining evidence. The statutes promote fairness because
there are no exceptions, as under the Fourth Amendment, except for
603. See Robert C. Power, Technology and the Fourth Amendment: A Proposed Formulation
for Visual Searches, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 20 (1989); Kent Greenfield, Comment,
Cameras in Teddy Bears: Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1045, 1046 (1991).
In addition, internal inconsistencies appear in many state statutes. Connecticut requires all-
party consent to intercept a "private telephonic conversation" but allows interception of an oral
communication upon one party consent. See Appendix C. In contrast, Oregon requires all-
party consent for an oral conversation but allows interception of a telephone conversation with
one-party consent. See Appendix C. The North Carolina statute prohibits wiretapping but has
no similar proscription for oral communication. See Appendix C.
604. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
605. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
606. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
607. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
608. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
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the use of informants. Perhaps the line drawn in Fourth Amendment
search and seizure cases should ideally coincide with the one drawn in
the eavesdropping statutes. Case law interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment will probably not change because of the distancing effect,
and the fact that the typical case in which the motion to suppress is
raised is one where the defendant is guilty of a serious crime. Eaves-
dropping statutes draw a more conservative line. Recent search and
seizure cases seem to sanction behavior which is very close to crossing
the line into engaging in practices abhorrent to a free society. Except
for all-party consent, the more favorable protection against electronic
surveillance provided under the eavesdropping statutes should be
preserved.
Another inconsistency is also irrational. This inconsistency is the
requirement of all-party consent in a dozen states and allowance of
electronic surveillance by one private party participant in the balance
of the states. The consent required to tape varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Traveling on the Interstate from Maine to Florida, one
would start in Maine (one-party consent), and travel through New
Hampshire and Massachusetts (two-party consent), Connecticut (one-
party consent for oral conversation and two-party consent for tele-
phone conversation), Rhode Island, New York, and New Jersey (one-
party consent), Delaware and Maryland (two-party consent), and Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina (one-party consent), to
Florida (two-party consent). Thus, from Maine to Florida there are at
least six major changes in eavesdropping law, which show how confus-
ing and complicated it is to keep eavesdropping requirements straight.
The present statutory protection against third-party monitoring and
taping should be preserved; however, the all-party consent require-
ment in a dozen states should be eliminated.
A final inconsistency is also irrational. This inconsistency is the use
of informants to conduct electronic surveillance without a threshold
level of proof as is required under the Fourth Amendment. In most
all-party consent states, the private party who tapes a conversation is
liable to be punished much more severely than a police officer or an
informant. A police officer is allowed to tape a conversation and to
have the conversation admitted into evidence if the police officer is a
party to the conversation or an informant-participant has consented to
the taping. In contrast, a private party is prohibited from taping with-
out all participants' consent, and a conversation taped with only one
party consent is inadmissible. This, in effect, sanctions the entrance of
big brother into the conversation, but allows someone taping a con-
versation for innocent reasons to be prosecuted for the taping. The
1998]
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most frequently given reasons for allowing law enforcement body
wires is officer or informant safety and obtaining evidence. Safety and
gathering evidence are not unique to the police officer or informant.
An additional reason for informant recording is to verify the inform-
ant's trustworthiness. Monitoring and taping through the use of police
officers and informants should not be allowed except upon some type
of prior review. The threshold should ideally be a court order. If that
threshold is unattainable, prior notification or authorization would
provide some protection.
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APPENDIX A
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE
STATUTES
Alabama
ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 5. Unreasonable search and seizure; search
warrants.
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-30 to 13A-11-37 (1996).
Alaska
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. Right of Privacy: "The right of the peo-
ple to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature
shall implement this section." Id.
ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.300-390 (Michie 1996).
Arizona
ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8. Right to privacy: "No person shall be dis-
turbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law." Id.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3004 to 13-3017 (1996).
Arkansas
ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 15. Unreasonable search and seizures.
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-60-120, 23-17-107 (Michie 1995).
California
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1. Inalienable rights: "All people are by nature
free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and pro-
tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and
privacy. Id.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-637.5 (West 1995).
Colorado
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7. Security of person and property-searches,
seizures, warrants.
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-15-101 to 16-15-104, 18-9-301 to 18-9-305
(1996).
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Connecticut
CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 7. Security from searches and seizures.
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-184a, 52-570d, 53a-187 to 53a-189, 54-41a to
54-41t (1995).
Delaware
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 6. Searches and seizures.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1335, 1336 (1996).
District of Columbia
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-541 to 23-556 (1996).
Florida
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. Searches and Seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against
the unreasonable interception of private communications by any
means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing
the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or
things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the
nature of the evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed
in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles
or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admis-
sible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissi-
ble under decisions of the United State Supreme Court construing
the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. Right of privacy: "Every natural person has
the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his
private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not
be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and
meetings as provided by law." Id.
FLA. STAT. ch. 934.01 to 934.10 (1995).
Georgia
GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, 13. Searches, seizures, and warrants.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-60 to 16-11-69 (Michie 1996).
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Hawaii
HAw. CONST. art. I, § 6. Right to Privacy: "The right of the people to
privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of
a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps
to implement this right." Id.
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7. Searches, Seizures and Invasion Of Privacy:
The right of the people be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of
privacy shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized or the communications sought to be intercepted.
Id.
HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 711-1111, 803-41 to 803-49 (1996).
Idaho
IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 17. Unreasonable searches and seizures
prohibited.
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6701 to 18-6709 (1996).
Illinois
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6. Searches, Seizures, Privacy and Interceptions:
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches,
seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by
eavesdropping devices or other means. No warrant shall issue with-
out probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12. Right to Remedy and Justice: "Every person
shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs
which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He
shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly." Id.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/14-1 to 5/14-9, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/
108A, 5/108B (West 1996).
Indiana
IND. CONST. art. 1, § 11. Unreasonable search or seizure.
IND. CODE §§ 35-33.5-4-1. to 35-33.5-5-6. (1996).
Iowa
IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 8. Personal security-search and seizures.
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IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 808B.l.-808B.8. (West 1995).
Kansas
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 15. Search and seizure.
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4001 to 21-4002, 22-2514 to 22-2519 (1995).
Kentucky
Ky. CONST. Bill of Rights § 10. Security from search and seizure-
Conditions of issuance of warrant.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.010-526.080 (Banks-Baldwin 1996).
Louisiana
LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5. Right to Privacy
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communica-
tions, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches,
seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, the persons or things to be
seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person
adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of
this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropri-
ate court.
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1302 to 15:1312 (West 1995).
Maine
ME. CONST. art. 1, § 5. Unreasonable searches prohibited.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 709-13, tit. 17-A, § 511 (West 1996).
Maryland
MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights art. 26. Warrants.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-401 to 10-414 (1996).
Massachusetts
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. xiv. Freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures; warrants.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (1996).
Michigan
MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 11. Searches and seizures.
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.539a-750.539i (1996).
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Minnesota
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10. Unreasonable searches and seizures
prohibited.
MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.01-626A.25 (1996).
Mississippi
Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 23.
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-501 to 41-29-537 (1996).
Missouri
Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 15. Unreasonable search and seizure prohib-
ited-contents and basis of warrants.
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 542.400-542.422 (1996).
Montana
MONT. CONST. art. 1I, § 10. Right of Privacy: "The right of individual
privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be
infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (1995).
Nebraska
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 7. Search and seizure.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-701 to 86-707.02 (1995).
Nevada
NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 18. Unreasonable seizure and search; issuance
of warrants.
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 179.410 to 179.525, 200.610 to 200.690, 209.419,
704.195 (1995).
New Hampshire
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 19. Searches and Seizures Regulated.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A:1 to 570-A:11, 644:9 (1995).
New Jersey
N.J. CONST. art. 1, 7. Freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures; warrant.
N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-1 to 2A:156A-26 (West 1996).
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New Mexico
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10. Searches and seizures.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-12-1 to 30-12-11 (Michie 1996).
New York
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12. Securing against unreasonable searches,
seizures and interceptions:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable intercep-
tion of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be vio-
lated, and ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or
affirmation that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence
of crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the particular means
of communication, and particularly describing the person or persons
whose communications are to be intercepted and the purpose
thereof.
Id.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 710.10 (McKinney 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4506
(McKinney 1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 250.00-250.35 (McKinney
1996).
North Carolina
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20. General warrants.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-155 (1996).
North Dakota
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8.
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-15-02, 29-29.2-01 to 29-29.2-05 (1995).
Ohio
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14. Search warrants and general warrants.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.51-2933.66 (Anderson 1996).
Oklahoma
OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 30. Unreasonable searches or seizures-War-
rants, issuance of.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 176.1-176.14 (1996).
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Oregon
OR. CONST. art. I, § 9. Unreasonable searches and seizures.
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.721-133.739, 165.535-165.549 (1995).
Pennsylvania
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8. Security from searches and seizures.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5704-5728 (1996).
Rhode Island
R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 6. Search and seizure.
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-35-21 to 11-35-25, 12-5.1-1 to 12-5.1-16 (1995).
South Carolina
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10. Searches and seizures; invasions of privacy:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unrea-
sonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the person
or thing to be seized, and the information to be obtained.
Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-17-470 to 16-17-480 (Law. Co-op. 1995).
South Dakota
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 11. Search and seizure.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-35A-1 to 23A-35A-21 (Michie 1996).
Tennessee
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7. Unreasonable searches and seizures-Gen-
eral warrants.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-601 to 39-13-604 (1996).
Texas
TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 9. Searches and seizures.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (West 1995); TEX. CRIM. CODE ANN.
art. 18.20 (West 1995).
Utah
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 14. Unreasonable searches forbidden-Issu-
ance of warrant.
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UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-401 to 76-9-406, 77-23a-1 to 77-23a-12
(1996).
Vermont
VT. CONST., ch. I, art. 11. Search and seizure regulated.
No statute.
Virginia
VA. CONST. art. I, § 10. General warrants of search or seizure
prohibited.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-61 to 19.2-70 (Michie 1996).
Washington
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7. Invasion of Private Affairs or Home Pro-
hibited: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law." Id.
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.73.030-9.73.250 (1996).
West Virginia
W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 6. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Prohibited.
W. VA. CODE §§ 62-1D-1 to 62-1D-16 (1996).
Wisconsin
WiS. CONST. art. 1, § 11. Searches and seizures.
WIs. STAT. §§ 968.27-968.33 (1995).
Wyoming
WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 4. Security against search and seizure.
WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-3-601 to 7-3-611 (Michie 1996).
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Appendix C
Applicable Provisions of State Wiretapping and
Eavesdropping Statutes
California
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE sections 631, 632, 633, and 633.5 provide
in pertinent part:
§ 631(a) ... Any person who, by means of any machine, instru-
ment, or contrivance, or in any other manner, intentionally taps,
or makes any unauthorized connection, whether physically, elec-
trically, acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with any telegraph
or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument, including the wire,
line, cable, or instrument of any internal telephonic communica-
tion system, or who willfully and without the consent of all par-
ties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner, reads,
or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any
message, report, or communication while at the same is in transit
or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or
received at any place within this state; or who uses, or attempts to
use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in any
way, any information so obtained, or who aids, agrees with, em-
ploys, or conspires with any person or persons to unlawfully do,
or permit, or cause to be done any of the acts of things men-
tioned above in this section, is punishable by a fine not exceeding
two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or by imprisonment
in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment in
the state prison, or by both a fine and imprisonment in the
county jail or in the state prison.
§ 632(a) . . . Every person who, intentionally and without the
consent of all parties to a confidential communication, by means
of any electronic amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops
upon or records the confidential communication, whether the
communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of
one another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or other de-
vice, except a radio, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or imprisonment in
the county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment in the
state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment.
§ 633 ... Nothing in Section 631, 632... prohibits the Attorney
General, any district attorney, or any assistant, deputy, or investi-
gator of the Attorney General or any district attorney, any of-
ficer of the California Highway Patrol, any chief of police,
assistant chief of police, or police officer of a city and county, any
sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff regularly employed and
paid in that capacity by a county, or any person acting pursuant
to the direction of one of these officers acting within the scope of
his or her authority, from overhearing or recording any commu-
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nication that they could lawfully overhear or record prior to the
effective date of this chapter.
§ 633.5 ... Section 631, 632... prohibits one party to a confiden-
tial communication from recording the communication for the
purpose of obtaining evidence reasonably believed to relate to
the commission by another party to the communication of the
crime of extortion, kidnaping, bribery, any felony involving vio-
lence against the person, or a violation of Section 653m.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631, 632, 633, 633.5 (West 1995).
Connecticut
CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES ANNOTATED section 52-570d
provides in pertinent part:
(a) No person shall use any instrument, device or equipment to
record an oral private telephonic communication unless the use
of such instrument, device or equipment (1) is preceded by con-
sent of all parties to the communication and such prior consent
either is obtained in writing or is part of, and obtained at the start
of, the recording, or (2) is preceded by verbal notification which
is recorded at the beginning and is part of the communication by
the recording party, or (3) is accompanied by an automatic tone
warning device which automatically produces a distinct signal
that is repeated at intervals of approximately fifteen seconds dur-
ing the communication while such instrument, device or equip-
ment is in use.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply
to: (1) Any federal, state or local criminal law enforcement offi-
cial who in the lawful performance of his duties records tele-
phonic communications; (2) Any officer, employee or agent of a
public or private safety agency, as defined in section 28-25, who
in the lawful performance of his duties records telephonic com-
munications of an emergency nature; (3) Any person who, as the
recipient of a telephonic communication which conveys threats of
extortion, bodily harm or other unlawful requests or demands,
records such telephonic communication.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-570d (West 1995).
Delaware
DELAWARE CODE ANNOTATED title 11, section 1336 provides in
pertinent part:
(b) (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section or
otherwise by law, any person who: (i) Wilfully intercepts, endeav-
ors to intercept or procures any other person to intercept or en-
deavor to intercept any wire or oral communication; or (ii)
wilfully discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the
contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived
therefrom, knowing or having reason to know that the informa-
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tion was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral com-
munication in violation of this section; or (iii) wilfully uses or
endeavors to use the contents of any wire or oral communication,
or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to
know that the information was obtained through the interception
of a wire or oral communication in violation of this section; shall
be guilty of a class G felony.
(c) It shall not be unlawful under this section for: ... (2) A per-
son acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral commu-
nication, where such person is a party to the communication or 1
of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception, unless such communication is intercepted for
the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of this
State or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1996).
Florida
FLORIDA STATUTE chapter 934.03 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any
person who (a) Intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept,
or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to inter-
cept any wire, oral, or electronic communication; (b) Intention-
ally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use
or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to
intercept any oral communication when: 1. Such device is affixed
to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other
like connection used in wire communication; or 2. Such device
transmits communications by radio or interferes with the trans-
mission of such communication; (c) Intentionally discloses, or en-
deavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire,
oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to
know that the information was obtained through the interception
of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this.
subsection; or (d) Intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing
or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communi-
cation in violation of this subsection; shall be punished as pro-
vided in subsection (4).
(2)... (c) It is lawful under §§ 934.03-934.09 for an investigative
or law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction
of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire,
oral, or electronic communication when such person is a party to
the communication or one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of
such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act. (d) It is
lawful under §§934.03-934.09 for a person to intercept a wire,
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oral, or electronic communication when all of the parties to the
communication have given prior consent to such interception. (e)
It is unlawful to intercept any communication for the purpose of
committing any criminal act.
FLA. STAT. ch. 934.03 (1995).
Illinois
720 ILLINOIS COMPILED STATUTES sections 5/14-2 and 5/14-3 pro-
vide in pertinent part:
Sec. 5/14-2 . . . A person commits eavesdropping when he: (a)
Uses an eavesdropping device to hear or record all or any part of
any conversation unless he does so (1) with the consent of all of
the parties to such conversation ....
Sec. 5/14-3 ... The following activities shall be exempt from the
provisions of this Article: (g) With prior notification to the
State's Attorney of the county in which it is to occur, recording
or listening with the aid of any device to any conversation where
a law enforcement officer, or any person acting at the direction of
law enforcement, is a party to the conversation and has con-
sented to it being intercepted or recorded under circumstances
where the use of the device is necessary for the protection of the
law enforcement officer or any person acting at the direction of
law enforcement, in the course of an investigation of a forcible
felony, a felony violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances
Act, a felony violation of the Cannabis Control Act, or any
"streetgang related" or "gang-related" felony as those terms are
defined in the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention
Act. Any recording or evidence derived as the result of this ex-
emption shall be inadmissible in any proceeding, criminal, civil or
administrative, except (i) where a party to the conversation suf-
fers great bodily injury or is killed during such conversation, or
(ii) when used as direct impeachment of a witness concerning
matters contained in the interception or recording. The Director
of the Department of State Police shall issue regulations as are
necessary concerning the use of devices, retention of tape record-
ings, and reports regarding their use. (i) Recording of a conversa-
tion made by or at the request of a person, not a law enforcement
officer or agent of a law enforcement officer, who is a party tothe
conversation, under reasonable suspicion that another party to
the conversation is committing, is about to commit, or has com-
mitted a criminal offense against the person or a member of his
or her immediate household, and there is reason to believe that
evidence of the criminal offense may be obtained by the
recording.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/14-2, 5/14-3 (1996).
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Maryland
MARYLAND CODE ANNOTATED, COURTS & JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
section 10-402 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Unlawful acts. - Except as otherwise specifically provided in
this subtitle it is unlawful for any person to: (1) Wilfully inter-
cept, endeavor to intercept, or procure any other person to inter-
cept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication; (2) Wilfully disclose, or endeavor to disclose, to
any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the in-
formation was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral,
or electronic communication in violation of this subtitle; or (3)
Wilfully use, or endeavor to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know
that the information was obtained through the interception of a
wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this
subtitle.
(b) Penalty. - Any person who violates subsection (a) of this
section is guilty of a felony and is subject to imprisonment for not
more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
(c) Lawful acts . .... (2) It is lawful under this subtitle for an
investigative or law enforcement officer acting in a criminal in-
vestigation or any other person acting at the prior direction and
under the supervision of an investigative or law enforcement of-
ficer to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication in or-
der to provide evidence of the commission of the offenses of
murder, kidnaping, rape, a sexual offense in the first or second
degree, child abuse, gambling, robbery, any felony punishable
under the "Arson and Burning" subheading of Article 27, brib-
ery, extortion, or dealing in controlled dangerous substances, in-
cluding violations of Article 27, § 286B or § 287A, fraudulent
insurance acts, as defined in Article 48A, § 233 or any conspiracy
or solicitation to commit any of these offenses, or where any per-
son has created a barricade situation and probable cause exists
for the investigative or law enforcement officer to believe a hos-
tage or hostages may be involved, where the person is a party to
the communication or one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to the interception. (3) It is lawful under
this subtitle for a person to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where the person is a party to the communica-
tion and where all of the parties to the communication have
given prior consent to the interception unless the communication
is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tor-
tious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States or of this State. (4) It is lawful under this subtitle for a law
enforcement officer in the course of the officer's regular duty to
intercept an oral communication, if: (i) The law enforcement of-
ficer initially detained a vehicle for a traffic violation; (ii) The law
enforcement officer is a party to the oral communication; (iii)
1998]
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The law enforcement officer has been identified as a law enforce-
ment officer to the other parties to the oral communication prior
to any interception; (iv) The law enforcement officer informs all
other parties to the communication of the interception at the be-
ginning of the communication; and (v) The oral interception is
being made as part of a video tape recording. (5) It is lawful
under this subtitle for an officer, employee, or agent of a govern-
mental emergency communications center to intercept a wire,
oral, or electronic communication where the officer, agent or em-
ployee is a party to a conversation concerning an emergency. (6)
(i) It is lawful under this subtitle for law enforcement personnel
to
utilize body wires to intercept oral communications in the course
of a criminal investigation if there is reasonable cause to believe
that a law enforcement officer's safety may be in jeopardy. (ii)
Communications intercepted under this paragraph may not be
recorded, and may not be used against the defendant in a crimi-
nal proceeding.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (1996).
Massachusetts
MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS chapter 272, section 99 provides
in pertinent part:
B. Definitions. As used in this section-.... 4. The term 'inter-
ception' means to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to
secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any intercepting device by any
person other than a person given prior authority by all parties to
such communication; provided that it shall not constitute an in-
terception for an investigative or law enforcement officer, as de-
fined in this section, to record or transmit a wire or oral
communication if the officer is a party to such communication or
has been given prior authorization to record or transmit the com-
munication by such a party and if recorded or transmitted in the
course of an investigation of a designated offense as defined
herein.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (1996).
Michigan
MICHIGAN COMPILED LAWS sections 750.539a, 750.539c, 750.539g
provide in pertinent part:
Sec. 539a ... As used in sections 539a to 539i :... (2) "Eaves-
drop" or "eavesdropping" means to overhear, record, amplify or
transmit any part of the private discourse of others without the
permission of all persons engaged in the discourse. Neither this
definition or any other provision of this act shall modify or affect
any law or regulation concerning interception, divulgence or re-
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cording of messages transmitted by communications common
carriers....
Sec. 539c. Any person who is present or who is not present dur-
ing a private conversation and who wilfully uses any device to
eavesdrop upon the conversation without the consent of all par-
ties thereto, or who knowingly aids, employs or procures another
person to do the same in violation of this section, is guilty of a
felony punishable by imprisonment in a state prison for not more
than 2 years or by a fine of not more than $ 2,000.00, or both....
Sec. 539g. Sections 539a to 539f do not prohibit any of the fol-
lowing: (a) Eavesdropping or surveillance not otherwise prohib-
ited by law by a peace officer of this state or of the federal
government, or the officer's agent, while in the performance of
the officer's duties ....
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539a, 750.539c, 750.539g (1996).
Montana
MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED section 45-8-213 provides in perti-
nent part:
(1) Except as provided in 69-6-104, a person commits the offense
of violating privacy in communications if he knowingly or pur-
posely: .... ( c ) records or causes to be recorded any conversa-
tion by use of a hidden electronic or mechanical device which
reproduces a human conversation without the knowledge of all
parties to the conversation. Subsection (c) does not apply to duly
elected or appointed public officials or employees when the tran-
scription or recording is done in the performance of official duty,
to persons speaking at public meetings, or to persons given warn-
ing of the recording...
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (1997).
New Hampshire
NEW HAMPSHIRE REVISED STATUTES ANNOTATED section 570-A:2
provides in pertinent part:
I. A person is guilty of a class B felony if, except as otherwise
specifically provided in this chapter or without the consent of all
parties to the communication, he: (a) Wilfully intercepts, endeav-
ors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or en-
deavor to intercept, any wire or oral communication; (b) Wilfully
uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use of
endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to
intercept any oral communication .... (c) Wilfully discloses, or
endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any
wire or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know
that the information was obtained through the interception of a
wire or oral communication in violation of this paragraph ....
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II. It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for: ... (c) Any law
enforcement officer, when conducting investigations of or mak-
ing arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, to carry with
him on his person an electronic, mechanical or other device
which intercepts oral communications and transmits such com-
munications by radio. (d) An investigative or law enforcement
officer in the ordinary course of his duties pertaining to the con-
ducting of investigations of organized crime, offenses enumer-
ated in this chapter, solid waste violations under RSA 149-M:10,
I and I-a, or harassing or obscene telephone calls to intercept a
telecommunication or oral communication, when such person is a
party to the communication or one of the parties to the commu-
nication has given prior consent to such interception; provided,
however, that no such interception shall be made unless the at-
torney general, the deputy attorney general, or an assistant attor-
ney general designated by the attorney general determines that
there exists a reasonable suspicion that evidence of criminal con-
duct will be derived from such interception .... (g) any law en-
forcement officer, when conducting investigations of or making
arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, to carry with him
on his person an electronic, mechanical or other device which
intercepts oral communications and transmits such communica-
tions by radio. ...
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (1995).
Oregon
OREGON REVISED STATUTES section 165.540 provides in pertinent
part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 133.724 or subsections
(2) to (7) of this section, no person shall: (a) Obtain or attempt to
obtain the whole or any part of a telecommunication or a radio
communication to which such person is not a participant, by
means of any device, contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether
electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, unless consent is
given by at least one participant. (b) Tamper with the wires, con-
nections, boxes, fuses, circuits, lines or any other equipment or
facilities of a telecommunication or radio communication com-
pany over which messages are transmitted, with the intent to ob-
tain unlawfully the contents of a telecommunication or radio
communication to which such person is not a participant. ( c )
Obtain or attempt to obtain the whole or any part of a conversa-
tion by means of any device, contrivance, machine or apparatus,
whether electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, if all partici-
pants in the conversation are not specifically informed that their
conversation is being obtained. (d) Obtain the whole or any part
of a conversation, telecommunication or radio communication
from any person, while knowing or having good reason to believe
that such conversation, telecommunication or radio communica-
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tion was initially obtained in a manner prohibited by this section.
(e) Use or attempt to use, or divulge to others any conversation,
telecommunication or radio communication obtained by any
means prohibited by this section....
(3) The prohibitions in subsection (1)(a), (b) or ( c ) of this sec-
tion shall not apply to subscribers or members of their family
who perform the acts prohibited in subsection (1) of this section
in their homes....
(5)(a) The prohibitions in subsection (1)(c) of this section do not
apply: ... (B) When a law enforcement officer obtains a conver-
sation between the officer, or someone under the direct supervi-
sion of the officer, and a person who the officer has probable
cause to believe has committed, is engaged in committing or is
about to commit a crime punishable as a felony under ORS
475.992 or 475.995 or the circumstances at the time the conversa-
tion is obtained are of such exigency that it would be unreasona-
ble to obtain the court order under ORS 133.726, providing the
person who obtains or records the conversation does not inten-
tionally fail to record and preserve the conversation in its
entirety...
(6) The provisions in subsection (1)(c) of this section do not ap-
ply to a person who records a conversation during a felony that
endangers human life.
OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540 (1995).
Pennsylvania
PENNSYLVANIA CONSOLIDATED STATUTES title 18, sections 5703-
5704 provide in pertinent part:
§ 5703 ... Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person
is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he: (1) intentionally
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person
to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, electronic or oral
communication; (2) intentionally discloses or endeavors to dis-
close to any other person the contents of any wire, electronic or
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or
having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communica-
tion; or (3) intentionally uses or endeavors to use the contents of
any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived
therefrom, knowing or having reason to know, that the informa-
tion was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic
or oral communication.
§ 5704... It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for: ... (2)
Any investigative or law enforcement officer or any person act-
ing at the direction or request of an investigative or law enforce-
ment officer to intercept a wire, electronic or oral
communication involving suspected criminal activities where: (i)
such officer or person is a party to the communication; (ii) one of
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the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception. However, no interception under this paragraph
shall be made unless the Attorney General or a deputy attorney
general designated in writing by the Attorney General, or the
district attorney, or an assistant district attorney designated in
writing by the district attorney, of the county wherein the inter-
ception is to be made, has reviewed the facts and is satisfied that
the consent is voluntary and has given prior approval for the in-
terception; however such interception shall be subject to the re-
cording and record keeping requirements of section 5714(a)
(relating to recording of intercepted communications) and that
the Attorney General, deputy attorney general, district attorney
or assistant district attorney authorizing the interception shall be
the custodian of recorded evidence obtained therefrom.... (4) A
person, to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication,
where all parties to the communication have given prior consent
to such interception .... (12) Any investigative or law enforce-
ment officer or any person acting at the direction or request of an
investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or
oral communication involving suspected criminal activities where
the officer or the person is a party to the communication and
there is reasonable cause to believe that: (i) the other party to the
communication is either: (A) holding a hostage; or (B) has barri-
caded himself and taken a position of confinement to avoid ap-
prehension; and (ii) that party: (A) will resist with the use of
weapons; or (B) is threatening suicide or harm to others.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5703-5704 (1996).
Washington
REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON sections 9.73.030, 9.73.110,
9.73.210, and 9.73.230 provide in pertinent part:
§ 9.73.030...
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it shall be un-
lawful for any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or the state of Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions
to intercept, or record any: (a) Private communication transmit-
ted by telephone, telegraph, radio, or other device between two
or more individuals between points within or without the state by
any device electronic or otherwise designed to record and/or
transmit said communication regardless how such device is pow-
ered or actuated, without first obtaining the consent of all the
participants in the communication; (b) Private conversation, by
any device electronic or otherwise designed to record or transmit
such conversation regardless how the device is powered or actu-
ated without first obtaining the consent of all the persons en-
gaged in the conversation.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, wire communi-
cations or conversations (a) of an emergency nature, such as the
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reporting of a fire, medical emergency, crime, or disaster, or (b)
which convey threats of extortion, blackmail, bodily harm, or
other unlawful requests or demands, or (c) which occur anony-
mously or repeatedly or at an extremely inconvenient hour, or
(d) which relate to communications by a hostage holder or barri-
caded person as defined in RCW 70.85.100, whether or not con-
versation ensues, may be recorded with the consent of one party
to the conversation.
(3) Where consent by all parties is needed pursuant to this chap-
ter, consent shall be considered obtained whenever one party has
announced to all other parties engaged in the communication or
conversation, in any reasonably effective manner, that such com-
munication or conversation is about to be recorded or transmit-
ted: Provided, That if the conversation is to be recorded that said
announcement shall also be recorded.
(4) An employee of any regularly published newspaper, maga-
zine, wire service, radio station, or television station acting in the
course of bona fide news gathering duties on a full time or con-
tractual or part time basis, shall be deemed to have consent to
record and divulge communications or conversations otherwise
prohibited by this chapter if the consent is expressly given or if
the recording or transmitting device is readily apparent or obvi-
ous to the speakers. Withdrawal of the consent after the commu-
nication has been made shall not prohibit any such employee of a
newspaper, magazine, wire service, or radio or television station
from divulging the communication or conversation.
§ 9.73.110 ...
It shall not be unlawful for the owner or person entitled to use
and possession of a building, as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(5), or
the agent of such person, to intercept, record, or disclose commu-
nications or conversations which occur within such building if the
persons engaged in such communication or conversation are en-
gaged in a criminal act at the time of such communication or con-
versation by virtue of unlawful entry or remaining unlawfully in
such building.
§ 9.73.210...
(1) If a police commander or officer above the rank of first line
supervisor has reasonable suspicion that the safety of the con-
senting party is in danger, law enforcement personnel may, for
the sole purpose of protecting the safety of the consenting party,
intercept, transmit, or record a private conversation or communi-
cation concerning the unlawful manufacture, delivery, sale, or
possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, controlled
substances as defined in chapter 69.50 RCW, or legend drugs as
defined in chapter 69.41 RCW, or imitation controlled substances
as defined in chapter 69.52 RCW.
(2) Before any interception, transmission, or recording of a pri-
vate conversation or communication pursuant to this section, the
police commander or officer making the determination required
by subsection (1) of this section shall complete a written authori-
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zation which shall include (a) the date and time the authorization
is given; (b) the persons, including the consenting party, expected
to participate in the conversation or communication, to the ex-
tent known; ( c ) the expected date, location, and approximate
time of the conversation or communication; and (d) the reasons
for believing the consenting party's safety will be in danger.
§ 9.73.230...
(1) As part of a bona fide criminal investigation, the chief law
enforcement officer of a law enforcement agency or his or her
designee above the rank of first line supervisor may authorize the
interception, transmission, or recording of a conversation or com-
munication by officers under the following circumstances: (a) At
least one party to the conversation or communication has con-
sented to the interception, transmission, or recording; (b) Prob-
able cause exists to believe that the conversation or
communication involves the unlawful manufacture, delivery, sale,
or possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, con-
trolled substances as defined in chapter 69.50 RCW, or legend
drugs as defined in chapter 69.41 RCW, or imitation controlled
substances as defined in chapter 69.52 RCW; and (c) A written
report has been completed as required by subsection (2) of this
section.
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.73.030, 9.73.110, 9.73.210, 9.73.230 (1996).
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